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Abstract 
The Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) implicates social anxiety and reasoning 
biases in the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions.  Computerised packages, 
such as Cognitive Bias Modification for Interpretation (CBM-I) have been shown to improve 
social anxiety in psychosis (Turner et al., 2011).  Similarly, the Maudsley Review Training 
Programme (MRTP) has improved reasoning biases associated with delusions (Waller et al., 
2011).  This study examined the use of both of these treatment packages in people with 
persecutory delusions.  It was hypothesised that CBM-I would reduce social anxiety, but not 
reasoning biases and that the MRTP would reduce reasoning biases, but not social anxiety.  It 
was also hypothesised that both packages would reduce paranoia.  A single case series design 
with twelve participants from Early Intervention and Recovery services in Norfolk was used.  
Measures of social anxiety, paranoia and reasoning biases were taken during baseline, 
package and one-month follow up.  Data were analysed according to Kazdin’s (2010) criteria 
and were inspected for clinical and reliable change.  Complimentary analyses were also 
performed using Simulation Modeling Analysis (Borckardt, 2006) and inferential statistics.  
Results indicated mixed support for the first hypothesis and moderate support for all other 
study hypotheses.  Paranoia reduced in line with reductions in social anxiety and/or reasoning 
biases in eight cases.  In two cases, no improvement in social anxiety or reasoning biases 
corresponded with lack of improvement in paranoia.  The remaining two cases contradicted 
any relationship between improved social anxiety, reasoning biases and paranoia.  These 
findings support the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007), suggesting that social 
anxiety and reasoning biases are distinct mechanisms in the formation of paranoia that have 
unique aetiology and treatment responses.  Computerised therapy may help people who are 
unwilling to engage with services and reduce cost of provision. 
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Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
 This thesis will focus on investigating whether Cognitive Bias Modification for 
Interpretation (CBM-I) and the Maudsley Review Training Programme (MRTP) affect social 
anxiety and reasoning biases in a differential manner within a sample of individuals with 
persecutory delusions.  This chapter will begin with a brief introduction to psychosis and the 
potential advantages of targeting single symptoms in psychosis.  A psychological 
understanding of persecutory delusions will be described using three influential models, each 
of which will be briefly evaluated.  The literature regarding cognitive behavioural treatments 
for persecutory delusions will be reviewed.  Finally, the rationale for this thesis will be 
outlined. 
1.2 Introduction to psychosis and focus on persecutory delusions 
 Psychosis is an umbrella term for various clinical presentations, mainly characterised 
by distorted thinking and perception.  Psychosis comprises positive symptoms, such as 
hallucinations and delusions, and negative symptoms, e.g., anhedonia and alogia (ICD-10, 
WHO, 2010).  This thesis will focus specifically on persecutory delusions, defined as firmly 
held threat beliefs that other people, groups or entities are deliberately causing psychological 
or physical harm, which are unfounded, resistant to change, preoccupying and distressing to 
the individual concerned (Freeman, 2007). 
1.3 Definition and prevalence of persecutory delusions 
 Freeman and Garety (2000) proposed criteria which focus more on the form of the 
delusion, rather than specific themes.  The criteria are: (a) belief that harm is presently being 
inflicted upon the individual, or that harm is imminent, and (b) belief that the persecutor has 
the intention to inflict harm on the individual.  These criteria will be adopted for the purpose 
of the current study.  What constitutes harm is also clarified: any harm – whether 
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psychological (e.g., irritation or humiliation) or physical (e.g., poisoning or cutting out parts 
of organs) – should be considered persecutory in nature.  Only beliefs about harm being 
inflicted are considered persecutory; thereby addressing the potential over inclusiveness of 
ideas of reference (e.g., government agencies monitoring phone calls, but without any 
intention to cause distress), as well as of persecution in research samples.   
After ideas of reference, delusions of persecution are the second most common 
symptom encountered in psychosis (Andreasen et al. 1991; Freeman, 2007).  In a study of 
1,136 acutely hospitalised patients, 4.4% experienced at least one persecutory delusion, 
which represented 78.4% of the 328 people in that sample with a delusion (Appelbaum, 
Robbins & Roth, 1999).  Sartorius et al. (1986) found that almost 50% of their international 
sample of individuals with signs of schizophrenia (N=1379) experienced persecutory 
delusions.  Persecutory delusions can also be found among individuals with various 
diagnoses other than schizophrenia; 44% of a sample of 136 people with unipolar depressive 
psychosis experienced persecutory delusions (Frangos, Athanassenas, Tsitourides, 
Psilolignos & Katsanou, 1983).  They are also prevalent in bipolar disorder, with one review 
estimating a frequency of 28% in the manic phase (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990). 
The majority of current studies that have examined efficacy of cognitive therapies 
have done so using samples comprising a range of differing psychotic experiences, or 
delusions of varying subtypes (e.g., Freeman et al., 1998).  Although useful, multi-symptom 
research does little to identify specific mechanisms of change or improvement because the 
symptom profiles of the psychoses are heterogeneous (Garety et al., 2008).  It may be a 
reason why effect sizes of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) for psychosis are estimated at 
small to moderate (Wykes, Steel, Everitt & Tarrier, 2008; Jauhar, McKenna, Radua, Fung, 
Salvador & Laws, 2014).  As a result, there has been a move towards a single-symptom 
approach to both research and clinical work (Garety et al., 2008), which should improve 
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clarity of what is being examined, increase confidence in the evidence, and enhance 
understanding of the specific components of therapy which are most effective.   
Having explored the merits of clearly defining persecutory delusions, and single-
symptom research in psychosis, the next section will examine cognitive models of threat 
beliefs.  This thesis will focus on the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007), which will 
inform the research questions and hypotheses. 
1.4 Cognitive models of persecutory delusions 
There are many cognitive models of persecutory delusions to explain their onset and 
maintenance.  Most of them fall into two different perspectives; the first approaches 
persecutory delusions from the writings of Maher (1974), which are characterised by 
experiences that drive a search for meaning by the individual.   The second perspective stems 
from motivational theory.   
1.4.1 The Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, 
Bebbington, 2002; Freeman, 2007).  The Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) 
proposes that persecutory delusions arise due to an interaction between vulnerability and 
stress (Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman, 2007).  Figure 1.1 outlines the Threat Anticipation 
Model (Freeman, 2007) of persecutory delusions.  Persecutory ideation arises due to attempts 
to make sense out of internal or external experiences that are unusual, anomalous, or 
emotionally salient.  Three pathways to formation and maintenance of persecutory beliefs are 
postulated: anomalous experiences, emotional processes and reasoning biases.   
1.4.1.1 Affective processes – depression and negative schematic beliefs.  Depression 
is known to be highly prevalent among people with psychosis (Buckley, Miller, Lehrer & 
Castle, 2009).  However, cross-sectional data put depression at the core of persecutory 
delusions also; Freeman, Garety and Kuipers (2001) found that 80% of their sample of people 
with persecutory delusions also presented with significant severity levels of depression, with 
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a mean Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) score of 23.  The role of depression is implicated in 
the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007), but not in the same way as anxiety.  First, 
the relationship between depression and paranoia is less clear (Freeman, 2007).  Second, 
depression is considered to be influential in the development of specific themes of 
persecutory ideation, as well as having a causal role in onset and maintenance.   
In summary, depression does seem to be an important component of persecutory 
ideation.  Recent studies indicate that there may be processes similar to both depression and 
persecutory ideation or paranoia (Freeman, 2007).  This is important to bear in mind when 
formulating and developing treatments for persecutory delusions which present with 
depression.  Having briefly discussed the importance of depression, the next section will 
consider the role of anxiety in persecutory ideation.   
1.4.1.2 Emotional processes – anxiety.  Differing forms of anxiety (such as social 
anxiety, state anxiety, or worry of an interpersonal nature) are argued to be central in the 
formation and maintenance of persecutory beliefs.  This is because the psychological 
processes underlying persecutory and anxious thoughts are both concerned with the 
anticipation of physical, social or psychological harm (Freeman et al., 2002).  Anxiety may 
therefore breed paranoid thinking, which in turn plays a part in the formation and 
maintenance of persecutory ideation (Freeman, 2007).  Social anxiety itself is defined as a 
fear of being negatively judged or scrutinised by others (Colman, 2006), which conceptually 
overlaps with clinical phenomena such as interpersonal sensitivities, worry and paranoia.  
The model hypothesises that the experience of social anxiety in itself is misinterpreted by the 
individual as objective evidence of threat.  Similar to how avoidance and biased 
interpretation of social information drives and maintains social anxiety (Clark & Beck, 2010), 
avoidance and biased interpretation of social information maintain threat beliefs because they 
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makes the individual’s social world more constricted, limiting the amount and diversity of 
potentially disconfirming information.   
Research indicates that anxiety is strongly associated with paranoia and with 
persecutory delusions (e.g., Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup, Freeman & Garety, 2007).  
Empirical evidence has indicated a causal and maintaining role for social anxiety in an urban 
setting in persecutory delusions (e.g., Ellett, Freeman & Garety, 2008).  Attempts to identify 
differential cognitive and behavioural responses among individuals with persecutory 
delusions and individuals with social phobia were not found, suggesting overlap between the 
clinical phenomena (e.g., Newman-Taylor & Stopa, 2013).  The authors note that individuals 
with persecutory delusions may present with cognitive and behavioural responses 
characteristic of social phobia, which lends further support to the idea of a hierarchy of 
paranoia (Freeman et al., 2005a) that first builds upon social evaluative concerns.   
Large longitudinal cohort studies (e.g., Schutters et al., 2012), show that social 
anxiety cognitions predict later onset of paranoid symptoms.  Research has found anxiety and 
interpersonal sensitivity to be significant predictor variables of unfounded persecutory 
thinking (e.g. Freeman et al., 2003, 2005b).  Furthermore, differential predictor variables of 
social anxiety and paranoia were examined.  The key variable that increased the risk for 
paranoia rather than social anxiety was presence of perceptual anomalies (Freeman, 2008).  
This means that emotional disturbance can lead to social anxiety, but the presence of 
anomalous experiences – experiences unique to psychosis – makes paranoia more likely.  The 
following section will discuss the second focus of this study – reasoning biases. 
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Figure 1.1 the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) 
1.4.1.3 Reasoning biases.  Although Maher (1974) argued that cognitive processes of people 
with delusions are the same as those from non-clinical populations, authors of the Threat 
Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) propose that delusions are formed and maintained by 
reasoning biases, unique to individuals with psychosis (e.g., Freeman et al., 2007; Garety et 
al., 2005).  These biases lead the individual to selectively gather and attend to confirmatory 
evidence and reject evidence that is contrary to the belief.  Probabilistic reasoning has been 
more extensively studied with respect to delusions (Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991; So, 
Garety, Peters & Kapur, 2010).  To test reasoning according to Bayesian probability, a 
content-neutral beads task was developed, which is described in detail in Section 2.2.3.5 
(Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991; Garety et al., 2005).  Briefly, the participant is presented 
with two jars, each filled with 100 beads of two different colours.  The proportions of the 
colours in each jar are usually either 85:15 (for the easier task) or 60:40 (for the hard task).  
The participant is presented with one bead at a time from a randomly selected jar and is asked 
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to decide from which jar the beads have come.  If a participant has decided which jar it is 
after two or fewer beads, then they have made a hasty decision, according to Bayesian 
probability (Garety et al., 1991).  The tendency to make hasty decisions based on insufficient 
evidence (e.g., to decide which jar the beads were drawn from after seeing two or less beads) 
has been termed the jumping to conclusions (JTC) reasoning bias.  Freeman (2007) reviewed 
the literature and found that in the ten such studies published at the time, all ten showed 
significantly hastier data gathering within the delusions groups, compared with non-clinical 
controls.  JTC may also be related to strength of belief conviction (Garety et al., 2005).  
Data on the relationship between JTC and persecutory delusions is less clear.  
However, several studies have found significant JTC biases in persecutory delusions samples, 
compared with matched non-clinical controls (Conway et al., 2002; Startup, 2004; Startup, 
Freeman & Garety, 2008), indicating that JTC may also be implicated in this particular 
clinical group. 
Other types of reasoning biases proposed within the model include lack of belief 
flexibility, which is an inability to reflect on and alter one’s own beliefs through the iterative 
process of generating and considering alternative explanations.  This style of reasoning has 
been quantified in three different ways; (1) asking the participant if there is any possibility 
that they could be mistaken about their belief and noting their response; (2) presenting the 
individual with a hypothetical scenario that contradicts their belief, and recording their 
responses to it; and (3) asking the participant to consider any other possible alternative 
explanations for their experiences that have led them to form their belief, even if they think 
they are unlikely.  The measures used for these biases include the Possibility of Being 
Mistaken (PM) and Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction (RTHC) components of the 
Maudsley Assessment of Delusions (MADS; Wessely et al., 1993).  The third construct is 
measured from the Explanations of Experiences assessment (Freeman et al., 2004).  Belief 
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inflexibility, measured by these three constructs, has been found to be significantly elevated 
in samples of individuals with delusions and has been associated with increased delusional 
conviction (Garety et al., 2005; Freeman et al., 2004; So et al., 2012).  The relationship 
between belief inflexibility and persecutory delusions is unclear at present. However, it 
seems likely that belief inflexibility is associated with persecutory delusions, given the fact 
that in one large study (So et al., 2012), 57.5% of a sample of 273 individuals with delusions 
reported persecutory delusions in particular, and belief inflexibility was found to be 
significantly inversely correlated with level of conviction of the overall sample.   
1.4.1.4 Anomalous experiences.  Anomalous experiences are explained as a 
dysfunction in cognitive processes that situate and disambiguate internal perceptual processes 
as originating from and remaining within the individual’s mind.  In other words, anomalous 
experiences occur from inner-outer confusion (Fowler, 2000; Frith, 1992).  Using the 
example of auditory hallucinations, thoughts that originate from the mind of the individual 
are experienced as auditory perceptions that seem external.  Passivity phenomena, ideas of 
reference and other psychotic experiences may also be explained by inner-outer confusion.   
Some empirical findings support the above hypotheses (e.g., Green & Kinsbourne, 
1990) however; a detailed review is beyond the scope of this section.  Data linking 
anomalous experiences to persecutory delusions specifically is limited, due to methodological 
problems (Freeman, 2007).  Anomalous experiences have been shown to differentially 
predict paranoia and not social anxiety (Freeman et al., 2005b).  Data on delusions in general 
indicate onset of beliefs due to anomalous experiences such as hallucinations (e.g., Garety & 
Hemsley, 1994).  Compton, Potts, Wan & Ionescu (2012) examined the temporal relationship 
between delusions and hallucinations in first episode psychosis. They divided their sample 
into four groups; (1) delusions only (n = 29, 18.2%), (2) delusions present at least one month 
before hallucinations (n = 31, 19.5%), (3) hallucinations present at least one month before 
  9
delusions (n = 26, 16.4%) and (4) delusions and hallucinations that emerged within the same 
month (n = 73, 45.9%).  Only a very small proportion of the sample experienced 
hallucinations without delusions.  The delusions only group also consistently exhibited less 
positive symptom severity and impairment.   
1.4.1.5 Summary of the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007).  According to 
the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007), persecutory delusions arise due to the 
interaction between anomalous experiences, emotional disturbance and reasoning biases.  
Some data suggest the possibility of a differential aetiology of persecutory delusions as 
compared to other types of delusion. For example, Garety et al. (2013) found that negative 
self-evaluation, depression and anxiety predicted a significantly increased chance of 
persecutory delusions, whereas grandiose delusions were predicted by lower levels of all 
three variables.  Grandiosity was also significantly better predicted by higher levels of 
positive self and positive other evaluations.  Although JTC and belief inflexibility were 
elevated in both groups, both styles of reasoning were significantly more pronounced in the 
group with grandiose delusions.  These findings support the processes implicated in the 
Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007).   
Mechanisms within the model include the role of depression, negative schematic 
beliefs, and anomalous experiences, but this study will focus on social anxiety and reasoning 
biases specifically.  Similar experimental manipulations of anxiety within non-clinical groups 
have also found support for the model.  Lincoln, Lange, Burau, Exner, and Moritz (2009) 
used a sample of 90 non-clinical participants who were randomly allocated to an anxiety-
inducing manipulation, or control task.  They found that paranoia and JTC were elevated 
within the anxiety provoking condition, that higher baseline vulnerability to psychosis 
predicted a more paranoid reaction to the anxiety provoking condition, and that the 
relationship between anxiety and paranoia was mediated by the JTC reasoning bias. 
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In conclusion, research is now focusing on detailed aetiological processes of 
persecutory ideation.  Initial data support the mechanisms postulated within the Threat 
Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007).   
1.4.2 Cognitive models based on motivational theory.  Alternative models such as 
the attributional bias and defence of self-esteem model of persecutory delusions (Bentall, 
1994; Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Kinderman & Bentall, 1997a) and Trower and 
Chadwick’s (1995) model of paranoia have also been developed.  The attributional bias 
model (Bentall, 1994) suggests that persecutory delusions are a defence of self esteem, 
therefore it is hypothesised that people with persecutory delusions display an externalising 
bias, compared with non-clinical controls.  Freeman (2007) conducted a review of the 
relevant studies at the time and reported that three of the studies support this claim (Fear, 
Sharp & Healy, 1996; Krstev, Jackson & Maude, 1999; Lyon, Kaney & Bentall, 1994), while 
two studies do not (Kinderman, Kaney, Morley & Bentall, 1992; Martin & Penn, 2002).  One 
possible reason for these mixed findings is difference in methodology across studies; 
including a mixture of between-group and within group cross-sectional designs, populations 
that were poorly defined (e.g., the sample reported by Krstev et al., 1999, comprised first 
episode psychosis with no operational criteria for any type of delusion), as well as variation 
in sample size.  Treatment identified from Bentall’s (1994) cognitive model involves specific 
forms of attribution therapy.  Although external attribution bias for negative events is a 
potentially important theoretical and clinical hypothesis, it differs from the Threat 
Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) by not being given a central role in the formation and 
maintenance of persecutory ideation, rather as a dimensional feature of it (Freeman, 2007). 
Trower and Chadwick’s (1995) model of persecutory delusions suggests that paranoia 
may be broadly categorised into two different types; ‘Bad Me’ paranoia, where the content of 
the delusion implicates some deserved punishment of the individual and ‘Poor Me,’ paranoia, 
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which implicates persecution that is not warranted.  Clinical aspects focus on addressing 
depressive beliefs in therapy, prior to paranoid beliefs, for those who present with ‘Bad Me’ 
paranoia.  They assert that people with ‘Bad Me’ paranoia will benefit from therapy due to 
alleviation of negative beliefs about the self.  Conversely, individuals who present with ‘Poor 
Me’ paranoia will be more difficult to engage, due to higher levels of narcissism and 
grandiosity, and will be more resistant to accepting help.   
However, there have been few studies to test these hypotheses.  One study 
investigated the clinical characteristics of a sample of 53 individuals sub classified into ‘Poor 
Me,’ ‘Bad Me,’ or neither category, finding that the ‘Bad Me’ group had lower self-esteem, 
more negative self-evaluative beliefs, lower negative evaluative beliefs about others and 
higher depression and  anxiety (Chadwick, Trower, Juusti-Butler & Maguire, 2005).  These 
findings may indicate that there are two distinct types of paranoia.  Further research into 
possible typologies of paranoia could prove clinically and theoretically useful.   
The second line of evidence that Trower and Chadwick (1995) cited originates from a 
cognitive model of auditory hallucinations (Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994) and the 
attributions given to them based on dimensions such as power, identity and purpose.  
However, this may not be a valid way of conceptualising persecutory delusions since the 
phenomenology of auditory hallucinations may not be directly the same as that of persecutory 
ideation. 
Although potentially useful, these models are mentioned here for context because 
they do suggest some interesting theoretical and clinical hypotheses, and there is some 
evidence for them.  Neither of these models identifies anxiety or reasoning biases as 
significant mechanisms in the formation and maintenance of paranoia, therefore, this thesis 
will focus on the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007). 
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1.5 Summary and conclusion 
In conclusion, clarity on the definition of persecutory delusions as well as their 
theoretical basis is essential for research and clinical practice to make advances.  As 
discussed above, psychological models of persecutory beliefs have been developed to 
identify treatment targets and test these empirically.  Prominent treatment targets suggested 
from the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman et al., 2002; Freeman, 2007) are interpersonal-
related anxiety and reasoning biases.  These models of persecutory beliefs have opened up 
further research avenues with which treatments can be developed and evaluated.  However, 
due to such attempts being made only relatively recently, it would be useful to investigate if 
cognitive packages targeted specifically at persecutory delusions are effective, and if so, if 
any common treatment approaches or targets can be identified as being most effective.  The 
next section will give a systematic review of the literature focusing on this issue. 
1.6 Systematic review of the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapies in treating 
persecutory delusions 
1.6.1 Overview.  This section gives a systematic review of the literature to evaluate 
the efficacy of cognitive behavioural therapy for persecutory delusions.   The review will 
consider the methodological profile of relevant studies.  It will highlight the need to replicate 
findings of key studies and to determine specific mechanisms of change, as well as common 
elements or therapeutic targets that work best.  The research and clinical implications of this 
will be discussed, with an emphasis on further developing the field. 
1.6.2 Search strategy.  A literature search was performed separately on the Embase, 
Medline and PsycINFO databases on 6th May 2014.  Although the review focuses on 
persecutory delusions within the context of psychosis, earlier searches incorporating different 
terms relating to psychosis (e.g.,  schizophren* OR psychosis OR schizoaffective...etc.) failed 
to detect key papers (e.g., Foster, Startup, Potts & Freeman, 2010).  Therefore, the search 
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used two groups of terms; one group of terms for various cognitive behavioural therapies and 
the other a group of differing terms relating to persecutory delusions.  Search terms were 
nested together, rather than entered as phrases, which maximised sensitivity.  The following 
terms were used: (cognitive AND behavio* AND therapy) OR CBT OR (cognitive AND 
therapy) OR (metacognitive AND therapy) OR (metacognitive AND training) OR (reasoning 
AND training) OR (cognitive AND bias AND modification) OR (acceptance AND 
commitment AND therapy) OR (dialectic AND behavio* AND therapy) OR (DBT) OR 
(dialectical AND behavio* AND therapy) AND (persecut* AND delusion*) OR persecut* 
OR (paranoi* AND delusion*) OR paranoi*.  Titles, abstracts and occasionally methodology 
sections were scrutinised manually to reveal CBT based packages that specifically reported 
persecutory delusions.  As evident from the search parameters, various CBT based packages 
were searched for, including 2nd and 3rd wave therapies.  The ancestry method was also used 
to identify studies the initial search missed. 
1.6.3 Inclusion criteria.  A priori limits were set to human studies, published in the 
English language.  Peer reviewed journals were not set as search parameters prior to the 
search, but non peer-reviewed articles were excluded during manual screening.  No other 
parameters were set.  The search revealed 509 results on Embase, 154 on Medline and 315 on 
PsycINFO.  Studies were only selected on the basis of persecutory delusions being reported 
in the title or abstract.  Studies reporting paranoid delusions alone were further scrutinised to 
determine suitability for inclusion.  This is because paranoid delusions and persecutory 
delusions are often referred to interchangeably in the literature (Key et al., 2003).  This may 
result in studies that purport to examine one specific element of psychotic experience actually 
including varying types, such as delusions of reference as well as persecutory delusions, in 
their respective samples.  In some cases, it was not clear if the delusion could be classified as 
paranoid or persecutory.  In keeping with Freeman and Garety’s (2000) criteria of (a) harm 
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occurring, or will be occurring to the individual in question, and (b) a persecutor having 
intention to inflict harm, some studies were omitted, (e.g., Serruya & Grant, 2009; Key et al., 
2003).  This is because some of the delusional themes were of being under surveillance, with 
no actual harm – psychological or physical – intended (or none reported).   
One study reported a randomised controlled trial of paranoia-focused CBT for a 
sample of individuals with persecutory delusions (Landa et al., 2012), but was excluded 
because only conference proceedings were published and no written material other than the 
abstract was available.  During various searches for more material, a previous abstract that 
briefly described the RCT was discovered (Landa et al., 2011), so this was included.  
Attempts to contact the authors to determine if more information was published were 
unsuccessful.  All duplicates were excluded in the initial screening phase.  In total, 14 studies 
were selected from Embase, one from PsycINFO, one from Medline, and one as described 
above.  A review of the studies’ reference lists revealed one further study (Kuipers et al., 
1998).  Although this was not an RCT specifically targeting persecutory delusions, it is the 
first RCT of CBT to specifically report persecutory delusions, and so effects of CBT can be 
examined.  This study was included in a selective review of CBT for persecutory delusions 
(Garety, Bentall & Freeman, 2008).  Three studies were then excluded from the full-text 
articles assessed for eligibility, as described above (Landa et al., 2012; Serruya & Grant, 
2009; Key et al., 2003).  Figure 1.2 below provides a PRISMA diagram (Moher et al., 2009) 
indicating how the literature was selected.  Table 1.1 below presents the selected studies in 
chronological order. 
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Figure 1.2 PRISMA diagram of systematic literature 
review
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Table 1.1 
Studies reporting on the efficacy of differing cognitive behavioural therapies for persecutory delusions, displayed in chronological order. 
Author Study 
design 
N/ 
Sex 
Mean 
age 
(SD) 
Diagnosis Delusion 
description(s) 
Therapy – 
no of 
sessions 
Outcome measures Outcomes 
(1st baseline - last follow up, 
or mean change, if 
applicable) 
Chadwick 
and Trower 
(1995) 
Multiple-
baseline 
single 
case  
1 M 31 Schizophrenia (a) Being punished by 
members of the public 
(b) Being physically 
punished by God for 
blasphemy 
12 sessions 
Cognitive 
Therapy 
1. BDI 
2. Idiographic 
conviction % rating 
of belief (a) 
3. Idiographic 
conviction % rating 
of belief (b) 
1. BDI: 24 – 9 
2. Conviction in belief a: 
100% - 5% 
 
3. Conviction in belief b: 
40% - 0%  
 
Kinderman 
and Bentall 
(1997b) 
Case 
report 
1 M 33 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
Conspiracy to pressure 
him into joining a drug 
cartel 
21 sessions 
Attribution 
Therapy 
1. BDI 
2. Idiographic 
paranoid anxiety, 
depression and self-
esteem ratings (/10) 
3. FPS 
4. IPSAQ  
1. BDI: 30 – 8  
2. Paranoid anxiety: 7/10 – 
1/10, depression† 
 self-esteem† 
3. FPS: 78 – 40 
4. IPSAQ +5 - +2 
  
Kuipers et 
al. (1997) 
RCT 38 M 
22 F 
40 
Range: 
18-65 
Psychosis Various persecutory 
delusions 
Mean of 19 
sessions 
CBT for 
psychosis 
1. BPRS 
2. MADS:  
conviction and 
distress 
3. BDI 
4. BAI 
1. BPRS: reduction** 
2. non-significant reduction 
in conviction and distress 
3. BDI: non-sig.  difference 
4. BAI: non-sig.  difference 
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Table 1.1 (continued) 
Author Study 
design 
N/ 
Sex 
Mean 
age 
(SD) 
Diagnosis Delusion 
description(s) 
Therapy – 
no of 
sessions 
Outcome measures Outcomes 
(1st baseline- last follow up, 
or mean change, if 
applicable) 
Morrison 
2004 
Case 
Study 
1 M 30 Delusional 
disorder 
Being under 
surveillance by a group 
who wished him harm 
12 sessions 
Imagery-
based CBT 
PSYRATS 
Delusions:  
1.  Conviction  
2.  Preoccupation 
3. Distress  
PSYRATS Delusions:  
1.Conviction: 100% - 0% 
2.Preoccupation: 75% - 0% 
3.Distress 75% - 0% 
Pinninti and 
Datto (2006) 
Case 
report 
1 F 80 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
Being poisoned by the 
blood tests required for 
clozapine monitoring 
† sessions 
CBT 
Medication 
adherence 
Initial withdrawal of 
clozapine due to refusal of 
blood draws – Acceptance of 
blood draws and clozapine 
adherence. 
Hagen and 
Nordahl 
(2008) 
Case 
study 
1 M 25 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
Being tortured by 
members of the anti-
narcotic squad through 
radio beams 
42 sessions 
Behavioural 
experiments 
Idiographic ratings 
of: 
1. Anxiety (/8) 
2. Depression (/8) 
3. Conviction (/8) 
 
1. Anxiety: 8/8 – 0/8 
2. Depression 8/8 – 0/8 
3. Conviction 8/8 – 0/8 
Foster, 
Startup, 
Potts and 
Freeman 
(2010) 
RCT 14 M 
10 F 
CBT: 
40 (10) 
TAU: 
39.1 
(9.2)  
Schizophrenia, 
schizoaffective 
disorder, 
delusional 
disorder 
Various persecutory 
delusions according to 
Freeman and Garety’s 
(2000) criteria 
4 sessions 
CBT worry 
intervention 
1. PSWQ 
2. PSYRATS-B: 
frequency / duration 
3. PSYRATS-B: 
distress 
4. GPTS 
1. Reduction in PSWQ* 
2. Non-significant reduction 
in PSYRATS 
frequency/duration 
3. Reduction in distress* 
4.Non-significant reduction 
in GPTS 
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Table 1.1 (continued) 
Author Study 
design 
N/ 
Sex 
Mean 
age 
(SD) 
Diagnosis Delusion 
description(s) 
Therapy – 
no of 
sessions 
Outcome measures Outcomes 
(1st baseline- last follow up, 
or mean change, if 
applicable) 
Kuller and 
Bjorgvinsson 
(2010) 
Case 
Study 
1 M 33 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
Being under 
surveillance by the 
mafia, who intend to 
kill him. 
30 sessions 
CBT 
Idiographic measures 
of 
1. Conviction (/100) 
2. Preoccupatiom 
(/100) 
 
1. Conviction: 98 – 20 
2. Preoccupation: 90 – 5 
Hatzipetrou 
and Tian Po 
Oei (2010) 
Case 
study 
1 M 53 Paranoid 
schizophrenia 
No description reported 11 sessions 
CBT 
1. DASS: 
Depression,  
2. DASS: Anxiety  
3. DASS: Stress 
4. BDI-II 
5. BAI 
1. DASS Depression: 25 – 18 
2. DASS Anxiety: 25 – 20 
3. DASS Stress: 28 – 21  
4. BDI-II: 36 – 24 
5. BAI: 33 – 22 
Coentre and 
Power 
(2011) 
Case 
report 
1 F 32 Psychosis, 
PTSD 
Men in white are 
following her and are 
coming to get her 
† sessions 
CBT 
Self-report 
qualitative 
descriptions of 
symptoms 
Psychotic symptoms 
resolved, according to self-
report and clinician opinion. 
Myers, 
Startup and 
Freeman 
(2011) 
Pilot 
Trial 
9 F 
6 M 
45.5 
(11.3) 
Insomnia and 
Schizophrenia, 
psychosis, 
schizoaffective 
disorder, or 
delusional 
disorder 
Various persecutory 
delusions according to 
Freeman and Garety’s 
(2000) criteria 
4 sessions 
CBT-I 
1. ISI 
2. PSQ 
3. GPTS 
4. PSYRATS-B 
5. DASS Anxiety 
6. DASS Depression 
7. CAPS 
1. ISI reduced** 
2. PSQ reduced** 
3. GPTS reduced** 
4. PSYRATS reduced** 
5. DASS Anxiety: reduced** 
6. DASS Depression: 
reduced** 
7. CAPS reduced* 
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Table 1.1 (continued) 
Author Study 
design 
N/ 
Sex 
Mean 
age 
(SD) 
Diagnosis Delusion 
description(s) 
Therapy – 
no of 
sessions 
Outcome measures Outcomes 
(1st baseline- last follow up, 
or mean change, if 
applicable) 
Bloy, Oliver 
and Morris 
(2011) 
Case 
study 
1 M 32 Psychosis Others are plotting and 
conspiring against him 
27 sessions 
of ACT 
1. CORE-OM 
2. PSYRATS-B 
3. CES-D 
4. HoNOS 
1. CORE-OM: 0.88 - 0.68 
2. PSYRATS-B: 8 – 7 
3. CES-D: 30 – 22  
4. HoNOS: 19 – 2 
Landa et al. 
(2011) 
RCT 24  Range: 
18-65 
DSM-IV 
Schizophrenia 
or Schizo -
affective 
disorder 
Persecutory delusions: 
specifics not reported 
30 sessions 
Group and 
Individual  
P-CBT 
1. Persecution 
Severity Score on 
PANSS 
2. Cognitive Biases, 
specific measure not 
reported 
1. Significant  reduction in 
Persecution Severity† 
2. Reduction in cognitive 
biases† 
 
Hepworth, 
Startup and 
Freeman 
(2011) 
ABA 
baseline 
case 
series 
8 M 
4 F 
40.3 
(11.9) 
Schizophrenia 
or delusional 
disorder 
Persecutory delusions 
according to Freeman 
& Garety’s (2000) 
criteria 
3 sessions 
EPMA 
1. PSYRATS-B 
2. DASS: Anxiety 
3. DASS: Depression 
4. PSWQ 
5.RSQ 
1. PSYRATS-B reduction** 
2. DASS: Anxiety reduction 
3. DASS: Depression* 
4. PSWQ: reduction* 
5.RSQ: reduction 
Ellett 
(2013) 
Case 
series 
2 M 34, 49 Delusional 
disorder 
Persecutory delusions 
according to Freeman 
& Garety’s (2000) 
criteria 
6 sessions 
mindfulness 
1. Conviction 
2. Distress 
3. Impact 
4. Preoccupation 
5. SMQ 
6. HADS 
Reduction in all ratings of 
psychopathology and 
increase in mindfulness 
ratings.  Positive behaviour 
change also. 
Note – standard deviations of mean ages are presented in parentheses.  † = missing/unreported data.  BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; Beck and Steer 
(1987).  FPS = Fenigstein and Vanable’s Paranoia Scale (1992).  IPSAQ = Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire; Kinderman and 
Bentall (1996).  BPRS = Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale; Overall and Gorham (1962).  MADS = Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Scale; Buchanan, 
Reed & Wessley (1993).  BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer (1988).  PSYRATS-B = Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scales, 
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Delusions Subscale; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier and Faragher (1999).  PSWQ = Penn State Worry Questionnaire; Meyer, Miller, Metzger and 
Borkovec (1990).  GPTS = Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales; Green et al. (2008).  DASS42 = Depression, Anxiety and Stress Scales; Lovibond and 
Lovibond (1995).  BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory – 2nd Edition; Beck, Steer & Brown (1996).  PTSD = post-traumatic stress disorder.  CBT-I = 
CBT for Insomnia.  ISI = Insomnia Severity Index; Bastien, Vallieres & Morin (2001).  PSQ = Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index; Buysse, Reynolds, 
Monk, Berman & Kupferet (1988).  CAPS = Cardiff Anomalous Perception Scale; Bell, Halligan & Ellis (2006).  ACT = Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy.  CORE-OM = Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation – Outcome Measure; Evans et al. (2000).  CES-D = Center for Epidemiologic Studies 
– Depression Scale; Ross and Mirowski (1983).  HoNOS = Health of the Nation Outcome Scales; Wing et al. (1998).  P-CBT = Paranoia-Focused CBT.  
PANSS = Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; Kay, Fiszbein & Opler (1987).  EPMA = Emotional Processing and Metacognitive Awareness.  RSQ 
= Response Style Questionnaire; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow (1991).  SMQ = Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire; Chadwick et al. (2008).  * p ≤ 
.05.  ** p ≤ .01. 
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1.6.4 Evaluation of case studies.  Chadwick and Trower (1995) described Bill, with 
whom they used cognitive therapy, to target both of his persecutory beliefs sequentially.  
Using a multiple-baseline design made the results more reliable than single case studies, as it 
established that observed change could be attributed with more confidence to the treatment, 
rather than extraneous influences.  The idiographic conviction rating in belief (a) was stable 
throughout baseline and intervention phase until session 5, when it fell from approximately 
95% to 50%.  Conviction in belief (b) was more erratic, but indicated a decline overall.  Use 
of follow up assessments at one, two and three months further strengthened the study.  
However, presenting an isolated case contributes little to the evidence base (Kazdin, 2010).  It 
is interesting that depression, not anxiety, was assessed – according to the Threat Anticipation 
Model (Freeman, 2007), there may have been a very important treatment target that was 
missed.   
Kinderman and Bentall (1997) presented BI, with whom they used attribution therapy, 
in order to allow BI to re-attribute negative life experiences to situational causes rather than 
persecutory delusions.  As described in table 1, they took multiple observations of idiographic 
measures of paranoid anxiety, low mood and self-esteem over two therapy phases, before and 
after introducing instructions to practice alternative situational explanations for ambiguous 
events.  As well as a visual graph, they also conducted one-way ANOVA indicating 
significant declines in paranoid anxiety (F (1, 47) = 24.08, p <.0005), low mood (F (1, 47) = 
10.11, p <.005) and poor self-esteem (F (1, 47) = 12.04, p <.005).  Improvements on paranoid 
anxiety were maintained at one - five month follow up.  A lack of multiple baseline 
assessments confused the differential effects of the two different therapies (Kazdin, 2010).   
Morrison (2004) reported Joe, with whom CBT with imagery was used.  Although use 
of standardised assessment tools (PSYRATS) could be considered more robust than 
idiographic measures, there was no extended baseline period.  Also, the study could have 
benefitted from more controlled applications of verbal, imaginal and behavioural intervention 
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strategies (Barker, Pistrang & Elliott, 2011).  Table 1 indicates improvement in delusional 
conviction, preoccupation and distress. 
Pinninti and Datto (2006) briefly described a case where CBT was used to assist with 
Clozapine monitoring.  The individual rapidly developed delusions of being poisoned by the 
blood tests necessary to continue Clozapine therapy and withdrew from treatment.  CBT was 
initiated and focused on this delusion.  Following improvement, Clozapine was re-instated 
and maintained.  Other than medication compliance, no other measures were reported in this 
letter to the editor, making further interpretation of the efficacy of CBT in this case 
impossible. 
Hagen and Nordahl (2008) presented Tony, who was treated with 42 sessions of 
behavioural experiments.  A rich account of the various behavioural experiments was given.  
All measures were idiographic and no stable baseline of difficulties was established (Kazdin, 
2010).  Although all domains improved, follow up was only a week following the therapy, 
which cannot determine longer term gains. 
Kuller and Bjorgvinsson (2010) reported on Michael, treated with CBT.  A detailed 
history and case conceptualisation is given, e.g., after 10 sessions, Michael was able to trust 
his wife again, and moved back home with his family.  This can be useful information from a 
clinical perspective.  However, no extended baseline assessment was conducted, weakening 
the methodology (Kazdin, 2010).  There was also no official follow-up. 
Hatzipetrou and Tian Po Oei (2010) described 11 sessions of CBT with MH, who 
experienced persecutory delusions and visual and auditory hallucinations.  Although 
improvements were documented, no elements specifically related to delusions were assessed, 
e.g., conviction, etc.  The authors did not include a description of the belief, and the therapy 
focused more on hallucinations.  Lack of extended baseline or follow-up also weakened their 
methodology (Kazdin, 2010). 
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Coentre and Power (2011) presented a case of psychosis and PTSD, treated with an 
unknown number of CBT sessions.  Although clear persecutory ideation was described, no 
standardised measures were reported, leaving only clinician opinion, which reported 
psychotic symptoms being ‘resolved,’ and persistent PTSD symptoms.  This article was much 
more focused on the challenges of diagnosis rather than the efficacy of CBT.  This was more 
of a clinical case presentation rather than a piece of research with methodological rigour. 
Bloy et al. (2011) reported on Brian, who believed that he was being filmed by the 
secret service and was the subject of a malevolent conspiracy.  He was treated with 27 
sessions of ACT, which, although a 3rd wave CBT therapy, is quite different in its underlying 
approach.  As with other studies, a rich account of Brian’s history and comprehensive case 
conceptualisation was given.  As indicated in Table 1, Brian improved on all outcomes, and 
these measures were appropriate for delusional experiences.  One strength of this study was 
calculation of reliable change indexes.  Interestingly, all outcomes except for the PSYRATS B 
demonstrated reliable reduction.  These outcomes fit well with the ACT model, as symptom 
reduction is not the aim: increasing ability to cope with and limiting distress resulting from 
symptoms is the focus.  A 6 month follow-up was conducted, but outcome measures were not 
taken.  HoNOS ratings were performed by independent evaluators, which is another 
advantage. 
Ellett (2013) described two participants who undertook mindfulness exercises for 
persecutory beliefs.  Description of the beliefs allowed clear comparison with Freeman and 
Garety’s (2000) criteria.  This study was succinctly reported, but contained all of the 
information needed to evaluate its strength.  Therapy followed previously published guidance, 
increasing uniformity of delivery.  Although outcomes were independently verified, clinical 
supervision of therapy delivery would have increased the study’s merit (Barker et al., 2011).  
The design addressed the research question well but a longer baseline was needed to establish 
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whether symptoms were on a natural path to recovery or not – Kazdin (2010) suggests a 
minimum of five observations.    
1.6.5 Evaluation of group Studies.  The RCT conducted by Kuipers et al. (1997), 
although not designed specifically for persecutory delusions, still comprises one of the best 
sources of evidence of the efficacy of CBT.  Randomisation to treatment and control 
conditions limited bias and also provided fair basis for comparison.  Although a CONSORT 
diagram (Altman et al., 2001) was not given, a full account of the recruitment and selection 
process was provided, increasing confidence in the sampling methods used.  Power 
calculations indicated their sample size was such that inferences could be made about the 
population from which the sample was derived.  Although assessors were not blinded to 
condition (a common difficulty in psychology research), all assessments were carried out by 
independent researchers.  Peer and therapy supervision was also reported, along with efforts 
to maintain uniform provision of therapy - manualised therapy facilitated this (Fowler, Garety 
& Kuipers, 1995).  Detailed numbers of therapy sessions conducted with all clients was 
reported, which is an advantage.  Similarly, strategies to maximise engagement and minimise 
drop out were also outlined.  This controlled against participants being excluded from 
analyses due to insufficient engagement, which can be the result of more severe levels of 
distress or symptoms.  Maximising engagement strengthened the method as this more closely 
mirrored clinical practice. 
In terms of data analysis, missing data and data transformations were reported and 
appropriate.  Where participants were lost to second assessment, subsequent intention to treat 
analyses were conducted using the carry forward method to impute missing values.  This 
represents a particular strength, given that this RCT was one of the first of its kinds at the 
time.  Assessments were conducted at initial, three, six and nine month intervals, with a 
follow-up assessment at 18 months after entry.  The length of follow-up assessment was a 
further strength.  Use of two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with both explanatory 
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factors being treatment centre (London, Norwich or Cambridge) and treatment group (CBT 
vs.  TAU) was an appropriate way of analysing the data.  Number needed to treat analysis 
might have been another advantage, had it been employed (Barker et al., 2011). 
Measures were appropriate for the research questions concerned – in the case of this 
review, significant improvement in the BPRS suspiciousness item indicated improvement in 
persecutory ideation and ideas of reference.  Unusual thought content (delusional ideas) and 
hallucinations also significantly improved.  The change was greatest on these three variables, 
indicating that efficacy of CBT for persecutory and delusional ideation was effective.  No 
other clinical or occupational variable improved significantly (apart from total BPRS scores), 
including other individual BPRS items, such as delusional conviction and distress.  Even 
considering its modest efficacy and the fact that generic CBT for psychosis was used rather 
than specific interventions targeting persecutory ideation, this study still represents some of 
the most robust evidence for efficacy of CBT. 
Foster et al. (2010) reported on the first published RCT to specifically target 
persecutory delusions.  Increased theoretical understanding of formation and maintenance of 
persecutory ideation has led to identification of more specific putative causative processes, 
resulting in development of novel treatment targets; in this case interpersonal worry.  They 
were also interested in finding if changes in worry were related to changes in paranoia, as 
there are theoretical grounds for this.  Inclusion criteria were psychosis spectrum disorder and 
presence of persecutory ideation according to Freeman and Garety’s (2000) criteria, which 
increaseed confidence in the sampling methods used.  They also stipulated a clinically 
significant level of worry: 45+ on the PSWQ.   
A CONSORT diagram was provided, outlining the recruitment process and losses to 
follow-up, which further improved transparency and confidence in non-biased recruitment 
and data analysis.  Block randomisation to treatment and control conditions, performed by an 
independent researcher limited selection bias.  Both treatment and control conditions were 
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described, but manualising the worry intervention might have improved uniform delivery of 
therapy across all participants.  Therapy supervision was given to the author who delivered it.  
There was no monitoring of therapy adherence or competence however, which is a weakness.  
High levels of engagement with therapy were reported: all individuals completed all 4 
sessions. 
A priori power calculation indicated a sample size of 24 (12 in each arm) to achieve a 
clinically important effect size of 0.9 in the analysis of PSWQ scores, at 90% power and 5% 
(2-sided) significance.  Outcome measures in Table 1 are appropriate to the research question: 
delusional dimensions as well as paranoia, worry and persecutory ideation are all important 
variables.  The outcomes were modeled using multilevel linear regression as the data were 
longitudinal and this method is robust against missing data (Van Der Leeden, 1998). 
Kendall’s tau was calculated to investigate possible relationships between reduction in 
worry and reduction in persecutory thoughts.  This method is robust against outliers and ties 
in the data.  Adjusting for baseline differences indicated that W-CBT reduced worry by ten 
points at two month follow-up in comparison to TAU – a significant difference.  Similarly, 
PSYRATS delusional distress scores were reduced by 1.7 points in comparison to TAU at 
two month follow-up.  Reliable and/or clinical change were not reported, which may have 
benefitted the study (Kazdin, 2010), although given that the reliable change index calculated 
by others (e.g., Bole et al., 2011) for the PSYRATS-B subscale is 5.41, it is very unlikely that 
reliable change could be evidenced based on the reported data.  Finally, non-significant 
reductions in paranoia when compared to TAU were positively correlated with reductions in 
persecutory ideation, measured by the PSYRATS, at two month follow-up.   
Although a good pilot study, it would have been greatly improved if the sample size 
had been increased (Barker et al., 2011); this may have added increased power to detect 
significant changes in paranoia.  There were also differences between the groups, the 
intervention group initially having higher levels of worry and paranoia.  Another follow-up 
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after 2 months would have improved understanding of longer term therapeutic gains Kazdin, 
2010). 
Myers et al. (2011) reported a pilot trial of CBT-I for persecutory delusions, given that 
insomnia has been theoretically and empirically identified as a strong putative causal and 
maintaining factor for paranoia and persecutory ideation (Freeman, 2007).   Using an open, 
uncontrolled trial methodology was appropriate for pilot research, but ideally a small scale 
RCT would have increased confidence in the findings.  Power calculations identified a total of 
eleven participants needed to have 80% power to detect an effect size of 0.96 for a reduction 
in insomnia, using a single group t-test with a 0.5 two-sided significance level.  Fifteen 
individuals were recruited to allow for loss to follow-up.  A diagnosis of psychosis spectrum 
disorder and presence of persecutory delusions as defined by Freeman and Garety (2000) 
clarified the sample.  Flow-charting recruitment and selection improved transparency and 
limited selection bias.  The components of therapy were briefly discussed, but there was no 
treatment manual developed, and although the therapist was supervised, adherence and 
competence was not formally assessed.   
The design was amended after eight participants had been through the process.  An 
extra baseline assessment of all outcome measures was added one or two weeks before the 
pre-treatment assessment, to assess stability of symptoms.  This strengthened the 
methodology, indicating that the symptoms were not on a path of natural recovery.  In terms 
of data analysis, there were no missing data.  Changes in outcomes across time (pre and post-
treatment, one month follow-up) were assessed using repeated measures ANOVA, which is 
appropriate, although reporting properties of assumptions of the data would have increased 
confidence in the appropriateness of the analyses.  Pairwise comparisons identified 
differences in assessment times and effect sizes were calculated using Cohen’s d (Cohen, 
1988) – this multiple statistical testing is a disadvantage (Barker et al., 2011), although 
confidence was enhanced due to all measures showing similar changes.   
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As indicated in Table 1, all outcomes were significantly reduced at one month follow-
up.  Although delusional content was never targeted, improving sleep reduced persecutory 
ideation.  There were also moderate to large effect sizes for reduction of anxiety, depression 
and anomalous experiences.  This study represents a well designed and carried out pilot test, 
with some disadvantages, such as lack of control group and randomisation, short length of 
follow-up assessment, and small sample size (Barker et al., 2011). 
Landa et al. (2011) reported a small scale RCT of group P-CBT for 24 adults 
experiencing drug-refractory persecutory delusions.  Groups were randomised to P-CBT plus 
TAU, or TAU alone.  Therapy consisted of one group and one individual session weekly for 
15 weeks, participants were assessed by blind assessors at baseline, post-treatment and six 
month follow up.   Differential treatment effects were examined using linear mixed effects 
modeling, indicating significant reductions in PANSS Persecution Severity (main outcome).  
It is unclear as to whether these analysis methods were appropriate, as no other information 
was given, e.g., power calculations.  No other details of the study were reported in this 
abstract, and so judgments cannot be made as to how well it was carried out.  The study does 
provide preliminary efficacy of P-CBT for persecutory delusions. 
Hepworth et al. (2011) reported a case series using an ABA design.  Two baseline 
assessments were conducted, allowing comparison of baseline differences between both time 
points.  They report that symptoms were improving during the baseline period, which limits 
confidence in the findings (see table 1.1; Barker et al., 2011), but does improve transparency 
and methodology.  The intervention itself involved three sessions of writing about their 
experiences of persecutory beliefs in a narrative style, to promote access to the emotional 
experience.  Further verbal descriptions of the material were encouraged but in a reflective 
rather than evaluative manner, to promote exposure to anxiety and hence habituation.  
Following this, the narrative was broken down to identify thoughts, feelings, images and 
memories, to promote metacognitive awareness.  Participants were then encouraged to 
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observe the malleability of thoughts, to promote acceptance.  Finally, Gestalt and diffusion 
techniques were used where experiences were particularly powerful and distressing.   
This study has some limitations.  No CONSORT diagram was provided to show how 
participants were recruited (Altman et al., 2001).  No randomisation to treatment was 
conducted.  All assessments were carried out unblinded also (Barker et al., 2011).  As 
indicated in Table 1, paired t tests were conducted to determine symptomatic change.  
However, no formal power calculation was reported, and so it is unclear if a sample size of 12 
participants with repeated measures can provide enough data for adequately powered analysis 
(Field, 2005).  With this in mind, the authors report reliable change estimates for the 
PSYRATS-B, indicating that ten participants showed reliable improvement in total scores 
following the intervention phase, one showed no change, and one reported a reliable increase 
in delusion symptoms. 
1.6.6 Discussion.  Although the literature reviewed is varied and from different 
theoretical viewpoints, there is preliminary support that CBT based interventions are 
efficacious for persecutory delusions.  Before the theoretical and clinical implications of these 
studies are discussed, the overall limitations shall be briefly outlined. 
1.6.6.1 Methodological issues regarding the studies reviewed.  Single-case research 
has been shown to be useful for pilot testing of novel therapies and developing rich 
phenomenological accounts of how hypothesised mechanisms interact to drive intention, 
behaviour and belief systems (Kazdin, 2010).  It also provides insight into individual 
mechanisms of change, which may then be tested using group designs.  The single case design 
can also be used to identify gaps in research and refine clinical theories or models.  Although 
the case studies reported give rich accounts of the problems and how they were maintained 
and treated, their usefulness is limited.  They cannot make claims as to efficacy of a therapy 
using isolated or small sample designs – they can only test them out in a preliminary fashion 
(Kazdin, 2010).  Regarding multiple baseline single case series methodology, a convincing 
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demonstration of intervention efficacy requires change that does not occur across settings, 
behaviour or individuals until the intervention is introduced; change that does occur across 
outcomes simultaneously is therefore difficult to interpret from a research viewpoint, even if 
it may be desirable from a clinical perspective (Nock, Michel & Photos, 2007).  In terms of 
data analysis, there is ongoing debate as to the most appropriate method for analysing time-
series data; different authors promoting visual inspection (e.g., Kazdin, 2010) and inferential 
statistical testing (e.g., Zhan & Ottenbacher, 2001).  Both approaches suffer disadvantages: 
visual inspection has been criticised for being too subjective, with different analysts reaching 
different conclusions (Kazdin, 2010), whereas inferential statistics for small sample sizes are 
invalid because they are underpowered to detect real change. 
As indicated, evaluating the efficacy of CBT for persecutory delusions is majorly 
hampered by a lack of well-designed RCTs.  Given that persecutory delusions are such a 
common experience in psychosis, the various trials that have examined efficacy of CBT for 
psychosis would have encountered and treated many individuals with persecutory ideation.  
This is unfortunate; a lack of clarity in defining, identifying and reporting persecutory 
delusions in this research has led to heterogeneity of the research samples.  This hampers 
exact analysis of effects, leading to a situation where firm conclusions cannot yet be drawn.   
More recent efforts to gain clarity on the problem are proving beneficial, with some 
small trials reporting preliminary progress.  The quality of these trials is improving which 
increases confidence in their findings.  However, there are always improvements that can be 
made.  Longer follow-up assessment periods would inform length of therapeutic gains Barker 
et al., 2011).  Arguably, once of the most crucial reasons for a follow-up assessment is that 
CBT based interventions help clients to maintain their own therapeutic gains.  Evidence 
indicates that CBT for psychosis is superior for maintenance of gains when compared to other 
more general supportive work, e.g., befriending (Garety, Fowler & Kuipers, 2000). 
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Although very difficult to achieve and easily undone, blind assessment is possible and 
studies that successfully employ it are at an advantage, as unblinded assessment has been 
found to be a particular source of bias (Tarrier & Wykes, 2004).  Manualisation of therapy, 
clear reporting of supervision and formal assessment of quality and adherence will add further 
clarity as to what the ‘active ingredients’ of the therapy are.  This also promotes further 
development of treatments, to make them safer, more tolerable and effective. 
In summary, there are some key methodological strengths across the above sample of 
studies.  The variety of case studies provides a rich account of various therapeutic targets, 
according to presentation, which inform individual clinical work.  The above case studies also 
identify novel treatment targets and provide detailed information on individual mechanisms of 
change.  The small numbers of RCTs provide data on the effectiveness of specific forms of 
CBT for persecutory delusions that target specific areas of psychopathology, e.g., clinical 
levels of worry and insomnia.   
However, there are key methodological weaknesses in the above sample of studies 
also.  Many of the case studies did not employ baseline lengths of sufficient duration to 
establish stability of symptoms.  The group designs suffer from this limitation also; one 
measure of symptoms at one time-point does not facilitate group statistical comparison, which 
is important in determining whether or not significant symptomatic differences existed prior 
to package.  One study that did address this difficulty was that of Myers et al (2011). 
1.6.6.2 Theoretical and clinical implications.  Broadly speaking, the research to date 
supports the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007).  Specific mechanisms of formation 
and maintenance of persecutory ideation include anxiety, such as worry and disturbances in 
functioning, e.g., insomnia.  These have been used successfully as proxy therapeutic targets, 
which have had beneficial effects on persecutory delusions and paranoia.  Out of the 15 
studies reviewed, nine of them report variants of anxiety as specific therapeutic goals.  
Considering some studies came from differing theoretical viewpoints, as well as others not 
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reporting any specifics about therapeutic targets; this in itself can be considered to be good 
consensus that anxiety is an important mechanism of persecutory ideation. 
Some therapeutic components common to the studies include generic CBT principles, 
such as engagement, working collaboratively, normalisation, exploring meaning and 
appraisals of psychotic experiences, working with negative affect and relapse prevention.  
Another common theme was not directly challenging delusional content.  This seems to be an 
important consideration when working clinically: Brehm (1966) termed ‘psychological 
reactance’ the process whereby direct challenging of a delusional belief may only serve to 
further reinforce it.  Other common components included reviewing the evidence, practicing 
generating alternative explanations for experiences and reality-testing.  These techniques 
could be thought of as attempts to improve belief inflexibility, as described by the Threat 
Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007).  However, no studies to date have targeted specific 
reasoning biases, such as JTC, within the context of persecutory delusions.  Whether or not 
this will result in clinical improvement remains to be determined, however, future studies now 
have very specific targets with which to test out therapies to see if they have a positive 
impact. 
Finally, the studies also show the positive benefits of applying attribution theory to a 
clinical setting (e.g., Kinderman & Bentall, 1997b).  This suggests that the Threat 
Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) may benefit from also considering the process of 
misattributions in persecutory ideation. 
1.6.7 Conclusion.  In summary, although the quality of the evidence of CBT for 
persecutory delusions is improving, it is still premature to draw firm conclusions about 
efficacy.  However, some forms of CBT that focus on convergent therapeutic targets (e.g., 
anxiety) do seem to benefit individuals with persecutory delusions.  Clearer definition of the 
problem and consensus among researchers as to the definition will greatly assist a more 
uniform approach to sampling methods.  Structured, clearly specified interventions set at 
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theoretically and empirically identified treatment targets will bring clarity to mechanisms of 
change.  Single-case research that is designed well should provide rich information about 
potential benefits and pitfalls of these therapies.  Appropriately designed group research that 
is well powered to detect key processes of change will enable findings to be generalised to the 
population, and should help shape policy of care and treatment.   
When considered together, the main drawback from the above sample of studies is that 
there are not enough of them to give a clear indication as to the efficacy of any of the forms of 
CBT for persecutory delusions used.  There is a clear need for further research as outlined 
above before the question ‘are CBT interventions efficacious for persecutory delusions?’ can 
be answered one way or the other.   
1.7 Rationale for the current study 
 The Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) identifies specific treatment targets 
for persecutory delusions.  In particular, social anxiety or worry of an interpersonal nature, 
anomalous experiences, and reasoning biases are implicated in the formation and maintenance 
of paranoia and persecutory ideation.   
With this in mind, together with the recent empirical evidence discussed, treatments to 
reduce social anxiety are now indicated in the study of persecutory delusions.  To identify 
suitable treatments for social anxiety, the anxiety literature should be consulted.  If there are 
psychological mechanisms common to individuals with anxiety disorders as well as 
individuals with psychotic disorders, then treatments shown to be efficacious for one group 
may also be so for the other.  There is much evidence indicating that socially anxious 
individuals selectively attend more to socially threatening words in experimental situations 
using tasks such as the dot-probe task (e.g., Pishyar et al., 2004) and the stroop test (e.g., 
Matthews & MacLeod, 1985).  These studies indicate that socially anxious individuals 
demonstrate a negative attention bias, which is in keeping with the Threat Anticipation Model 
(Freeman, 2007) of persecutory ideation.  Studies also indicate that individuals with clinical 
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and non-clinical levels of social anxiety demonstrate a more negative interpretation bias when 
processing and interpreting ambiguous social information; i.e., they interpret ambiguous 
situations as negative and threatening (e.g., Stopa & Clarke, 2000; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000).  This bias would seem to have particular clinical relevance for individuals with social 
anxiety as well as paranoia, given the overlap between the two, since most social situations 
are ambiguous and are therefore open to interpretation. 
1.7.1 Targeting social anxiety: cognitive bias modification for interpretation 
(CBM-I).  Building on these findings, recent research has focused on whether or not these 
interpretative biases can be modified to help the individual process social information in a less 
negative and threatening way.  One treatment is known as Cognitive Bias Modification for 
interpretation (CBM-I; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  This is based on the premise that 
repeatedly exposing the individual to socially ambiguous stimuli and then promoting positive 
and non-threatening interpretation of that information will modify the pre-existing negative 
interpretation bias towards a more positive one.  This is usually done through text-based 
computer training programmes that deliver repeated scenarios in specific ways.  How CBM-I 
is conducted will be described in further detail in section 2.3.1 below.   
Many previous studies have shown a relationship between negative interpretation bias 
and varying levels of severity of anxiety, ranging from non-clinical high trait anxiety (e.g., 
MacLeod & Cohen, 1993) to clinical levels of social anxiety (e.g., Mobini, Reynolds & 
Mackintosh, 2013).  A recent meta-analysis of studies using CBM-I within clinical and non-
clinical samples indicates small but significant effect sizes on anxiety in both post-test (g = 
0.13, 95% CI = [0.05, 0.22]) and stressor (g = 0.28, 95% CI = [0.16, 0.41] types of study 
protocol (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011). 
Therefore, this study will not seek to replicate previous studies by determining 
whether or not interpretation biases change as a result of CBM-I.  Any change in social 
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anxiety symptoms attributed to CBM-I will be assumed to have happened due to underlying 
change in interpretation biases.   
 At present, the link between social anxiety, paranoia and persecutory delusions is 
reasonably well established.  However, no experimental studies have used CBM-I to target 
social anxiety within the context of persecutory delusions.  Two studies published to date 
have examined the feasibility of CBM-I to treat both social and state anxiety within the 
context of psychosis.  Steel, Wykes, Ruddle, Smith, Shah and Holmes (2010) reported a non-
significant reduction in state anxiety following a single session of CBM-I in a group of 21 
individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Turner et al. (2011) piloted a CBM-I task 
particularly for social anxiety in psychosis using a case series of six individuals experiencing 
first episode psychosis, resulting in more positive interpretation of social situations and 
improvement in social anxiety after a single session.  However, neither study investigated 
levels of paranoia.  Given the proposed link between social anxiety and paranoia in the 
genesis of persecutory ideation, it would seem theoretically worthwhile to investigate any 
indirect effects CBM-I may also have on paranoia, as well as social anxiety.  Preliminary 
empirical findings suggest a possible link between reducing interpersonal anxiety, such as 
worry and a corresponding reduction in paranoia, as previously discussed (Foster et al, 2010).   
However, given that the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) highlights at least 
three important mechanisms (social anxiety or worry, anomalous experiences and reasoning 
biases), reducing social anxiety alone may not be enough to produce appreciable reductions in 
persecutory thinking.  Targeting reasoning biases may also reduce paranoia; promote 
increased data gathering in uncertain situations and increase belief flexibility, which may 
result in increased processing of disconfirming information.  Computerised treatment 
packages targeting reasoning biases have been developed for delusions generally, and may 
now be indicated for persecutory delusions.  
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1.7.2 Targeting reasoning biases: the Maudsley Review Training Programme 
(MRTP; Waller, Freeman, Jolley, Dunn & Garety, 2011).  As previously discussed, the 
Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) also implicates reasoning biases in the formation 
and maintenance of persecutory delusions.  Selective gathering of confirmatory evidence and 
dismissal of disconfirmatory evidence are hypothesised to lead to the rapid acceptance of 
beliefs, even if there is limited evidence to support them.  Computerised reasoning packages 
have been developed and piloted to reduce the reasoning biases of JTC, promote increased 
belief flexibility, and reduce delusional conviction rates.  These have generally been delivered 
also as computer packages, which involve training slides, video vignettes and other exercises 
that individuals can engage with.  For example, Waller et al. (2011) used the MRTP among 13 
people with delusions with high conviction, demonstrating a significant improvement in 
reasoning (belief flexibility, and a non significant reduction in JTC) after a single session.  A 
more detailed description of the MRTP is given in section 2.3.2.  Similarly, preliminary 
results from a recent randomised controlled trial using the same programme indicate an 
improvement in reasoning (significant reduction in JTC and improvement in belief flexibility) 
over the 3 time points measured, following 3 sessions (Waller, H. personal communication, 
June 2012).   
Although the exact nature of the relationship between reasoning biases and paranoia is 
less clear (Freeman et al., 2005a), research does suggest some association between paranoia 
and the JTC bias in particular (e.g., Moritz, Van Quaquebeke & Lincoln, 2012; Garety et al., 
2013).  Therefore, similar to social anxiety, investigating the effect of improving reasoning 
biases on levels of paranoia would also be theoretically and clinically important. 
1.7.3 The rationale for hypothesising differential effects of CBM-I and the MRTP 
on social anxiety and reasoning biases.  As discussed above, negative interpretative biases 
contribute to social anxiety, and targeting these biases using CBM-I has led to modest 
improvements in anxiety.  Reasoning biases are involved in persecutory delusion formation 
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and maintenance through biased data gathering and lack of belief flexibility, and targeting 
these biases with the MRTP has led to improvements in reasoning.   
The Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) proposes that both social anxiety and 
reasoning biases play different yet complementary roles in the formation and maintenance of 
paranoia and therefore persecutory delusions.  To date, no studies have examined the 
differential effects of CBM-I on social anxiety and the MRTP on reasoning biases within the 
same group.  This comprises the first research question.  Since social anxiety and reasoning 
biases are hypothesised to interact and therefore develop and maintain paranoia, the second 
research question asks whether targeting social anxiety and reasoning biases will have any 
subsequent effect on levels of paranoia.  These will be the aims of the current study. 
1.7.4 Research hypotheses.  Based on the rationale above, the following hypotheses 
will be tested: 
1. In comparison to baseline, five sessions of CBM-I will reduce levels of social 
anxiety, but will not improve reasoning in a sample of individuals with 
persecutory delusions. 
2. In comparison to baseline, five sessions of CBM-I will correspondingly reduce 
levels of severity of paranoia in a sample of individuals with persecutory 
delusions. 
3. In comparison to baseline, five sessions of the Maudsley Review Training 
Programme (MRTP) will improve reasoning, but will not improve anxiety in a 
sample of individuals with persecutory delusions.   
4. In comparison to baseline, five sessions of MRTP will result in a 
corresponding reduction in paranoia in a sample of individuals with 
persecutory delusions. 
The next chapter will outline the design and methodology used to test the above 
hypotheses. 
 38 
 
Methods 
2.1 Participants   
Participants were approached from Early Intervention and Adult Recovery services 
based in King’s Lynn.  Inclusion criteria were males and females aged between 18-65 years 
with a primary diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum disorder and presence of persecutory 
delusions, based on Freeman and Garety’s (2000) criteria.  Both criteria were (a) belief that 
harm is occurring, or that harm will occur to the individual and (b) belief that the persecutor 
has intention to inflict harm on the individual.  Conviction level in persecutory belief needed 
to be at 50% or higher at time of assessment, as assessed by The Psychotic Symptoms Rating 
Scales – Delusions subscale (PSYRATS-B; Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier & Faragher, 1999).  
Participants needed to be deemed to have capacity to give informed consent by their care 
coordinator or responsible clinician. 
Exclusion criteria included a primary diagnosis of substance or alcohol dependency, 
organic syndrome or learning disability, insufficient command of English to engage in the 
tasks, or receiving psychological input at the same time as the study (for ethical reasons and to 
reduce potential differential effects of other interventions on outcome measures).   
Although no formal power calculation was needed, some consideration of sample size 
was required.  Kazdin (2010) does not describe any formal means of calculating how many 
participants are adequate for a single case series for standard hypothesis testing.  Therefore, 
other non-statistical considerations were addressed, such as: what would be a feasible number 
of participants, given the constraints of time and resources?  What would provide a good 
enough balance of participants, to be able to be randomised to four different conditions and to 
provide enough data to adequately test the differential hypotheses?  Although no sample sizes 
are recommended, Gerring (2007) does describe single case series studies with a sample of 
five participants to test standard hypotheses.  Since there are no other papers or books (to the 
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author’s knowledge) that recommend appropriate sample sizes, it was decided that doubling 
the minimum of five and adding two (for potential attrition, etc.) would be a sensible sample 
size for the current study.  Therefore, 12 participants were sought after.  All 12 participants 
were recruited, with no missing data and none lost to follow-up.  The sample comprised eight 
males and four females with a mean age of 39.4 (SD = 14.5) and an age range of 19-61.  
Table 3.2 in the results section gives full demographic and clinical information on all 
participants. 
2.2. Design   
The study employed a multiple baseline single case series ABC crossover design 
(Kazdin, 2010), with a total of 12 participants allocated to one of four conditions using block 
randomisation.  Block randomisation was conducted by the author’s primary supervisor and 
the allocation slips kept in sealed envelopes so that the author did not know to which 
condition the participant would be assigned until after the participant had consented on to the 
study.  The four conditions comprised two differing baseline lengths of two or three weeks 
and counterbalanced order of treatment blocks.  Counterbalancing of packages assisted with 
control of carry-over effects and enhanced confidence in attributing any symptomatic 
improvement to the treatment, rather than extraneous influences (Kazdin, 2010).  Multiple 
baseline periods and two baseline assessments established that symptoms were not on a 
natural path to recovery (Nock et al., 2007).  Each package block was approximately two 
weeks, bearing in mind flexibility of research appointments for participants.  Figure 2.1 
illustrates the design and treatment allocation.   
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Figure 2.1 Outline of four conditions to which participants were randomised 
Participants N=3 14 Days CBM-I Reasoning Follow up 
 
Participants N=3 14 Days Reasoning CBM-I Follow up 
Participants N=3 21 Days Reasoning CBM-I Follow up 
Participants N=3 21 Days CBM-I Reasoning Follow up 
 
 2.2.1 Measures.  Measures included semi-structured interviews, standardised 
questionnaires and idiographic ratings.  Initially, basic demographic information was recorded 
including age, sex, and length of difficulties, medication use and estimated premorbid IQ. 
2.2.1.1 The National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson, 1982).  The NART is a 
commonly used indicator of premorbid IQ, based on the finding that ability to pronounce 
irregular words is a cognitive skill that is left relatively unimpaired following onset of 
conditions such as dementia or psychosis (McGurn et al., 2004).  McGurn et al. (2004) found 
that the correlations between age 11 IQ and NART scores at age 80 were moderate, both for 
individuals who had developed dementia (r = .63, p < 0.001) and for those who had not (r = 
.60, p < 0.001), indicating that the NART is a good proxy measure of premorbid intelligence.  
These data were collected for use as general demographic information about participants and 
are reported along with the other demographic data in the results section.  A copy of the 
NART is included in Appendix 4. 
 2.2.1.2 The PSYRATS-B (Haddock et al., 1999).  The PSYRATS-B was used to 
screen for presence of persecutory ideation, which was then used to determine agreement with 
Freeman and Garety’s (2000) criteria for persecutory delusions.  This semi-structured 
interview assesses severity of delusions in several different domains; preoccupation with 
delusions, conviction, distress and disruption to life caused by beliefs.  Drake, Haddock, 
Tarrier, Bentall and Lewis (2007) report an intra-class correlation coefficient for the 
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PSYRATS-D subscale of .70, indicating good test-retest reliability.  Kendall’s tau for each 
subscale score minus that item ranged from .17 to .41, indicating overall adequate internal 
consistency.  Drake et al. (2007) also report a Spearman coefficient of .80, indicating good 
sensitivity to change in relation to the Delusions subscale of the Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale (PANSS; Kay et al., 1987), which is a very well established measure of 
positive symptoms.  A copy of the PSYRATS-D is included in Appendix 4. 
2.2.1.3 The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998).  This 
measure assesses levels of social anxiety, including cognitive, affective and behavioural 
reactions to situations that involve social interaction.  Out of a total of 60 points, scores of 34 
or above indicate clinically significant social phobia, while scores of 43 or above indicate 
clinical levels of social anxiety that impact on the individual’s life greatly.  Mattick and 
Clarke (1998) report high internal consistency (α = .94), while others have demonstrated good 
test-retest reliability (range from .86 to .92; Heimberg, Mueller, Holt, Hope & Liebowitz, 
1992).  Factor analysis has revealed good construct validity, indicating that the SIAS 
measures social anxiety well with good convergent and discriminant validity also being 
demonstrated (Orsillo, 2001).  The SIAS is increasingly being used in research studies as well 
as in clinical work with people who experience psychosis, e.g., Turner et al. (2011).  A copy 
of the SIAS is included in Appendix 4. 
2.2.1.4 The Green et al., Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS; Green et al., 2007).  The 
GPTS is a 32-item scale with two constructs measuring (1) ideas of reference and (2) overt 
persecution, which combined make a robust measure for paranoia.  Reliability was found to 
be very high (α = .90) and factor analysis demonstrated good measurement of ideas of 
reference and persecution. Concurrent and convergent validity were estimated by correlating 
scores from the GPTS with existing measures of paranoia, namely the Paranoia Scale (PS; 
Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992) and the Peters et al., Delusions Inventory (PDI; Peters, Joseph & 
Garety, 1999).  This indicated good validity of the GPTS when compared with the PDI 
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(Spearman’s ρ = 0.39, p = 0.01) and the PS (ρ = 0.81, p = 0.01, Green et al., 2007).   
Sensitivity to change in relation to the PSYRATS was demonstrated by significant positive 
correlations with GPTS scores over time.  A copy of the GPTS is included in Appendix 4. 
2.2.1.5 The 85:15 and 60:40 Beads Tasks (Garety et al., 2005; Dudley, John, Young 
& Over, 1997).  These tasks both represent the ‘easy’ and ‘difficult’ versions of a Bayesian 
probabilistic reasoning task that has been extensively used among individuals with delusions, 
to measure the JTC reasoning bias.  During this ‘easy’ task, individuals are presented with 
two jars each containing 100 coloured beads.   There are 85 beads of one colour (e.g., black) 
and 15 beads of another (e.g., yellow) in one jar, while the other jar contains beads in opposite 
proportions (i.e., 15 black and 85 yellow).   The jars are removed from view.   Upon request 
from the participant, beads are presented, one at a time, from one of the jars in a 
predetermined order.   Although predetermined, the participants are informed that the jars and 
order of beads have been selected randomly every time the task is given.  Participants can 
view as many beads as they want until they are certain from which jar the beads are drawn.  In 
a harder version of the task, a colour ratio of 60:40 instead of 85:15 may be used (Dudley et 
al., 1997).  Freeman (2007) reviewed the literature and found that in the ten studies looking at 
discriminatory performance on the different versions of the beads tasks, all ten showed 
significantly hastier data gathering within the delusions groups.  JTC seems to also be related 
to strength of belief conviction (Garety et al., 2005).  The relationship between JTC and 
persecutory delusions is less clear, most likely because the majority of studies rarely focus on 
delusion subtypes.  However, initial data indicate that the JTC bias has been found to also be 
significantly pronounced among individuals with persecutory delusions when compared with 
matched non-clinical controls (Conway et al., 2002; Startup, 2004; Startup, Freeman & 
Garety, 2008).  Data were grouped by category of whether participants JTC or not – this was 
operationalised as a decision based on two or fewer beads drawn. 
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2.2.1.6 Possibility of being Mistaken (PBM) and Reaction to Hypothetical 
Contradiction (RTHC) items from the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions Schedule 
(MADS; Wessely et al., 1993).  These measures have been extensively used in delusions 
research (Garety et al., 2005).  These components of the MADS are delivered as a semi-
structured interview.  PBM is measured by recounting the evidence that the participant has 
cited for their belief and by then asking the participant ‘Is there any possibility that you might 
be mistaken?’ in relation to their primary belief.  A Yes/No response is recorded, providing 
categorical data.  Wessely et al. (1993) report good inter-rater reliability for this component (k 
= .91).  RTHC involves presentation of a hypothetical scenario (the participant is informed it 
is hypothetical, in order to encourage engagement with the scenario) that is at clear odds with 
the content of the delusion.  Their reaction to this scenario is coded as follows: 1. 
Ignores/Rejects Scenario, 2. Accommodates Scenario into Delusion, 3. Delusional Conviction 
is lowered, 4. Delusion is dismissed.  In this case, one and two indicate belief inflexibility, 
three and four indicate belief flexibility, thus providing either ordinal or categorical data for 
this measure. Wessely et al. (1993) report good inter-rater reliability for this component (k = 
.90). Copies of these measures are included in Appendix 4. 
2.2.1.7 Explanations of Experiences Assessment (EoE; Freeman et al., 2004).  This is 
an item also taken from the MADS (Wessely et al., 1993), which presents a description of the 
delusional belief, and asks, citing the identified evidence for this belief, if any other 
explanations for these experiences could be possible, even if the participant considers the 
alternative to be very unlikely.  The numbers of explanations that are qualitatively different 
from the primary explanatory delusion are counted, therefore giving continuous scores to be 
used in analysis.  Freeman et al. (2004) report an inability to calculate a simple reliability 
statistic and so examined each of the changes over three months separately for the 25 
individuals that were given repeat administration of the EOE interview, concluding that good 
stability was demonstrated overall.  In terms of validity, individuals who had alternatives 
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(83%) were more likely than those who did not (43%) to have greater awareness that they 
experienced false beliefs, as assessed by the Assessment of Insight in Psychosis (Amador, 
Strauss, Yale, Gorman, & Endicott, 1993), t (95) = 3.16, p < .01.  Therefore, this indicates 
that the EoE shows some validity, in that it is consistent with another established measure of 
insight (Freeman et al., 2004).  A copy of the EoE interview schedule is included in Appendix 
4. 
2.2.1.8 Idiographic ratings of anxiety, conviction and paranoia.  In order to establish 
levels of anxiety, delusional conviction and paranoia that are stable and not on a natural path 
to recovery, it was necessary to take multiple measures on a daily basis.  Idiographic self-
ratings of anxiety, delusional conviction and paranoia were completed once daily.  
Participants were asked to provide a rating from 0-100% to measure social anxiety severity.  
To assist participants with giving these ratings, anchor points were provided; 0% = not at all 
anxious, 25% = somewhat anxious 50% = moderately anxious, 75% = very anxious, 100% = 
extremely anxious.  Similar anchor points were also given to assist with 0-100% ratings levels 
of delusional conviction and paranoia (Appendix 5). 
2.2.1.9 Anecdotal qualitative observations from participants.  As part of every session, 
any noteworthy qualitative feedback from participants was recorded.  This typically included 
any helpful aspects of either programme they had remembered, or how they felt they were 
responding to the study programmes.  These qualitative data were not subjected to any formal 
analysis; the author’s primary supervisor read through drafts of the results section to ensure 
that comments included were appropriate and were for informational purposes to enhance 
understanding of the quantitative results of each case.   
2.3 Experimental manipulations 
2.3.1 Text-based CBM-I for social anxiety in psychosis, Turner et al. (2011).  The 
aim of CBM-I is to train individuals to appraise an ambiguous social situation in a more 
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positive or neutral way.  It is the bias modification which is hypothesised to result in symptom 
reduction (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  The training materials used in the current study 
were based on the original text based paradigm and were identical to those developed by 
Turner et al. (2011).  Prior to beginning each session, participants were asked to engage in a 
brief visual exercise, in order to promote visual imagination of the text-based materials, which 
previous research has shown to be more effective than verbal processing alone (e.g., Holmes, 
Matthews, Dalgleish & Mackintosh, 2006).  This exercise is based on the study by Holmes et 
al. (2006).  Participants were asked to close their eyes while they imagined cutting a lemon 
(holding the lemon, shining a light on it and looking at its skin, cutting it with a knife and 
squeezing it) then rating how vividly they could imagine the images on a 5 point likert scale 
(1 = not at all vivid, 5 = extremely vivid).  This exercise provides a useful means of assessing 
the degree to which participants can use imagery as well as explaining what was being asked 
of them during the following task. 
Following administration of the brief visual exercise, participants were presented with a 
written set of instructions and 100 scenarios (see Appendix 6), given in blocks of 10, with 
optional brief rests after each block.  Each scenario was 3 lines in length, and was emotionally 
ambiguous until the last word, which was presented as fragmented, and resolves the scenario 
in a positive way.  To progress through the text-based stimuli at their own pace, participants 
pressed the ‘advance key’ (programmed to be the down arrow key).  The scenario concluded 
once the participant entered the correct letter.  At the end of each scenario, a comprehension 
question was presented to ensure the participant had interpreted and understood the scenario 
in the intended way.  Feedback on whether the participant’s response was ‘correct’ or 
‘incorrect’ was given.  Each session lasted approximately 60 minutes.   
An example of one scenario is: “A friend suggests that the two of you join an evening 
class on creative writing.  The thought of other people looking at your efforts makes you feel 
[word presented with missing letters: enth----st-c].  [Correct word: enthusiastic].  [Missing 
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letter: u].  Would you expect to feel uncomfortable if others look at your work?  [Correct 
response: No].”  No other data (e.g., response time, interpretation bias pre/post measurement) 
from the CBM-I task will be recorded.  As described in the introduction, interpretation bias 
will be assumed to have changed, if levels of social anxiety have decreased from baseline, 
following CBM-I. 
2.3.2 The Maudsley Review Training Programme; the MRTP – Waller et al. 
(2011).  Adapted from earlier work by Ross, Freeman, Dunn and Garety (2011), this package 
aims primarily to reduce frequency of JTC, improve ability to generate alternative 
explanations of experiences and ultimately to reduce delusional conviction, without directly 
challenging any of the delusional content itself.  The training package was delivered in task 
format; each task was delivered by computer and then discussed with the participant.  A 
synopsis of the five tasks follows, a screenshot of some of the slides in the MRTP is provided 
in Appendix 10.   
Task 1: ‘What’s the Picture?’  This task introduces the idea that it can be difficult to 
come to an informed decision without all of the evidence.  Six pictures are revealed in 
sections, one at a time; the participant is given the option to decide what picture it is (from a 
list of six possibilities displayed at the beginning), or to request another piece to be added to 
it.  The task is designed so that all options are potentially correct to begin with, and only by 
requesting more information will the correct option become clearer.  This teaches participants 
to look for more evidence before making a decision. 
Task 2: ‘Illusions.’ This introduces the idea that things are not always as they first seem 
and that sometimes we only see part of the story, which can lead us to jump to conclusions 
and make mistakes. A series of optical illusions are presented, which helps to illustrate this. 
Task 3: ‘First impressions.’  This task gives three real life examples in video vignettes 
of scenarios. Participants are asked to rate what they believe is going on at early stages of the 
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scenarios, which illustrates how we can all make incorrect assumptions, if we do not slow 
down and gather all the necessary evidence. 
Task 4: ‘Looking for other possible explanations.’  This introduces the idea of thinking 
flexibly about alternative explanations before reaching a conclusion. Three video vignettes are 
shown, each with the option of positive, neutral or paranoid interpretation. Participants are 
encouraged at various points to use the interactive software to interpret the scenario as they 
see fit, with a discussion after the end of each vignette, depending on their interpretation. 
Task 5: ‘JTC summary.’  This final task allows review of the key learning points 
throughout the tasks. Participants are shown four video scenarios, involving characters who 
jump to conclusions. They are encouraged to identify who the characters that jump to 
conclusions will be. Finally, they are asked about how the characters might have avoided the 
situations they got themselves into, by not jumping to conclusions. 
 The tasks do not involve any material directly related to the participant’s delusional 
content, but are based on everyday scenarios such that it is anticipated or hoped that the 
participant might be able to generalise the ideas to their own experiences.  The format is video 
and task-based, which is interactive, and encourages active participation.  Each session lasted 
about 60 minutes. 
 2.3.3 Equipment.  The 85:15 and 60:40 versions of the Beads Task (Garety et al., 2005, 
Dudley et al., 1997) were developed on Microsoft PowerPoint.  The CBM-I materials were 
programmed and presented using E-Prime Software (Version 2.0, Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc 2010).  The MRTP materials were developed on Microsoft PowerPoint and then 
transferred to a Real BASIC programme to incorporate the interactive elements (Waller et al., 
2011).  The programmes were run on a personal laptop using Windows 7 Home Premium (© 
Microsoft Corporation, 2009).  The testing sessions were carried out in locations convenient 
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and comfortable for the research participants, i.e., either on NHS premises, or in their own 
homes.   
2.4 Procedure   
 2.4.1 Ethical approval, consent and randomisation.  Ethical approval was granted by 
the NRES Committee East of England on 14th June, 2013 (Ref: 13/EE/0134; see Appendix 
11).  Research and Development approval for Norfolk and Suffolk NHS Foundation Trust 
was given on 26th July, 2013 (see Appendix 12 for the Letter of Access).   
 Potential participants were first approached by their care coordinators or case managers 
within Early Intervention and Recovery services in West Norfolk.  Following discussion with 
the researcher to determine eligibility for the study, case managers approached potential 
participants with the Participant Information Sheet (Appendix 1), in order to briefly explain 
what the project entailed and to ascertain if they would be interested in taking part.  If so, case 
managers passed on contact information (home address and telephone number) to the 
researcher who would send them the Participant Information Sheet with a cover letter 
(Appendix 2), indicating that they would be contacted via telephone to arrange a screening 
meeting.   
 At the screening meeting the PSYRATS-B semi-structured interview was conducted.  
This information was used to determine whether the study was suitable for the participant.  
Those who did not meet inclusion criteria were informed verbally and thanked for their time.  
Those who were eligible and still interested in taking part were asked to sign a consent form 
(Appendix 3).  Following consent, basic demographic information was documented (such as 
age, sex, length of difficulties, estimated premorbid IQ and medication use) and participants 
were randomly allocated to one of the four groups as outlined in figure 2.1 above.  Block 
randomisation was conducted by the researcher’s supervisor.  The researcher was blinded to 
allocation of condition, using sealed envelopes, until after the participant had consented to 
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take part.  Figure 2.2 below provides a flow diagram of study participants.  The five 
participants who were not suitable were so because they had no specific beliefs that they were 
being harmed on purpose.  They were referred for screening by their care co-ordinators in 
Early Intervention services because they experienced paranoia.  However, after screening, it 
transpired that they experienced generalised paranoia, but no persecutory delusions. 
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Figure 2.2 Recruitment flowchart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.4.2 Assessment.  Following consent and randomisation, participants completed the 
following measures with the researcher in a baseline assessment (Appendix 4):  
1. The NART (Nelson, 1982). 
2. The SIAS (Mattick & Clarke, 1998). 
3. The GPTS (Green et al., 2007). 
4. The 85:15 and 60:40 Beads Tasks (Garety et al., 2005; Dudley et al., 1997). 
5. PBM and RTHC items from the MADS, (Wessely et al., 1993).   
6. The EoE (Freeman et al., 2004). 
7. Idiographic ratings of anxiety, conviction and paranoia.   
 2.4.3 Baseline period.  Upon completion of the initial research assessment, 
participants began their two or three week baseline period, during which they rated their level 
of social anxiety, conviction in their main delusion, and severity of paranoia once daily, using 
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a booklet of the three idiographic ratings described above (Appendix 5).  Text message 
reminders were sent by the researcher if requested by the participant. 
Upon completion of the baseline period, the research assessment was conducted again, 
and the first session of the computerised therapy was given.  Participants completed the three 
idiographic measures of conviction, paranoia and social anxiety at the end of each session.  
Both blocks of computerised treatment were five sessions long, delivered over two weeks at a 
rate of approximately one session every two or three days.  Following completion of the first 
block of computerised package, the participants completed the research assessment again.  
The second block of computerised treatment then began two or three days after completion of 
the first.  As before, the three idiographic measures were completed at the end of each session.  
Upon completion of the second block of computerised package, participants completed the 
research assessment and then entered the follow-up phase.   
 During follow-up, participants did not need to do anything, but were encouraged to 
record or note any questions, comments or thoughts that they would like to bring up at the 
follow-up meeting.  After one month, the follow-up meeting was conducted, where all of the 
above measures were re-administered, except for the NART. Participants were also debriefed 
during this session.  Figure 2.3 provides a flow diagram of the procedure. 
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Figure 2.3 Participant flow diagram 
 
2.5 Data analysis plan 
Data were recorded on original anonymous paper files and later entered on to a 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheet.  This spreadsheet was checked several times for accuracy of 
data entry.  Data on conviction for participant 11 had to be retrospectively re-rated by the 
participant during both package phases, as it transpired during the follow up assessment that 
participant 11 had been rating how much they believed the delusion was happening at that 
time, rather than how much they believed the delusion was true.  Participant 3 declined to do 
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the NART, because the voices were calling them derogatory names at the time.  Other than 
these instances, there were no other known missing or incorrect data. 
2.5.1 Hypothesis one: In comparison to baseline, five sessions of CBM-I will 
reduce levels of social anxiety, but will not improve reasoning.  To test this hypothesis, the 
idiographic data on social anxiety were visually inspected and Kendall’s tau was calculated 
(Kazdin, 2010).  Data were plotted graphically according to participant on social anxiety 
measures over time.  A standardised measure of social anxiety, the SIAS, was also used and 
the five measurements were plotted underneath the idiographic data.  Reliable and clinical 
changes were examined between both baseline assessments, at the end of each package phase, 
and at four week follow-up.  Further information on reliable and clinical change and how they 
were calculated is given in the results chapter. 
The reasoning component of this differential hypothesis was tested using the beads 
tasks.  Reliable change could not be calculated due to insufficient published data, but a cut off 
score of 3+ draws indicated not JTC.  These data were tabulated across the five time points 
along with the categorical data derived from the PM, continuous data from the EoE and 
ordinal data from the RTHC. Using these two graphs and one table, the differential effects of 
CBM-I on social anxiety and reasoning were investigated. 
2.5.2 Hypothesis two: In comparison to baseline, five sessions of CBM-I will 
correspondingly reduce levels of severity of paranoia.  As above, this hypothesis was 
tested using visual inspection of the idiographic paranoia data; Kendall’s tau was also 
calculated to assess stability of baseline (Kazdin, 2010).  GPTS scores were plotted across 
phases and aligned underneath the idiographic ratings.  There are no clinical cut-offs 
published for the GPTS, (Green et al., 2007).  However, based on criterion b by Jacobson and 
Truax (1991), the clinical cut-off was calculated to be 86.2.  The reliable change index for the 
GPTS was calculated using the same guidance to be 18.69.  These calculations are given in 
more detail in the results section.   
 54 
 
Conviction was included in the analyses with the GPTS scores because it is a 
dimensional measure of paranoia (Haddock et al, 1999; Freeman, 2007), indicating how 
firmly held the persecutory belief is and how susceptible to change the belief may be.  The 
idiographic data were visually inspected to determine which package had an effect on 
conviction, if any.  Kendall’s tau was also calculated to assess stability of baseline.  An 
improvement in paranoia occurred if a participant improved in GPTS scores and/or 
conviction.  
2.5.3 Hypothesis three: In comparison to baseline, five sessions of the Maudsley 
Review Training Programme (MRTP) will improve reasoning, but will not improve 
anxiety.  As with the first hypothesis, this hypothesis was tested by visual inspection and 
Kendall’s tau calculation of the idiographic data on social anxiety (Kazdin, 2010).  
Idiographic social anxiety and SIAS data were plotted graphically according to each 
participant over time, visually inspected and examined for clinical and/or reliable change.   
The reasoning component of this differential hypothesis was tested using the tabulated 
reasoning measures as described above.  Improvements in these reasoning measures that were 
stable (i.e., were not present during baseline and were maintained at follow up) were 
attributed to the relevant package. 
2.5.4 Hypothesis four: In comparison to baseline, five sessions of MRTP will result 
in a corresponding reduction in paranoia.  As described, this hypothesis was tested using 
visual inspection and Kendall’s tau calculation of the idiographic paranoia and conviction 
data (Kazdin, 2010).  GPTS data were examined for clinical and/or reliable change.  
2.5.5 Statistical analysis.  Although Kazdin (2010) advocates the use of visual 
inspection alone, others argue that statistical analyses of time series data are more appropriate 
(e.g., Zhan & Ottenbacher, 2001).  A recent large scale study reviewed the validity of both 
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visual inspection and statistical analyses, concluding that both should be used in conjunction 
with one another (Harrington, 2013).   
A programme running Simulation Modeling Analysis (SMA; Borckhardt, 2006) uses 
bootstrapping to reliably analyse short streams (N < 30) of time series, autocorrelated data.  
SMA was used along with visual inspection to analyse the conviction data.  SMA analysis 
was only used with conviction data because there was no standardised measure to accompany 
conviction change, which could also be inspected visually, as with the social anxiety and 
paranoia data.  Even though it is likely that the conviction data are not normally distributed, 
Borckardt (2006) recommends use of Pearson’s r rather than Spearman’s ρ to determine 
significant change in slope and level of phases, because it is more reliable within the model 
used.   
Conviction data from each treatment phase were both compared with baseline, because 
the package could not analyse three variables using correlation.  This assumes no carry-over 
effects, which is a limitation, but the analyses should be considered in conjunction with the 
visual inspection.  Use of statistical analysis makes it easier to determine differential effects 
on conviction, which was measured with idiographic ratings alone. 
To complement interpretation of the visual analyses of social anxiety, paranoia and 
reasoning biases, underpowered statistical tests of significance were used, and where 
appropriate, effect sizes generated.  Data on all participants were merged together to increase 
power, but again this assumes no carry-over effects, which is a limitation, but is preferable to 
tests with N = 6.   
Due to the fact that multiple comparisons would limit the confidence of the findings, it 
was decided to test three variables; the second baseline assessment and measures taken from 
the CBM-I and the MRTP packages.  These tests were reported within the relevant sections 
on hypotheses at the end of the results chapter.  Because these tests are underpowered, the 
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results should be interpreted with caution.  However, if the visual analyses correspond with 
the statistical test results, it may improve confidence in the findings. 
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Results 
3.1 Overview 
 This chapter outlines the results of the data analysis plan.  Self-reported idiographic 
measures of social anxiety, paranoia and belief conviction were collected at assessment points 
then graphed in terms of number of days of involvement in the study and visually inspected 
using Kazdin’s (2010) criteria.  Social anxiety and paranoia measures were assessed for 
reliable and clinically significant change at various time points: within the baseline period 
itself, following each package phase and at follow up.  Reasoning data were tabulated and 
monitored for change across phases.  Statistical analyses were also computed to complement 
the visual inspection.  Data were initially grouped together according to each participant, with 
a summary of the results per hypothesis at the end.  Effect sizes of both packages on social 
anxiety and paranoia were calculated. 
3.2. Data presentation and analysis 
 3.2.1 Visual inspection.  Kendall’s tau (Kendall, 1970) establishes whether scores 
over baseline are stable enough to make a good basis for comparison with the other phases.  
Kazdin’s (2010) four criteria for visual inspection are outlined in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 
Criteria for data evaluation in single-case series designs 
Characteristic Definition 
 
Change in mean 
 
Change in mean scores from phase to phase, in the expected direction 
 
Shift in level 
 
Change in score from the last day of one phase and the first day of the 
next.  An abrupt shift facilitates interpretation. 
 
 
Change in slope 
Whether the direction of the slope changes between phases; slopes can be 
classified as (1) stable, (2) accelerating or (3) decelerating 
 
Latency of change 
 
The speed with which change occurs when the conditions are changed; 
briefer latency of change implies an effect 
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 Idiographic data were examined according to Table 3.1 above across phases; from left 
to right.  This means that change was assessed in one phase based on comparison with the 
preceding phase.  When assessing latency of change, change in idiographic rating between 
phases was established by comparing the final rating in the preceding phase with the ratings in 
the following phase.  The first rating that was different was noted and the number of days that 
lapsed in between that change was calculated, and reported in the relevant tables.   
When all four criteria are met, effects can be easily attributed to the relevant package 
(Kazdin, 2010).  However, all four criteria need not be met to infer an effect, and the criteria 
can vary, making the process more subjective (Kazdin, 2010).  Reliable and clinical change 
was assessed slightly differently.  Scores on the SIAS and GPTS were examined by first 
determining whether there was a significant reduction between both baseline assessments.  
Reduction in the second baseline assessment, relative to the first, made it more difficult to 
attribute change to the relevant package because the baseline itself was not stable.  Mean 
baseline scores minus the RCI were then compared with all phases, to determine whether 
there was a significant reduction in each phase.   
Clinical and/or reliable reductions compared to baseline were reported for each phase, 
including follow up.  Due to the fact that two package phases were used to test differential 
hypotheses, it was decided that the package that first resulted in a significant effect would 
support the relevant hypothesis.  This was to separate out potential interaction effects of both 
packages.  For example, if there were no significant reductions in social anxiety during 
baseline or MRTP phases, but there were during the CBM-I and follow-up phases, hypothesis 
one (CBM-I would improve social anxiety, but not reasoning biases) would be supported.  
Regarding reasoning biases, it was decided that if an improvement in any one of the five 
measures of reasoning biases was stable across the remaining phases, the improvement would 
be attributed to the relevant package.  For example, if a participant JTC during baseline and 
then stopped JTC following phase one (MRTP), and also stopped JTC throughout other 
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phases (i.e., CBM-I and follow-up), then this would be interpreted as an improvement in 
reasoning biases, following the MRTP package. 
3.2.2 Calculation of clinical and reliable change indices.  The guidance by Jacobson 
and Truax (1991) was used to calculate clinical and reliable change indices.   
3.2.2.1 Clinical change.  Jacobson and Truax (1991) recommend three different ways 
of calculating appropriate cut scores to denote clinical levels of symptoms when these cut 
scores have not been published.  When clinical and non-clinical norms are available and do 
not overlap with each other, criterion b is recommended (Jacobson & Truax, 1991); this is 
where the post-treatment score should fall within two standard deviations of the normative 
group mean.  Jacobson and Truax (1991) argue that this criterion leads to fairly stringent 
levels of clinically significant change.  For paranoia assessed by the GPTS using 
psychometric data from Green et al. (2007), this was calculated as: 
b = (non-clinical mean) + 2*(SD of non clinical group) 
b = 48.8 + 37.4 = 86.2. 
Therefore, GPTS scores above 86 during baseline that reduced to below 86 during 
package phases were considered clinically significant.  This is out of a possible range of 32 - 
160.  
According to Mattick and Clarke (1998), SIAS scores above 34 during baseline that 
reduced to below 34 during package phases were also considered clinically significant.   
3.2.2.2 Reliable change.  The reliable change index (RCI) was calculated using the 
following formula (Jacobson & Truax 1991):  
1.96*SD1*√2*√ (1-r) 
Where SD1 = standard deviation of the sample and r = test re-test reliability coefficient.   
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Using the standard deviation and reliability coefficient reported by Mattick and Clarke 
(1998), the RCI for the SIAS was calculated to be: 
1.96*16.4*√2*√ (1-.92) = 12.86. 
Data from Green et al. (2007) yielded 1.96*18.7*√2*√ (1-.87) = 18.69.  Reductions 
greater than or equal to 13 points on the SIAS and 19 points on the GPTS were considered 
statistically significant.   
3.2.3 Participant information.  Table 3.2 gives the clinical and demographic 
characteristics of the sample.  Table 3.3 outlines the threat belief of each participant and 
conviction obtained during screening interview. 
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Table 3.2 
Clinical and demographic characteristics of participants 
Characteristic Value Range 
Mean age (SD) 39.4 (14.5) 19-61 
Gender  
8 
 
Male  
Female 4  
Mean estimated NART IQ (SD) 109.7 (5.9)* 100-116 
Ethnicity   
White British 12  
Diagnosis   
Paranoid schizophrenia 5  
Non-organic psychosis 3  
Schizoaffective disorder 3  
Delusional disorder 1  
Mean length of difficulties in years (SD) 10.29 (7.59) 1-23 
Patient status   
Outpatient 12  
Recruited from Early Intervention 3  
Recruited from Recovery Services 9  
Participants taking antipsychotics 11  
Mean daily chlorpromazine equivalents (SD) 420.8 (285.6) 0 – 1000mg daily 
Initial percentage delusional conviction (SD) 85 (15) 50-100% 
Baseline PSYRATS total scores (SD) 19.67 (1.83) 16-22 
Follow-up PSYRATS total scores (SD) 11.5 (5.81) 0-19 
Note: *Participant 3 declined to do the NART.  All other data are complete.  Chlorpromazine 
equivalents were calculated according to Woods (2003 & 2011) and Atkins, Burgess, 
Bottomley and Riccio (1997); PSYRATS – Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scale. 
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Table 3.3 
The content of the study participants’ delusions and initial conviction 
 
 
 
Participant 
Number Description of delusions 
Initial 
Conviction 
1 
“The travellers are upsetting me, filming me, watching 
everything I do in order to upset me and stress me as much 
as they can; eventually they will beat me to death.” 
100% 
2 “If I go out by myself, I will be taken and imprisoned by a group of people and I will never see my family again.” 75% 
3 
“People down the bottom of the garden, neighbours and MI5 
are constantly sending me pains by laser because they hate 
me.” 
75% 
4 “My neighbours spy on me, they say nasty things about me 
and they torment me, it’s like fun for them and hell for me.” 80% 
5 “If I am outside, I will be attacked by a member of the public at any minute.” 100% 
6 “They put a microchip in my head to keep me under 
constant surveillance to mess with my life.” 100% 
7 “When outside, I will be attacked or murdered any minute.” 80% 
8 “I get interfered with by spirits daily, in order for them to 
aggravate and annoy me.” 75% 
9 “Members of the public want to hurt me by getting into my 
mind.” 50% 
10 “The travellers want to get revenge on me by badly beating 
me.  This could happen any minute.” 90% 
11 
“The secret service has placed cameras in my house, 
watching and listening to me because they want to upset me 
and kill me.” 
90% 
12 
“Much of my family, friends and everyone are involved in a 
game to try to confuse me and upset me.” 100% 
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3.3 Participant 1 
Participant 1 is a 19 year old male, with one year duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Early Intervention Services. 
3.3.1 Social anxiety data. 
Figure 3.1 Participant 1 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety worsened (tau = .362, p < .05), which facilitates 
interpretation, as the slope was arcing in the opposite direction to that during the treatment 
phases, indicating an effect.  Table 3.4 provides the results from visual inspection of figure 
3.1, which reads from left to right, e.g., ‘reduced’ in the MRTP column means that a further 
reduction in mean idiographic social anxiety occurred relative to the CBM-I phase.  
Considered together, the results show no reliable effect on social anxiety, although there is 
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some indication that idiographic ratings reduced following the introduction of CBM-I. 
Reliable reduction in SIAS scores occurred at follow-up. 
Table 3.4 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.1 
Social anxiety Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
76 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC NC 
Slope Accelerating Decelerating Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 1 12 NC 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N N Y 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of idiographic rating change between phases is expressed as 
number of days, N – No, Y – Yes, SIAS reliable change threshold during package phases was 
calculated by subtracting the RCI from mean time-point one and two ratings. 
3.3.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.2 Participant 1 idiographic conviction scores 
 
Table 3.5 outlines the visual inspection of the conviction data. Conviction remained at 100% 
throughout the full duration of the study. 
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3.3.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.3 Participant 1 idiographic and standardised paranoia scores  
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia worsened (tau = .512, p < .01), which facilitates 
interpretation due to magnitude of symptoms increasing prior to package.  Table 3.5 provides 
the results from visual inspection of figure 3.2, indicating no effect on conviction or paranoia.  
However, there is some indication that idiographic ratings of paranoia reduced following the 
introduction of CBM-I. 
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Table 3.5 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.2 and 3.3 
Paranoia Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
72 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC NC 
Slope Accelerating Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change  1 4 28 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Mean 
conviction  100 100 100  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change   NC NC NC 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes, GPTS reliable change threshold during package phases was calculated by 
subtracting the RCI from mean time-point one and two ratings. 
 
3.3.4 Reasoning data. 
Table 3.6 
Standardised measures for participant 1  
Measure B1 B2 CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
EoE 0 0 0 0 0 
PBM No No No No No 
RTHC 2 2 2 2 2 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 2 – 
accommodated contradiction into delusion. 
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As indicated in table 3.6, participant 1 did not JTC on either of the beads tasks during 
any of the time points.  Scores on the EoE, PBM and RTHC assessments indicate a lack of 
belief flexibility at all time points that did not change following either package phase.  These 
results show no effect on reasoning biases.  
3.3.5 Participant summary.  Idiographic ratings of social anxiety reduced with 
introduction of CBM-I and were maintained.  SIAS scores did not reliably reduce until 
follow-up, indicating no specific effects of either package.  Although idiographic paranoia 
decreased, there was no reliable or clinical change in scores on the GPTS and conviction and 
reasoning biases remained stably high.  Idiographic and standardised ratings of social anxiety 
seemed to follow the same trajectory.  Idiographic ratings of paranoia improved, but GPTS 
did not.  Regarding qualitative feedback on the packages, participant 1 felt that the CBM-I 
package was very helpful, noting that they practiced more positive interpretation of 
ambiguous social information after the sessions, e.g., when they heard fellow residents 
mention their name and laugh, they thought maybe the residents were talking about something 
funny they had said, rather than making fun of them.  Participant 1 also reported the MRTP to 
be helpful, saying they tried to put into practice to slow down and think through situations, 
even if their first explanation for what had happened was their delusional one.  Overall, it 
seemed that there was little effect of either package, possibly because participant 1 had a more 
severe overall presentation.  Similar lack of response in more severe psychotic symptoms has 
been indicated in the literature (e.g., a meta-analysis by Cormac, Jones & Campbell, 2002). 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
3.4 Participant 2 
 Participant 2 is a 20 year old female, with five years duration of difficulties, 
recruited from Early Intervention Services. 
3.4.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.4 Participant 2 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores  
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety was stable (tau = .321, p = .136).  Table 3.7 
provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.4, indicating no effect on social anxiety, 
although there is some indication that idiographic ratings of social anxiety reduce following 
the introduction of the CBM-I package. 
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Table 3.7 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.4 
Social anxiety Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
65 NC Reduced  
Shift in level  NC Gradual decrease NC 
Slope Stable Stable Decelerating  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 6 3 41 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Note: NC – No Change, N – No, Y – Yes. 
 
3.4.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.5 Participant 2 idiographic conviction scores  
 
Baseline appeared stable (tau = .301, p = .165).  Table 3.8 provides the results from 
visual inspection of figure 3.5.   
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3.4.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.6 Participant 2 idiographic and standardised paranoia ratings 
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia worsened (tau = .499, p < .05).  Table 3.8 provides the 
results from visual inspection of figures 3.5 and 3.6, indicating that CBM-I improved 
paranoia, as measured by idiographic ratings and GPTS scores.  Visual analysis indicated that 
CBM-I improved conviction, which was maintained at follow up.  SMA concurred with these 
results: no change in level (r = -0.301, p = 0.194) or slope (r = 0.188, p = 0.422) of conviction 
occurred between baseline and MRTP phases, however a significant reduction in level of 
conviction (r = -0.641, p <.01) not slope (r = -0.067, p = 0.781) occurred between baseline 
and CBM-I phases.  
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Table 3.8 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.5 and 3.6 
Paranoia Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
56 Stable Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC NC 
Slope Accelerating Decelerating Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 6 10 41 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N N N Y 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N N Y Y 
Mean 
Conviction 
Ratings 
56 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC Increased 
Slope Stable Decreasing Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 6 7 41 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.4.4 Reasoning data. 
Table 3.9 
Standardised measures for participant 2  
Measure B1 B2 MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
EoE 0 0 1 1 1 
PBM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RTHC 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 1 – reduced 
delusional conviction. 
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As indicated in table 3.9, participant 2 did not JTC on either of the beads tasks during 
any of the time points.  Scores on the EoE assessment indicate an improvement in generating 
alternative explanations of experiences following the MRTP phase.  PBM and RTHC 
assessments indicate presence of belief flexibility at all time points that did not change 
following each phase.  This indicates improved reasoning biases following the MRTP, 
although participant 2 already had better flexibility of thinking and lower conviction than 
others. 
3.4.5 Participant 2 summary.  Idiographic ratings of social anxiety reduced with 
introduction of the MRTP and were further reduced following CBM-I.  SIAS scores were not 
reliably reduced, indicating no effect.  Idiographic conviction reduced following CBM-I, 
which was maintained.  Idiographic paranoia decreased after MRTP, which further decreased 
following CBM-I.  This corresponded with a reliable and clinical reduction in GPTS scores 
following CBM-I.  Although participant 2 had less severity in terms of reasoning biases, the 
MRTP did improve this.  Idiographic and standardised ratings of social anxiety and paranoia 
seemed to follow a similar trajectory.  Participant 2 also reported finding the CBM-I training 
helpful when out socially, although they reported it being tedious to complete.  The MRTP 
was also reported to be helpful, in training participant 2 to generate alternative explanations 
for things that related to the delusional content, e.g. attributing hearing voices outside saying 
‘they’re going to get you,’ to being stressed/the psychosis rather than the delusional 
explanation.  Overall, it seemed that there was more of an effect during the package phases, 
possibly because participant 2 had a less severe overall presentation. 
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3.5 Participant 3 
Participant 3 is a 31 year old male, with 16 years duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Recovery Services. 
3.5.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.7 Participant 3 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety was unstable yet not significantly increasing or 
decreasing (tau = -.103, p = .649).  Table 3.10 provides the results from visual inspection of 
figure 3.7, indicating no effect on social anxiety. 
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Table 3.10 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.7 
Social anxiety Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
52 Reduced Increased  
Shift in level  Abrupt decrease NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 3 NC NC 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.5.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.8 Participant 3 idiographic conviction scores  
 
Baseline idiographic conviction ratings did not appear to be stable, but there was no 
significant trend (tau = .225, p = .326).  Table 3.11 provides the results from visual inspection 
of figure 3.8. 
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3.5.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.9 Participant three idiographic and standardised paranoia scores  
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia decreased over time, making interpretation more 
difficult as this suggests a change in symptoms before any package was introduced (tau = -
.475, p < .05).  Table 3.11 provides the results from visual inspection of figures 3.8 and 3.9, 
indicating no clear effect on conviction.  SMA agreed with this finding, indicating no change 
in level (r = -0.173, p = 0.4774) or slope (r = -0.018, p = 0.94) of conviction between baseline 
and CBM-I phases.  Similarly, there was no change in level (r = -0.173, p = 0.508) or slope (r 
= -0.062, p = 0.815) of conviction between baseline and MRTP phases.  Regarding paranoia 
in table 3.11, even though the baseline is not stable, the magnitude of change would suggest a 
reduction in paranoia following the MRTP that is maintained at follow up. 
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Table 3.11 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.8 and 3.9 
Paranoia Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
43 Reduced Increased  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Decelerating Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 10 12 NC 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N N Y N 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction Y N Y Y 
Mean 
Conviction 
Ratings 
36 Reduced NC  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 3 17 36 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.5.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.12 
Standardised measures for participant 3  
Measure B1 B2 CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
J J J X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
J J J X X 
EoE 0 1 1 2 2 
PBM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RTHC 3 1 2 1 0 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, J – JTC, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 3 – 
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rejected/dismissed contradiction, 2 – accommodated contradiction into delusion, 1 – reduced 
delusional conviction, 0 – dismissed delusion. 
Table 3.12 indicates that participant 3 did JTC on both beads tasks during both time-
point one and two assessments and the CBM-I phase.  Participant 3 did not JTC on either task 
following the MRTP phase.  This continued at follow up.  Scores on the EoE assessment 
indicate improved belief flexibility at the second time-point, with a further improvement 
following the MRTP phase, maintained at follow up.  PBM scores did not change throughout.  
RTHC assessments indicate an improvement in belief flexibility at second time-point, which 
remained the same throughout both package phases.  Participant 3 eventually dismissed the 
belief at follow up.  These results indicate that the MRTP, not the CBM-I package, improved 
reasoning biases. 
3.5.5 Participant 3 summary.  Participant 3 fluctuated in idiographic ratings of 
anxiety and paranoia, but there was some indication of a decrease following introduction of 
CBM-I, which was maintained with following the MRTP.  SIAS scores remained in the 
clinical range throughout.  GPTS scores reduced during time-point one and two, maintained 
following CBM-I and further decreased after the MRTP.  However, they increased to clinical 
and non-reliable levels at follow-up.  This suggests that the MRTP did reduce paranoia, which  
remains reliably reduced at follow up.  Initial conviction satisfied study inclusion criteria of 
above 50% but mean baseline conviction fell below this.  There was no effect on conviction.  
Reasoning biases improved after the MRTP.  Therefore, reasoning biases were influenced by 
the MRTP, as was paranoia, which supports the idea that reasoning biases are implicated in 
paranoia.  There seemed to be some discrepancy between idiographic and standardised ratings 
of social anxiety and paranoia.  Unfortunately, participant 3 reported getting little help from 
either package.  Overall, it seemed that there was only a minor effect of either package, 
possibly because participant 3 had a more severe overall presentation. 
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3.6 Participant 4 
Participant 4 is a 47 year old female, with 14 years duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Recovery Services. 
3.6.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.10 Participant 4 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores  
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety appeared unstable, but without significant change 
in symptoms (tau = -.015, p = .927).  Table 3.13 provides the results from visual inspection of 
figure 3.10, which indicates that CBM-I improved social anxiety. 
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Table 3.13 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.10 
Social anxiety Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
54 Reduced Increased  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC Increase 
Slope Stable Decelerating Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 1 8 39 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N Y Y 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N Y Y 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.6.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.11 Participant 4 idiographic conviction scores  
 
Baseline idiographic conviction was not stable, but there was no significant direction 
in trend (tau = -.109 p = .502).  Table 3.14 provides the results from visual inspection of 
figure 3.11. Conviction ratings appear to reduce following introduction of the CBM-I 
package.  
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3.6.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.12 Participant 4 idiographic and standardised paranoia scores 
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia did not appear stable from visual inspection, but change 
was not shown to be significant over the baseline phase (tau = 0, p= 1).  Table 3.14 provides 
the results from visual inspection of figures 3.11 and 3.12, indicating a reduction in conviction 
following the MRTP that is further reduced after CBM-I.  SMA indicated no change in level 
(r = -0.254, p = 0.207) or slope (r = -0.238, p = 0.224) of conviction between baseline and 
MRTP phases.  Comparison between baseline and CBM-I phases revealed a significant 
reduction in level (r = -0.641, p < .01) but not slope (r = -0.437, p = 0.117) of conviction.  
This indicates that CBM-I, not the MRTP significantly improved conviction.  Visual 
inspection results in table 3.14 indicate that the MRTP improved paranoia as measured by 
idiographic ratings and GPTS scores. 
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Table 3.14 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.11 and 3.12 
Paranoia Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
57 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Decelerating  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 1 8 NC 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N Y Y Y 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N Y Y Y 
Mean 
Conviction 
ratings 
70 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC Abrupt 
Slope Stable Stable Decelerating  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 1 8 39 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.6.4 Reasoning data. 
Table 3.15 
Standardised measures for participant 4  
Measure B1 B2 MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
EoE 0 0 2 2 2 
PBM No No Yes Yes Yes 
RTHC 3 2 1 1 1 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 3 – 
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rejected/dismissed contradiction, 2 – accommodated contradiction into delusion, 1 – reduced 
delusional conviction. 
Table 3.14 indicates that participant 4 did not JTC on any of the beads tasks during all 
phases.  Scores on the EoE assessment indicate improved belief flexibility following the 
MRTP phase, which was maintained throughout CBM-I and follow up.  PBM scores 
improved following the MRTP phase.  RTHC assessments indicate improved belief flexibility 
after the MRTP phase, which was maintained throughout.  This indicates that the MRTP 
improved reasoning biases. 
3.6.5 Participant 4 summary.  There was fluctuation in idiographic measures of 
social anxiety and paranoia to start off with which reduced with the introduction of the MRTP 
and was maintained.  Clinical and reliable reduction in SIAS scores occurred only after 
introduction of CBM-I.  A clinical and reliable reduction in GPTS scores occurred after 
introduction of the MRTP, and was maintained.  There was a reduction in conviction by the 
end of MRTP package, which became significant following CBM-I.  Improvement in 
reasoning biases (EoE, PBM, RTHC) occurred following introduction of the MRTP which 
was maintained across phases.  There was marked discrepancy between idiographic and 
standardised ratings of social anxiety; however, the same paranoia measures seemed to follow 
a similar trajectory to one another.  Participant 4 reported finding it challenging to practice the 
ideas presented by both packages, although they tried very hard to make this happen.  
Participant 4 reported seeing the potential for the packages to help a good deal.  With this in 
mind, participant 4 worked very hard to challenge their views in relation to other people and 
particularly the neighbours (who were the persecutors), to the point where participant 4 
reported not dismissing the belief fully, but being much less distressed by it.  Even though 
participant 4’s presentation could be thought of as more severe than others, there seemed to be 
a strong response to both package packages in this case. 
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3.7 Participant 5 
Participant 5 is a 53 year old male, with 20 years duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Recovery Services. 
3.7.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.13 Participant 5 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores  
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety was stable (tau = .309, p = .099).  Table 3.16 
provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.13, indicating that CBM-I improved 
social anxiety. 
 
 
 84 
 
Table 3.16 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.13 
Social anxiety Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
99 Slight increase Slight reduction  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable Stable 
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 NC 7 31 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N Y N 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N Y Y Y 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.7.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.14 Participant 5 idiographic conviction scores  
 
Baseline conviction appeared stable visually, but testing indicated a significant 
increase over time (tau = .387, p < .05).  Table 3.17 provides the results from visual 
inspection of figure 3.14, suggesting that conviction did reduce over the study period. 
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3.7.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.15 Participant 5 idiographic and standardised paranoia scores  
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia was stable (tau = .336, p = .072).  Table 3.17 provides 
the results from visual inspection of figures 3.14 and 3.15, indicating a cumulative effect of 
both packages on conviction.  SMA agreed with this, indicating no change in level (r = -
0.451, p = 0.067) or slope (r = 0.079, p = 0.76) of conviction between baseline and CBM-I 
phases.  Comparison between baseline and MRTP phases indicated a reduction in level (r = -
0.820, p < 0.001) but not slope (r = -0.216, p = 0.533) of conviction.  Table 3.17 also 
indicated that CBM-I improved GPTS scores which were maintained throughout.   
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Table 3.17 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.14 and 3.15 
Paranoia Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
98 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  NC Abrupt Increase NC 
Slope Stable Unstable Unstable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 6 3 NC 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N N Y Y 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N Y Y Y 
Mean 
Conviction 
Ratings 
94 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Accelerating Decelerating Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 6 7 NC 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.7.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.18 
Standardised measures for participant 5  
Measure B1 B2 CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
J X X X X 
EoE 0 0 0 1 1 
PBM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RTHC 1 1 1 0 0 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, J – JTC, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 1 – reduced 
delusional conviction, 0 – dismissed delusion. 
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Table 3.18 shows that participant 5 did not JTC on either of the beads tasks during all 
phases, with the exception of JTC once on the first time-point.  Scores on the EoE assessment 
indicate an improvement in belief flexibility following the MRTP phase, which continued at 
follow up.  PBM scores did not change throughout.  RTHC assessments indicate improved 
belief flexibility following the MRTP phase, where participant 5 dismissed the belief.  This 
continued at follow up.  These results indicate that the MRTP improved reasoning biases. 
3.7.5 Participant 5 summary.  There were no changes in idiographic ratings of social 
anxiety, but reliable change in SIAS scores occurred following CBM-I, which was maintained 
(and became clinically significant) after introduction of MRTP package.  Reduction in 
idiographic ratings of paranoia following CBM-I followed further reduction during the MRTP 
package.  Reliable and clinical change in GPTS scores occurred following introduction of 
CBM-I which was maintained (and became clinically significant) following MRTP package.  
Reduction in conviction occurred following CBM-I and a further significant reduction was 
observed following the MRTP.  Improvement in reasoning biases (EoE, RTHC) occurred only 
after the MRTP, which was given after CBM-I, suggesting a specific effect of the MRTP on 
reasoning biases.  There was marked discrepancy between idiographic and standardised 
ratings of social anxiety; however, the same paranoia measures seemed to follow a similar 
trajectory to one another.  Participant 5 reported finding both packages helpful; to the point 
that delusional conviction fell significantly following CBM-I.  This could be due to the nature 
of the belief being that they would be killed if they went outside.  It could be that reduction in 
negative interpretative biases had a knock-on effect on social anxiety and paranoia 
simultaneously.  Even though participant 5’s presentation could be thought of as more severe 
comparatively (with high initial social anxiety, paranoia and conviction), there seemed to be a 
strong response to both package packages in this case. 
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3.8 Participant 6 
Participant 6 was a 30 year old male, with 6 years duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Recovery Services. 
3.8.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.16 Participant 6 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline social anxiety did not appear stable following visual inspection, but there was 
no significant change (tau = .164, p =.453).  Table 3.19 provides the results from visual 
inspection of figure 3.16, indicating no effect on social anxiety. 
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Table 3.19 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.16 
Social anxiety Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
26 Increased Decreased  
Shift in level  Abrupt Abrupt Abrupt 
Slope Stable Accelerating Unstable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 5 3 31 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.8.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.17 Participant 6 idiographic conviction scores 
 
The results of visual inspection of conviction data are in table 3.20. Conviction remained at 
100% throughout the study period. 
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3.8.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.18 Participant 6 idiographic and standardised paranoia scores 
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia was stable (tau = .109, p = .641).  Table 3.20 provides 
the results from visual inspection of figures 3.17 and 3.18, indicating no effect on conviction 
or paranoia. 
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Table 3.20 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.17 and 3.18 
Paranoia Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
9 Increased Reduced Increased 
Shift in level  NC Abrupt Abrupt Increase 
Slope Stable Accelerating Decelerating  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 11 3 31 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Mean 
conviction  100 100 100  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change   NC NC NC 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.7.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.21 
Standardised measures for participant 6  
Measure B1 B2 CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
EoE 0 0 0 0 0 
PBM No Yes No Yes Yes 
RTHC 3 3 3 3 3 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 3 – 
rejected/dismissed contradiction. 
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Table 3.21 shows that participant 6 did not JTC on either of the beads tasks during all 
phases.  Scores on the EoE assessment indicate a lack of belief flexibility, which continued 
across all conditions.  PBM scores changed during time-point one and two, again after the 
CBM-I phase, and again following the MRTP phase.  RTHC assessments indicate a lack of 
belief flexibility such that participant 6 completely rejected the scenario every time.  These 
results indicate no effect of the packages on reasoning biases. 
3.8.5 Participant 6 summary.  Idiographic ratings of social anxiety fluctuated 
throughout the study and were quite low ratings in comparison to other participants.  No 
change in SIAS scores indicated no effect on social anxiety.  Idiographic paranoia was also 
low to start off with, increasing slightly following introduction of package and then fluctuated 
over duration of study.  GPTS scores were also lower than other participants to begin with and 
were under the clinical cut-off.  No reliable change indicated lack of any effect on paranoia.  
Conviction remained at 100% throughout study, and there were no effects of either package 
on reasoning biases.  Although idiographic and standardised measures of social anxiety and 
paranoia followed similar trajectories, the idiographic ratings did not reflect the severity of the 
standardised measures.  Participant 6 reported not finding either package to be of any help.  
They felt that the CBM-I paradigm was ‘obvious’ and ‘childish’ in its aims, and they reported 
feeling a little patronised by it.  Even though participant 6’s presentation could be thought of 
as less severe than others, there seemed to be no response to either package packages in this 
case. 
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3.9 Participant 7 
Participant 7 is a 41 year old male, with 13 years duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Recovery Services. 
3.9.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.19 Participant 7 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety did not appear stable from visual inspection, but 
was not shown to be significantly changing over the baseline phase (tau = -0.197, p = 0.25).  
Table 3.22 provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.19, indicating that the 
MRTP improved social anxiety. 
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Table 3.22 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.19 
Social anxiety Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
48 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 1 3 NC 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N Y Y Y 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N Y Y Y 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.9.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.20 Participant 7 idiographic conviction scores  
 
Baseline idiographic conviction appeared stable following visual inspection and was 
also shown not to significantly change over the baseline period (tau = -0.01, p = 0.97).  Table 
3.23 provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.20 and suggests that conviction 
reduced following the introduction of the MRTP package. 
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3.9.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.21 participant 7 idiographic and standardised paranoia scores 
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia did not appear stable from visual inspection but was not 
found to significantly change over the baseline phase (tau = -0.127, p = 0.483).  Table 3.23 
provides the results from visual inspection of figures 3.20 and 3.21, indicating that the MRTP 
and CBM-I had cumulative effects on conviction.  The results of SMA agreed with this, 
indicating a significant change in level (r = -0.856, p < 0.001) but not slope (r = -0.444, p = 
0.237) of conviction between baseline and MRTP phases and significant reduction in level (r 
= -0.887, p < 0.001) not slope (r = -0.460, p = 0.259) of conviction when comparing baseline 
with CBM-I.  Table 3.23 also indicated that CBM-I improved GPTS scores that maintained at 
follow up. 
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Table 3.23 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.20 and 3.21 
Paranoia Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
50 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt Abrupt NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 1 3 NC 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction * * * * 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N N Y Y 
Mean 
Conviction 
Ratings 
51 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt Abrupt NC 
Slope Stable Decelerating Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 1 3 33 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, * 
- Scored below clinical cut off at time-points one/two, N – No, Y – Yes 
3.9.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.24 
Standardised measures for participant 7  
Measure B1 B2 MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
J J X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
J J X X X 
EoE 0 0 1 2 2 
PBM Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
RTHC 1 1 0 0 0 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, J – JTC, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 1 – reduced 
delusional conviction, 0 – dismissed delusion. 
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As indicated in Table 3.24, participant 7 JTC on both of the beads tasks during both 
time-points one and two, but not following the MRTP phase.  Scores on the EoE assessment 
indicate improved belief flexibility following the MRTP phase and a further improvement 
following the CBM-I phase, which is maintained at follow up.  PBM scores remain 
unchanged.  RTHC assessments indicate improved belief flexibility following the MRTP 
phase, which is maintained thereafter.  These results indicate that the MRTP improved 
reasoning biases. 
3.9.5 Participant 7 summary.  There was some fluctuation in idiographic anxiety and 
paranoia at baseline, and a reduction in idiographic social anxiety and paranoia following the 
start of the MRTP package which was maintained with the CBM-I package and at follow-up. 
A reliable and clinically significant reduction in SIAS scores occurred following the MRTP 
which was maintained with CBM-I and at follow-up.  Reduction in GPTS scores occurred 
following the MRTP but this only became reliable following CBM-I package and was 
maintained at follow up.  Participant 7 was below the clinical cut off for paranoia throughout.  
Conviction analyses indicated cumulative effects of both the MRTP and CBM-I.  The MRTP 
improved reasoning biases.  Idiographic and standardised ratings of social anxiety and 
paranoia measures seemed to follow a similar trajectory to one another.  Qualitatively, 
Participant 7 reported finding the MRTP very helpful and CBM-I less so (it was described by 
the participant as “boring”).  The MRTP was felt to be so helpful that their delusion was 
dismissed completely by the end of the study.  Participant 7 was the only person for whom the 
MRTP significantly improved social anxiety.  Participant 7’s presentation could be thought of 
as less severe than others, which may partly explain the positive response to both package 
packages in this case. 
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3.10 Participant 8 
Participant 8 is a 48 year old male, with 8 years duration of difficulties, recruited from 
Recovery Services. 
3.10.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.22 Participant 8 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety was stable (tau = -0.159, p = 0.536).  Table 3.25 
provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.22, indicating some reduction in social 
anxiety, although this was not significant or reliable. However, participant 8 scored below the 
clinical cut-off for social anxiety from the start of the study. 
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Table 3.25 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.22 
Social anxiety Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
27 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 4 NC NC 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction * * * * 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, * 
- Already below clinical cut off, N – No 
3.10.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.23 participant 8 idiographic conviction scores 
 
Visual examination of figure 3.23 is displayed in table 3.26.  Conviction remained high 
throughout the duration of the study. 
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3.10.3 Paranoia Data.   
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia was stable (tau = -0.297, p = 0.23).  Table 3.26 provides 
the results from visual inspection of figures 3.23 and 3.24, indicating no effect on conviction 
and that the MRTP improved GPTS scores, which was maintained throughout the CBM-I 
package phase and at follow up. 
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Table 3.26 
Results of visual inspection of conviction and paranoia data in figures 3.23 and 3.24 
Paranoia Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
41 Reduced Increased  
Shift in level  Abrupt Increase Abrupt Decrease NC 
Slope Stable Unstable Accelerating  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 4 3 NC 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction * * * * 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N Y Y Y 
Mean 
conviction  75 75 75  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change   NC NC NC 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, * 
- Scored below clinical cut off, N – No, Y – Yes. 
3.10.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.27 
Standardised measures for participant 8  
Measure B1 B2 MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
J J X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
J J X X X 
EoE 1 1 2 1 1 
PBM No No Yes No No 
RTHC 2 2 2 2 2 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, J – JTC, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 2 – 
accommodated contradiction into delusion. 
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Table 3.27 shows that participant 8 JTC on both of the beads tasks during both time-
points one and two.  This improved following the MRTP phase and throughout.  Scores on the 
EoE assessment indicate an improvement in belief flexibility following the MRTP phase, that 
returned to baseline level following the CBM-I phase and at follow up.  PBM scores 
improved only following the MRTP phase and also revert back to baseline level following 
CBM-I and at follow up.  RTHC assessments indicate lack of belief flexibility throughout.  
These results indicate that the MRTP improved reasoning biases.  
3.10.5 Participant 8 summary.  Reduction in idiographic ratings of anxiety occurred 
following the MRTP which was maintained (and potentially further reduced) following CBM-
I.  There were no reliable changes in SIAS scores, but participant 8 scored below the clinical 
cut off at time-point one and two.  Idiographic ratings of paranoia fluctuated throughout the 
study, but these were not as high as other participants.  A reliable reduction in GPTS scores 
occurred after the MRTP and was maintained throughout, but participant 8 scored below the 
clinical cut off for paranoia at time-point one and two.  Conviction remained at 75% 
throughout.  There was some indication of improvement in reasoning biases (JTC, EoE, 
PBM) following MRTP but only improvement in the JTC task maintained with CBM-I and at 
follow up.  This indicates that the MRTP improved reasoning biases and paranoia.  There was 
marked discrepancy between idiographic and standardised ratings of social anxiety; however, 
the idiographic and GPTS measures seemed to follow a similar trajectory to one another.  
Participant 8 reported not finding either package to be particularly helpful.  Participant 8’s 
less severe presentation (comparatively) may partly explain the positive effects of both 
packages. 
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3.11 Participant 9 
Participant 9 is a 55 year old male, with 23 years duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Recovery Services. 
3.11.1 Social anxiety data. 
Figure 3.25 Participant 9 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety was stable (tau = -0.221, p = 0.249).  Table 3.28 
provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.25, indicating a reduction in idiographic 
ratings and a significant reduction in SIAS scores by the end of the study. 
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Table 3.28 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.25 
Social anxiety Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
76 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 9 NC NC 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N N Y 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
3.11.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.26 Participant 9 idiographic conviction scores across all conditions 
 
Baseline conviction improved, making interpretation more difficult due to the 
direction of conviction being the same as that of the package phases, which makes it more 
difficult to ascertain if any reduction in conviction can  be attributed to either package (tau = -
0.683, p < .001).  Table 3.29 provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.26. 
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3.11.3 Paranoia Data. 
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia was improving (tau = 0.424, p < 0.05).  Table 3.29 
provides the results from visual inspection of figures 3.26 and 3.27, indicating that the MRTP 
significantly reduced conviction but already within the context of some improvement.  The 
SMA results were in agreement with this observation, indicating no significant change in 
level (r = -0.296, p = 0.5768) but a significant reduction in slope (r = -0.820, p < 0.05) 
between baseline and CBM-I phases.  A significant change in level (r = -0.778, p < 0.05) and 
slope (r = -0.830, p < 0.05) of conviction was found between baseline and MRTP phases.  
The results in table 3.29 also indicate no clear effect of either package on paranoia, although 
there was a reliable reduction at follow up. 
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Table 3.29 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.26 and 3.27 
Paranoia Baseline CBM MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
30 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt NC NC 
Slope Decelerating Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 1 NC NC 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction * * * * 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N N N Y 
Mean 
Conviction 
Ratings 
33 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Decelerating Stable Decelerating  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 NC 7 NC 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, * 
- scores below clinical cut off, N – No, Y – Yes. 
3.11.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.30 
Standardised measures for participant 9  
Measure B1 B2 CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
J X X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
EoE 0 0 0 1 2 
PBM Y Y Y Y Y 
RTHC 1 1 1 0 0 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, J – JTC, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, Y – Yes, 
N – No, PBM – Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical 
Contradiction; 1 – reduced delusional conviction, 0 – dismissed delusion. 
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Table 3.30 shows that participant 9 JTC once at time-point one, and did not JTC on 
either beads task during all remaining phases.  Scores on the EoE assessment indicate lack of 
belief flexibility, which improved following MRTP and follow up phases.  PBM scores were 
stable across phases.  RTHC assessments indicate belief flexibility that improved following 
the MRTP and follow up phases, such that participant 9 dismissed the delusion.  These results 
indicate that the MRTP improved reasoning biases. 
3.11.5 Participant 9 summary.  A reduction in idiographic ratings of social anxiety 
occurred following CBM-I, with a further reduction following the MRTP.  There was no 
reliable reduction in SIAS scores following either package but a reliable change had occurred 
at follow up.  Some reduction in idiographic ratings of paranoia followed CBM-I and were 
maintained throughout, however, there was some improvement during baseline.  GPTS scores 
were also below the clinical range throughout the study.  No reliable change in GPTS scores 
occurred following either package but there was a gradual decreasing slope in GPTS scores 
over the duration of study that ended up with reliable reduction at follow up.  Conviction also 
improved during baseline and was maintained during CBM-I, with an additional reduction 
following the MRTP.  There was some improvement in reasoning biases only following 
MRTP (EoE, RTHC) but participant 9 already showed flexibility at time-point one and two 
(PBM) and JTC improved between both time-points.  Idiographic and standardised measures 
of social anxiety largely agree with one another and follow a similar trajectory.  Idiographic 
and GPTS scores also follow a similar trajectory, but the severity of both scores is not 
matched, i.e., idiographic measures don’t reflect the same severity as the GPTS.  Participant 9 
reported finding both packages very helpful and gave several examples of how they had put 
into practice the training tips from the MRTP.  Participant 9’s comparatively less severe 
presentation may partly explain the positive response to both package packages. However, it 
is difficult to ascertain specific effects of either package due to the gradually improving 
profile of scores over the duration of the study. 
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3.12 Participant 10 
Participant 10 is a 61 year old male, with 1.5 years duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Recovery Services. 
3.12.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.28 Participant 10 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety was improving (tau = -0.614, p < 0.01).  Table 
3.31 provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.28, indicating that CBM-I 
improved social anxiety but this became non-reliable at follow-up, although the reduction was 
maintained to some degree. 
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Table 3.31 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.28 
Social anxiety Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
58 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Decelerating Decelerating Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 7 3 NC 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction * * * * 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N Y N 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, * 
- Scores within non-clinical range, N – No, Y – Yes. 
 
3.12.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.29 participant 10 idiographic conviction scores  
 
Visual examination of figure 3.29 is in table 3.32.  Conviction remained high over the 
duration of the study. 
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3.12.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.30 participant 10 idiographic and standardised paranoia scores  
 
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia improved (tau = -.569, p < 0.05).  Table 3.32 provides 
the results from visual inspection of figures 3.29 and 3.30, indicating no effect of either 
package on conviction or paranoia. 
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Table 3.32 
Results of visual inspection of conviction and paranoia data in figures 3.29 and 3.30 
Paranoia Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
59 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Decelerating Decelerating Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 12 4 30 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Mean 
conviction  90 90 90  
Shift in level  NC NC NC 
Slope Stable Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change   NC NC NC 
Note: NC – No Change, N – No, Y – Yes. 
 
3.12.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.33 
Standardised measures for participant 10  
Measure B1 B2 MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
EoE 0 0 2 1 2 
PBM No No Yes Yes Yes 
RTHC 2 2 1 1 1 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, J – JTC, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 2 – 
accommodated contradiction into delusion, 1 – reduced delusional conviction. 
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Table 3.33 shows that participant 10 did not JTC on either of the beads tasks during all 
assessments.  Scores on the EoE indicate improved belief flexibility following the MRTP 
phase, which was maintained at follow up.  PBM scores improved following the MRTP phase 
and were maintained at CBM-I and follow up.  RTHC assessments indicate belief flexibility 
that improved following the MRTP phase and was maintained.  These results indicate that the 
MRTP improved reasoning biases. 
3.12.5 Participant 10 summary.  Idiographic ratings of social anxiety and paranoia 
improved during baseline and were further improved following the MRTP, which was 
maintained throughout.  Reliable reduction in SIAS scores only occurred following CBM-I, 
but was not maintained at follow up.  SIAS scores remained below the clinical cut-off 
throughout.  There were no changes in GPTS scores or conviction rates throughout the study 
(conviction remained at 90%).  Improvements in reasoning biases occurred following the 
MRTP (EoE, PBM, RTHC), and were maintained during CBM –I and at follow up.  Although 
idiographic and standardised measures of social anxiety follow a similar trajectory, they do 
not match on severity, as the idiographic data indicate more severe levels of social anxiety 
than the SIAS scores.  Idiographic and standardised paranoia scores are very disparate and do 
not follow the same trajectory; the GPTS scores reflect more severe paranoia than the 
idiographic ratings would suggest.  Participant 10 was not experiencing clinical levels of 
social anxiety when entering the study, which may partly explain the positive response to 
CBM-I.  Similarly, participant 10’s more severe clinical GPTS scores did not respond 
significantly, even though idiographic measures of paranoia did.  Participant 10 reported 
finding the packages somewhat helpful and worked hard to practice some of the training tips, 
but found this difficult to translate into clinical gains, particularly in terms of paranoia. 
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3.13 Participant 11 
Participant 11 is a 46 year old female, with 15 years duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Recovery Services. 
3.13.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.31 Participant 11 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety ratings appeared to improve, but this was not 
found to be significant (tau = -0.341, p = 0.14).  Table 3.34 provides the results from visual 
inspection of figure 3.31, indicating no effect on social anxiety. 
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Table 3.34 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.31 
Social anxiety Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
54 Increased Reduced  
Shift in level  Abrupt Abrupt NC 
Slope Stable Stable Decelerating  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 2 3 28 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
 
3.13.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.32 Participant 11 idiographic conviction scores  
 
Baseline idiographic conviction scores significantly improved over the baseline phase 
(tau = -0.611, p <.01).  Table 3.35 provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.32 
and suggest no effect of either package on conviction. 
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3.13.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.33 Participant 11 idiographic and standardised paranoia scores 
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia was found to significantly improve over the baseline 
phase (tau = -0.641, p <.01).  Table 3.35 provides the results from visual inspection of figures 
3.32 and 3.33, indicating no effect on conviction, which was supported by SMA, indicating 
identical statistics when comparing baseline with the MRTP and CBM-I phases; no 
significant change in level (r = 0.371, p = 0.401) or slope (r = -0.396, p = 0.368) of 
conviction.   Table 3.35 also indicated a reliable reduction of CBM-I on paranoia that 
clinically reduced following the MRTP, but which was not maintained at follow up. 
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Table 3.35 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.32 and 3.33 
Paranoia Baseline CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
55 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  NC Abrupt NC 
Slope Decelerating Stable Decelerating  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 NC 3 NC 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N N Y N - increased 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N Y Y N 
Mean 
Conviction 
Ratings 
62 Increased NC  
Shift in level  Abrupt Increase NC NC 
Slope Decelerating Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 2 NC NC 
Note: NC – No Change, N – No, Y – Yes. 
3.13.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.36 
Standardised measures for participant 11  
Measure B1 B2 CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
X X X X X 
EoE 0 0 0 0 0 
PBM No No No No No 
RTHC 3 1 2 2  2 
Note: X – not Jumping to Conclusions, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – 
Possibility of being mistaken, RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 3 – 
rejected/dismissed contradiction, 2 – accommodated contradiction into delusion, 1 – reduced 
conviction 
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Table 3.36 shows that participant 11 did not JTC on either of the beads tasks during all 
phases.  Scores on the EoE and PBM assessments indicate lack of belief flexibility across all 
conditions.  RTHC assessments indicate improved belief flexibility at second time-point, 
which reverts to lack of belief flexibility across all other phases.  These results indicate no 
effect on reasoning biases. 
3.13.5 Participant 11 summary.  There was some fluctuation in baseline idiographic 
anxiety and paranoia that appeared to be improving spontaneously.  There was some 
improvement following CBM-I and additional reduction following MRTP, maintained at 
follow up.  No reliable or clinically significant change in SIAS scores occurred following 
either package participant 11 remained stably high throughout.  Reliable reduction in GPTS 
scores occurred following CBM-I with clinically significant change occurring following 
MRTP.  However, scores had increased back to time-point one and two levels at follow up.  
There was a slight increase in conviction during package phase – this was due to the 
realisation at follow up assessment that participant 11 was rating how much they believed the 
delusion was happening presently, rather than rating how much did they believe it at all.  
When queried, participant 11 decided to go back over the idiographic ratings and re-rate; 
because it was felt the previous conviction ratings were lower and not accurate.  During the 
course of the study, participant 11 believed that the secret service had withdrawn their 
surveillance equipment and had stopped the persecution for the time being.  No effect of 
either package on reasoning biases was noted.  There was also marked discrepancy between 
idiographic and standardised ratings of social anxiety and paranoia.  Participant 11 reported 
finding limited benefit from both packages.  Participant 11’s comparatively more severe 
presentation may partly explain the lack of maintained response to both package packages.  
Participant 11 had their Flupentixol Decanoate depot reduced from 120mg to 100mg 
fortnightly during week two of the package phase.  This may indicate that their symptoms 
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were improving, as participant 11 had spent over two months in a psychiatric ward and had 
been consented on to the study five weeks post discharge.   
3.14 Participant 12 
Participant 12 is a 22 year old female, with one year duration of difficulties, recruited 
from Early Package Services. 
3.14.1 Social anxiety data.   
Figure 3.34 Participant 12 idiographic and standardised social anxiety scores 
 
Baseline idiographic social anxiety looked stable following visual inspection but was 
shown to significantly worsen over the baseline phase (tau = 0.425, p < .05).  Table 3.37 
provides the results from visual inspection of figure 3.34, indicating no effect of either 
package on social anxiety. 
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Table 3.37 
Results of visual inspection of social anxiety data in figure 3.34 
Social anxiety Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
98 Reduced Reduced  
Shift in level  NC NC Abrupt Increase 
Slope Accelerating Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 4 11 29 
SIAS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
SIAS Reliable 
Reduction N N N N 
Note: NC – No Change, Latency of change between phases is expressed as number of days, N 
– No, Y – Yes. 
 
3.14.2 Conviction data.   
Figure 3.35 participant 12 idiographic conviction scores 
 
Baseline conviction was stable (tau = 1, p = 1).  Table 3.38 provides the results from 
visual inspection of figure 3.35, suggesting a small reduction in conviction following the 
CBM-I package phase. 
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3.12.3 Paranoia Data.   
Figure 3.36 participant 12 idiographic and standardised paranoia scores 
 
Baseline idiographic paranoia appeared stable following visual inspection but was 
shown to significantly worsen over the baseline phase (tau = 0.488, p < .01).  Table 3.38 
provides the results from visual inspection of figures 3.29 and 3.30, indicating no significant 
effect on conviction.  However, SMA results differed from this analysis slightly.  SMA 
analysis could not be performed as all values within baseline and MRTP phases were 
identical.   However, significant change in level (r = -0.410, p = 0.0344) not slope (r = -0.173, 
p = 0.3972) of conviction was found between baseline and CBM-I phases, which does 
indicate an effect of CBM-I on conviction.  Table 3.38 also indicated that a reliable reduction 
in GPTS scores was only present at follow up. 
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Table 3.38 
Results of visual inspection of paranoia and conviction data in figures 3.35 and 3.36 
Paranoia Baseline MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
Mean 
Idiographic 
Ratings 
21 Increase NC  
Shift in level  NC NC Abrupt Increase 
Slope Accelerating Stable Stable  
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 NC NC 29 
GPTS Clinical 
Reduction N N N N 
GPTS Reliable 
Reduction N N N Y 
Mean 
Conviction 
Ratings 
100 NC Decreased  
Shift in level  NC NC Abrupt 
Slope Stable Stable Stable Stable 
Latency of 
change between 
phases 
 NC 11 29 
Note: NC – No Change, N – No, Y – Yes. 
3.14.4 Reasoning data 
Table 3.39 
Standardised measures for participant 12  
Measure B1 B2 MRTP CBM-I Follow Up 
85:15 Beads 
Task 
J J J J J 
60:40 Beads 
Task 
J J J J J 
EoE 0 0 2 1 1 
PBM N N Y N N 
RTHC 3 2 1 1 1 
Note: J – JTC, EoE – Explanations of Experiences, PBM – Possibility of being mistaken, 
RTHC – Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction; 3 – rejected/dismissed contradiction, 2 – 
accommodated contradiction into delusion, 1 – reduced delusional conviction. 
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Table 3.39 shows that participant 12 did JTC on both tasks at all assessments.  Scores 
on the EoE indicate improved belief flexibility following the MRTP phase, which declined 
but remained improved at follow up.  PBM scores improved following the MRTP phase but 
were not maintained at CBM-I and follow up.  RTHC assessments indicate belief flexibility 
that improved following the MRTP phase and was maintained.  These results indicate that the 
MRTP improved reasoning biases. 
3.14.5 Participant 12 summary.  Idiographic anxiety and paranoia remained stable 
visually, but were shown to worsen over time according to tau calculations with very slight 
reductions in both package phases.  No reliable or clinically significant change in SIAS scores 
occurred following either package (social anxiety remained stably high).  No reliable or 
clinically significant change occurred in GPTS scores following either package (paranoia 
remained stably high), with a reliable decrease at follow up.  Conviction ratings remained 
stably high with a suggestion of a very slight decrease following CBM-I.  Reasoning biases 
improved following the MRTP package (EoE, PBM, RTHC) but only EoE remained 
following CBM-I.  JTC occurred throughout.  Although idiographic and standardised 
measures of social anxiety seemed to follow the same trajectory, there was marked 
discrepancy between idiographic and standardised measures of paranoia.  Participant 12 
reported limited benefit from both packages, and struggled to leave the house, even to go to 
the shops.  Participant 12’s comparatively more severe presentation may partly explain the 
lack of response to either package packages.  Participant 12 changed from Risperidone 10mg 
daily to Olanzapine 20mg daily during the baseline period, because those involved in their 
care felt that the symptoms were worsening.  
Following inspection of data for individual participants, the next section will collate 
data from all participants and relate this to the hypotheses posed in section 2.5. 
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3.15 Hypothesis one: In comparison to baseline, five sessions of CBM-I will reduce levels 
of social anxiety, but will not improve reasoning 
 Table 3.40 below collates the data on differential effects of CBM-I on social anxiety.  
Overall, it shows that social anxiety significantly improved following CBM-I in three out of 
twelve participants.  CBM-I did not improve reasoning biases in any participants. 
Table 3.40 
Collated data on differential effects of CBM-I on social anxiety per participant 
Note: Y – Yes, N – No, ^ - Participant scored below clinical cut off to begin with * – 
Reduction occurred, but maintained following significant reduction from MRTP, N/A – not 
applicable 
Using the Friedman test, social anxiety did not significantly change over the 2nd time-
point or both package phases (χ2 (2) = 5.522, p = .066).  To test for potential differential 
effects, Wilcoxon tests were conducted using a Bonferroni correction for three multiple 
comparisons.  This yielded  
 
Participant 
 
Baseline 
and 1st 
package 
Reliable 
Reduction 
in Social 
Anxiety 
Clinical 
Reduction 
in Social 
Anxiety 
Improved 
Reasoning 
Biases 
Hypothesis 
One 
Supported 
Maintained 
at follow 
up 
1 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
2 2 weeks 
MRTP 
N N^ N N N/A 
3 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
4 3 weeks 
MRTP 
Y Y N Y Y 
5 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
Y N N Y Y 
6 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
7 3 weeks 
MRTP 
* * N N Y 
8 2 weeks 
MRTP 
N N^ N N N/A 
9 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
10 2 weeks 
MRTP 
Y N^ N Y N 
11 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
12 3 weeks 
MRTP 
N N N N N/A 
 124 
 
p = .05/3, p = .0167.   
Effect sizes were computed by using the formula from Field (2005): 
r = Z*√N 
Where r = the effect size, Z = significance Z score computed for each T statistic and N 
= the total number of observations.   
Mean (± SD) social anxiety for time-point two, CBM-I and MRTP conditions were 
49.17 (16.57), 39.42 (17.57) and 44.25 (15.68) respectively.  Compared to time-point two, 
social anxiety significantly reduced following CBM-I (T = 5, r = -0.51, p < .01).  There was 
no difference in social anxiety when comparing time-point two and MRTP phases (T = 24.5, r 
= -0.15, p = .239).  Similarly, there was no difference in social anxiety between either 
treatment phase when taking the Bonferroni correction into account (T = 64, r = -0.4, p = 
.026).  Mean (± SD) social anxiety at follow up was 37.33 (14.93).  Reduction in social 
anxiety was also maintained at follow up (T = 4, r = -0.56, p <.005).  It appears that, in 
comparison to time-point two, the CBM-I phase significantly improved social anxiety, not the 
MRTP.  It should be noted that this test was underpowered, so confidence in the findings is 
limited.  However, the analysis does agree somewhat with the visual inspection that three of 
twelve participants (and a trend in participants 1, 2 & 8) showed reduction in social anxiety, 
while all twelve participants did not improve on reasoning biases.  In two out of three cases 
(participants 4 & 5), reductions in social anxiety were maintained at follow up.  In summary 
therefore, all that can be said about the effects of CBM-I on social anxiety with any degree of 
confidence is that the results are mixed and are therefore unclear.  What must also be taken 
into account is the potential for cumulative effects of CBM-I on social anxiety but also 
potentially on unmeasured depression.    
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3.16 Hypothesis two: In comparison to baseline, five sessions of CBM-I will 
correspondingly reduce levels of severity of paranoia 
 Table 3.41 below collates the data on the effects of CBM-I on levels of paranoia.  
Overall, it shows that six out of twelve participants improved on measures of paranoia 
following the CBM-I package.  In two of the three cases in which social anxiety improved 
following CBM-I (participants 4 & 5), there were corresponding reductions in paranoia.  In 
one case (participant 10) a reduction in social anxiety occurred following CBM-I, with no 
corresponding reduction in paranoia. 
Table 3.41 
Collated data on effect of CBM-I on paranoia per participant 
Note: Y – Yes, N – No, * - Scored below clinical cut off at baseline, N/A – Not applicable 
 The Friedman test indicated that paranoia changed significantly over the course of 
both package packages (χ2 (2) = 9.913, p < .01).  This was followed up by Wilcoxon tests 
 
Participant 
 
Baseline 
and 1st 
package 
Reliable 
Reduction 
in Paranoia 
Clinical 
Reduction 
in Paranoia 
Reduction 
in 
conviction 
Hypothesis 
Two 
Supported 
Maintained 
at follow 
up 
1 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
2 2 weeks 
MRTP 
Y N Y Y Y 
3 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
4 3 weeks 
MRTP 
N N Y Y Y 
5 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
Y N N Y Y 
6 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N* N N N/A 
7 3 weeks 
MRTP 
Y N* Y Y Y 
8 2 weeks 
MRTP 
N N* N N N/A 
9 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N* N N N/A 
10 2 weeks 
MRTP 
N N N N N/A 
11 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
Y N N Y N 
12 3 weeks 
MRTP 
N N Y Y Y 
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using the Bonferroni correction for three multiple comparisons, yielding p = .0167.  Mean (± 
SD) paranoia scores for the time-point two, CBM-I and MRTP conditions were 107.58 
(28.98), 87.58 (30.15) and 79.67 (36.2) respectively.  Compared to time-point two, paranoia 
significantly reduced following CBM-I (T = 7, r = -0.51, p < .01).  There were no differences 
in paranoia when both treatment phases were compared (T = 45, r = -.10, p = 0.338).  Mean (± 
SD) paranoia scores at follow up were 74.58 (31.3).  Reduction in paranoia was also 
maintained at follow up (T = 0, r = -0.62, p <.001).  It appears that, in comparison to time-
point two, CBM-I significantly improved paranoia, with a moderate effect size.  With regards 
to the visual inspection, it should be noted that an improvement in either conviction or GPTS 
scores constituted an improvement in paranoia, therefore support for hypothesis two.  
Although underpowered, these findings agree with the visual inspection results; six out of 
twelve participants showed significant improvement in either GPTS scores, conviction, or 
both. 
3.17 Hypothesis three: In comparison to baseline, five sessions of the Maudsley Review 
Training Programme (MRTP) will improve reasoning, but will not improve anxiety  
Table 3.42 below collates the data on differential effects of the MRTP on reasoning.  
Overall, this indicates improved reasoning biases in nine out of twelve participants 
(participants 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 & 12) with one out of twelve participants improving in 
social anxiety from the MRTP (participant 7).  This resulted in eight of twelve cases 
supporting hypothesis three. 
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Table 3.42 
Collated data on differential effects of the MRTP on reasoning biases per participant 
 
Participant 
 
Baseline 
and 1st 
package 
Reliable 
Reduction 
in Social 
Anxiety 
Clinical 
Reduction 
in Social 
Anxiety 
Improved 
Reasoning 
Biases 
Hypothesis 
Three 
Supported 
Maintained 
at follow 
up 
1 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
2 2 weeks 
MRTP 
N N* Y Y Y 
3 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N Y Y Y 
4 3 weeks 
MRTP 
N N Y Y Y 
5 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N Y Y Y 
6 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
7 3 weeks 
MRTP 
Y Y Y N Y 
8 2 weeks 
MRTP 
N N* Y Y Y 
9 3 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N Y Y Y 
10 2 weeks 
MRTP 
N N* Y Y Y 
11 2 weeks 
CBM-I 
N N N N N/A 
12 3 weeks 
MRTP 
N N Y Y Y 
Note: Y – Yes, N – No, * - Scored below clinical cut off at time-point one or two, N/A – Not 
applicable 
Taking the dichotomous data of the 85:15, 60:40 beads and PBM tasks together, 
Cochrane’s Q was performed, which indicated significant change in reasoning biases across 
phases (Q (2) = 13.636, p < .001).  To test for differential effects, McNemar’s tests (suitable 
for binary, repeated measures data; UCLA, 2014) were conducted using the Bonferroni 
correction of p = .0167.  Table 3.43 gives the frequency of JTC and the amount of times 
participants indicated there was no possibility that they could be mistaken.   
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Table 3.43 
Frequency table for JTC and PBM data 
 Time-point 2 CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Reasoning Bias Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency 
* 4/12 2/12 1/12 1/12 
^ 4/12 2/12 1/12 1/12 
† 6/12 5/12 2/12 4/12 
Note: * - JTC on the 85:15 task, ^ - JTC on the 60:40 task, † - reporting no possibility of being 
mistaken about delusion on the PBM interview. 
Compared to time-point two, reasoning biases significantly improved following the 
MRTP (r = 0.54, p < .001).  There was no difference in reasoning biases between time-point 
two and the CBM-I phases (p = .063), neither was there a difference between MRTP and 
CBM-I phases when accounting for the correction (p = .031).  The significant improvement 
comparing time-point two and the MRTP maintained at follow up (r = 0.47, p < .005).  These 
results indicate that the MRTP, not CBM-I, improved performance on the 85:15, 60:40 beads 
tasks and the PBM task, with a moderate effect size. 
 The continuous data for the EoE assessment were subjected to Friedman’s test, 
indicating significant differences between time-point two and both treatment phases (χ2 (2) = 
10.457, p < .005).  Mean (± SD) numbers of alternative explanations at time-point two, CBM-
I and MRTP conditions were 0.167 (0.389), 0.75 (0.754) and 1.167 (0.835), respectively.  
Post hoc Wilcoxon tests using the Bonferroni correction of p = .0167 indicated significant 
improvement in reasoning when comparing the MRTP to time-point two (T = 51.5, r = -0.52, 
p < .01).  There was no significant difference in reasoning biases between time-point two and 
CBM-I phases when correcting for multiple comparisons (T = 32, r = -0.43, p = .031), or 
between CBM-I and MRTP phases (T = 24, r = -0.39, p = .063).  Mean (± SD) numbers of 
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alternative explanations at follow up were 1.167 (0.835).  These improvements in EoE scores 
were maintained at follow up, compared to time-point two (T = 51, r = -0.46, p = .01).  These 
results indicate that the MRTP improved performance on the EoE assessment, not CBM-I, 
with small – moderate effect sizes. 
 The ordinal data of the RTHC were tested using Friedman’s test, indicating no 
significant differences in reasoning biases on this measure between phases (χ2 (2) = 4.750, p = 
.114).  Table 3.44 gives the frequency of the four different RTHC codes. 
Table 3.44 
Frequency table for RTHC codes 
 Time-point 2 CBM-I MRTP Follow Up 
Code Frequency Frequency Frequency Frequency 
0 0/12 1/12 3/12 4/12 
1 6/12 6/12 5/12 4/12 
2 5/12 4/12 3/12 3/12 
3 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 
Note: 0 – dismissed delusion, 1 – reduced delusional conviction, 2 – accommodated 
contradiction into delusion, 3 – rejected/dismissed contradiction. 
To investigate potential differential effects, Wilcoxon’s test with the above Bonferroni 
correction of p = .0167 was used, indicating no significant difference in reasoning biases 
between time-point two and MRTP phases (T = 4, r = -0.55, p = .063).  Similarly, there was 
no difference in reasoning biases between time-point two and CBM-I phases (T = 7, r = -0.55, 
p = 0.344), or between CBM-I and MRTP phases (T = 0, r = -0.5, p = 0.125).  These results 
indicate that neither package had any effect on reasoning biases measured by the RTHC. 
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Again, although underpowered, these results do agree with the results from visual 
inspection that indicate that nine out of twelve participants improved in reasoning biases 
following the MRTP, while eight of those nine participants showed no improvement in social 
anxiety. 
3.18 Hypothesis four: In comparison to baseline, five sessions of MRTP will result in a 
corresponding reduction in paranoia 
Table 3.45 below collates the data on the effects of the MRTP on levels of paranoia.  
Overall, this shows that six out of twelve participants (participants 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 & 9) 
experienced an improvement in paranoia from the MRTP.  All of these participants also 
demonstrated improvement in reasoning biases. 
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Table 3.45 
Collated data on effects of the MRTP on paranoia per participant 
Participant 
Baseline 
and 1st 
package 
Reliable 
Reduction 
in Paranoia 
Clinical 
Reduction 
in Paranoia 
Reduction 
in 
conviction 
Hypothesis 
four 
Supported 
Maintained 
at follow 
up 
1 3 weeks CBM-I N N N N N/A 
2 2 weeks MRTP N N N N N/A 
3 2 weeks CBM-I Y Y* N Y Y 
4 3 weeks MRTP Y Y N Y Y 
5 3 weeks CBM-I N N Y Y Y 
6 2 weeks CBM-I N N N N N/A 
7 3 weeks MRTP N N Y Y Y 
8 2 weeks MRTP Y N N Y Y 
9 3 weeks CBM-I N N Y Y Y 
10 2 weeks MRTP N N N N N/A 
11 2 weeks CBM-I N Y^ N N N/A 
12 3 weeks MRTP N N N N N/A 
Note: Y – Yes, N – No, * – clinical reduction was not maintained at follow up, ^ - Further 
clinical reduction followed after MRTP but paranoia scores had already reliably decreased 
following CBM-I, N/A – Not applicable 
 The Friedman test indicated that paranoia changed significantly over the course of 
both package packages (χ2 (2) = 9.913, p < 0.01).  This was followed up by Wilcoxon tests 
using a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons, yielding p = .0167.  Mean (± SD) 
paranoia scores for the time-point two, CBM-I and MRTP conditions were 107.58 (28.98), 
87.58 (30.15) and 79.67 (36.2) respectively.  Compared to time-point two, paranoia 
significantly reduced with the MRTP (T = 4, r = -0.49, p < .01).  There were no differences in 
paranoia when both treatment phases were compared (T = 45, r = -.10, p = 0.338).  Mean (± 
SD) paranoia scores at follow up were 74.58 (31.3).  Reduction in paranoia was also 
maintained at follow up when compared to time-point two (T = 0, r = -0.62, p <.001).  It 
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appears that, in comparison to time-point two, the MRTP significantly improved paranoia, 
with a moderate effect size.   
With regards to the visual inspection, it should be noted that an improvement in either 
conviction or GPTS scores constituted an improvement in paranoia, therefore support for 
hypothesis four.  Although underpowered, the statistical tests above agree with the visual and 
statistical testing of the GPTS and conviction data; six out of twelve participants reduced in 
GPTS scores, conviction, or both. 
3.19 Relationship between social anxiety, reasoning biases and paranoia 
Table 3.46 below outlines the relationship between improved social anxiety, improved 
reasoning biases and paranoia, regardless of the package responsible. 
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Table 3.46 
Relationships between improved social anxiety, improved reasoning biases and paranoia 
Participant 
 
Baseline and 
1st package 
Improved 
Social 
Anxiety 
Improved 
Reasoning 
Biases 
Reduction 
in Paranoia 
Relationship 
Supported 
1 3 weeks CBM-I N N N Y 
2 2 weeks MRTP N Y Y Y 
3 2 weeks CBM-I N Y Y Y 
4 3 weeks MRTP Y Y Y Y 
5 3 weeks CBM-I Y Y Y Y 
6 2 weeks CBM-I N N N Y 
7 3 weeks MRTP Y Y Y Y 
8 2 weeks MRTP N Y Y Y 
9 3 weeks CBM-I N Y Y Y 
10 2 weeks MRTP Y Y N N 
11 2 weeks CBM-I N N Y N 
12 3 weeks MRTP N Y Y Y 
Note: Y – Yes, N – No 
 Table 3.46 above indicates that in eight out of twelve participants (participants 2, 3, 4, 
5, 7, 8, 9 & 12) improved paranoia (measured by a reduction in GPTS and/or conviction, by 
either package) corresponded with improved social anxiety (by either package) and/or 
improved reasoning biases.  In five out of twelve cases (participants 2, 3, 8, 9 & 12), 
improved paranoia corresponded with improved reasoning biases only.  In three out of twelve 
cases (participants 4, 5 &7), improvements in both social anxiety and reasoning biases 
corresponded with improvements in paranoia.  In two cases (participants 1 & 6), no 
improvement in social anxiety and reasoning biases corresponded with no improvement in 
paranoia.  These are the only two cases in the series where neither package had any effect on 
any measures.  In one case (participant 10), improvement in both social anxiety and reasoning 
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biases did not correspond with any reduction in paranoia.  In one case (participant 11), no 
improvement in social anxiety and no improvement in reasoning biases corresponded with 
improvement in paranoia.  Although these findings are quite mixed, overall they suggest that 
in ten out of twelve cases (participants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 & 12), improvement (or lack 
thereof) in social anxiety and/or reasoning biases corresponded with improvement (or lack 
thereof) in paranoia.  In two out of twelve cases (participants 10 & 11), no relationship 
between improvement in social anxiety and/or reasoning biases corresponding with 
improvement in paranoia was found.   
Table 3.47 further clarifies the relationship between social anxiety, reasoning biases 
and paranoia according to which package evoked change.  This indicates that CBM-I 
improved anxiety and correspondingly paranoia in two cases (participants 4 & 5).  It also 
indicates that the MRTP improved reasoning biases and corresponding paranoia in six cases 
(participants 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 & 9).  As indicated, there is overlap in participants 4 and 5, where 
the CBM-I and MRTP packages both improved conviction and GPTS scores. 
Table 3.47 
Relationships between improved social anxiety, improved reasoning biases and paranoia, 
according to package 
Participant 
CBM-I 
Improved 
Social 
Anxiety 
CBM-I 
Reduced 
GPTS 
CBM-I 
Reduced 
Conviction 
MRTP 
Improved 
Reasoning 
Biases 
MRTP 
Reduced 
GPTS 
MRTP 
Reduced 
Conviction 
1       
2  Y Y Y   
3    Y Y  
4 Y  Y Y Y  
5 Y Y  Y  Y 
6       
7  Y Y Y  Y 
8    Y Y  
9    Y  Y 
10 Y   Y   
11  Y     
12   Y Y   
Note: Y – Yes 
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Table 3.48 
Baseline variables that distinguish participants who benefitted from either or both packages 
Participant Mean 
Baseline 
Belief 
Conviction 
Duration of 
Difficulties 
Clinical 
Levels of 
Social 
Anxiety 
Clinical 
Levels of 
Paranoia 
Benefitted 
from 
CBM-I 
Benefitted 
from 
MRTP 
1 100 1 Y Y N N 
2 56 5 N Y Y Y 
3 36 16 Y Y N Y 
4 70 14 Y Y Y Y 
5 94 20 Y Y Y Y 
6 100 6 Y N N N 
7 51 13 Y N Y Y 
8 75 8 N N N Y 
9 33 23 N N N Y 
10 90 1.5 Y Y Y Y 
11 62 15 Y Y Y N 
12 100 1 Y Y N Y 
 
Table 3.48 above gives the participant baseline characteristics and response to either 
or both packages on any measure.  As can be seen, participants 1 and 6 did not respond to 
either package.  Overall, it would seem that mean baseline conviction does not play a 
significant role in response to either/both packages; although participants 1 and 6 had high 
average conviction (100%) throughout baseline and did not respond, other participants with 
high average conviction (e.g., participants 10, 8, 5 & 4) did.  The same could be said for 
duration of difficulties, as some participants with very low duration of difficulties did not 
respond to either package (e.g., participant 1).  From observing the table, it does not appear 
that time-point one and two levels of social anxiety and/or paranoia exert any effect on 
response to package either, although it is difficult to determine relationships without 
inferential statistics. 
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3.20 Chapter conclusion 
This chapter details and displays the results of the current study in ascertaining the 
differential effects of both packages on social anxiety and reasoning biases as well as on 
paranoia.  It may be worth noting here that the overall sample reflects three individuals from 
Early Intervention Services and nine from Recovery services.  Although studies suggest that 
samples from Early Intervention and Recovery services are different, particularly in terms of 
chronicity and duration of difficulties (e.g., Singh, 2010), it is interesting to note here that the 
three participants from Early Intervention (participants 1, 2 & 12) comprised two individuals 
with a comparatively more severe presentation in terms of symptoms and treatment response 
(participants 1 & 12) and an individual with a comparatively less severe presentation overall.  
This indicates that the full sample may be considered in its entirety, without special 
consideration for participants from Early Intervention, as they did not seem to exert a 
differential influence over the presentation of the general sample.   
Three out of twelve participants supported hypothesis one, i.e., that CBM-I would 
improve social anxiety, not reasoning biases.  The statistical analyses also indicated a 
significant effect of CBM-I, not the MRTP, on social anxiety.  Six out of twelve participants 
(participants 2, 4, 5, 7, 11 & 12) supported hypothesis two, that CBM-I would improve 
paranoia.  This comprised four out of twelve reductions in GPTS scores, and four out of 
twelve reductions in conviction, with two cases of overlap.  The underpowered statistical 
analyses also support this hypothesis.   
Eight out of twelve participants supported hypothesis three; that the MRTP would 
improve reasoning biases, not social anxiety.  In one case, (participant 7) the MRTP improved 
social anxiety and reasoning biases.  The statistical analyses described above indicate 
significant improvement of the MRTP, not CBM-I, on reasoning biases, on all measures 
except the RTHC, which failed to reach significance.   
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Six out of twelve participants (3, 4, 5, 7, 8 & 9) supported hypothesis four; that the 
MRTP would reduce paranoia.  This comprised three out of twelve reductions in GPTS scores 
(participants 3, 4 & 8) and three out of twelve reductions in conviction (participants 5, 7 & 9).  
Statistical analyses outlined above also indicate a significant overall effect of the MRTP on 
paranoia. 
Finally, the patterns between improvement (and lack thereof) in social anxiety and/or 
reasoning biases and corresponding improvement (and lack thereof) in paranoia were 
investigated.  A total of eight out of twelve participants demonstrated improvements in social 
anxiety and/or reasoning biases that also corresponded with improvements in paranoia.  Two 
participants did not show any improvements in social anxiety, reasoning biases or paranoia.  
One participant reported improvements in social anxiety and reasoning biases but did not 
report any corresponding improvements in paranoia.  One participant did not report 
improvements in social anxiety or reasoning biases but did report improvements in paranoia.  
These results are discussed in the next section.   
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Discussion 
4.1 Chapter overview 
 This chapter reviews the aims of the study, and interprets and discusses the findings.  
The theoretical implications are discussed with an emphasis on the literature described in the 
introduction.  How this study might inform clinical and service development within the NHS 
is also mentioned.  Future research questions are identified based on this study.  Limitations 
and advantages of the research are also outlined. 
4.2 Aims 
 The main aims of this study were twofold: (1) Do CBM-I and the MRTP exert 
differential effects on social anxiety, and reasoning biases?  (2) Do either/both packages also 
reduce paranoia?  Following a review of the literature, social anxiety and reasoning biases 
were implicated in the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions (Freeman, 2007) 
and may therefore be important therapeutic targets.  However, the link between these 
mechanisms and the potential they may play in the development and persistence of delusional 
levels of paranoia are less clearly understood from the current evidence.  This study aimed to 
clarify any relationship between these clinical constructs. 
4.3 Summary of results 
 Single case series designs are useful from a clinical perspective, but the small sample 
sizes mean that generality of results must be conducted with caution (Kazdin, 2010).  This is 
particularly true for the underpowered group analyses conducted, which undermines 
confidence in the findings.  However, as Harrington (2013) suggests, visual inspection and 
clinical/reliable change should be used in conjunction with inferential statistical tests of single 
case series data.  If these two independent and methodologically different analytical strategies 
 139 
 
both converge on the same results, confidence in the findings and ability to generalise back to 
the population may increase. With this in mind, the hypotheses will now be discussed. 
4.3.1 Hypothesis one: five sessions of CBM-I will reduce levels of social anxiety, 
but will not improve reasoning.  In support of this hypothesis, three of twelve participants 
met reliable and/or clinical reduction in social anxiety (participants 4, 5 and 10).  In one of 
these cases CBM-I occurred first (participant 5) and in two cases (participants 4 & 10) CBM-I 
occurred after the MRTP but it was only at the point that CBM-I was introduced that 
reductions in social anxiety occurred, suggesting a specific effect of CBM-I.  Three 
participants trended towards significantly reduced social anxiety during the CBM-I package 
(participants 1, 2 & 8).  Of the significant changes, two out of three participants’ reduced 
social anxiety was maintained at follow up (with the exception of participant 10).  There were 
no reliable and/or clinical changes in the remaining six participants.  It should be noted that in 
some cases, (participants 2, 8 & 10) time-points one and/or two social anxiety scored below 
the clinical cut off of 34 to begin with.  Having said this, time-points one and/or two scores 
were close to the clinical cut off, suggesting some degree of social anxiety.
 
All twelve participants showed no improvement in reasoning biases following CBM-I, 
suggesting effects of CBM-I that were specific to social anxiety, not reasoning biases.  A 
change in only one quarter of participants provides only partial support for hypothesis one.  
The main reason why more participants did not support hypothesis one was because there was 
no reliable/clinical reduction in social anxiety: a reduction of at least 13/80 points on the 
SIAS.  It is possible that the reason for this is due to the study design – larger effects must be 
present in each case for the analysis strategy to be able to attribute an effect to the treatment 
with confidence (Kazdin, 2010).  Several participants approached reliable/clinical reductions 
in social anxiety, but did not meet reliable or clinical change criteria.  Therefore, the statistical 
tests carried out may clarify whether or not this hypothesis is supported.   
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In addition to the individual differences, group analyses also supported hypothesis 
one.  Although the Friedman test showed no significant change in social anxiety over the 
second time-point or package phases, post hoc Wilcoxon tests showed that, compared to time-
point two, social anxiety significantly reduced following CBM-I.  There was no difference in 
social anxiety when comparing time-point two and MRTP phases.  Reduction in social 
anxiety was also maintained at follow up.  However, social anxiety was still not 
reliably/clinically reduced in nine out of twelve participants.  Taken together, these results 
indicate that CBM-I improved social anxiety but not reasoning biases, in three out of twelve 
participants, with a moderate effect size overall.  The findings for this hypothesis are therefore 
mixed. 
4.3.2 Hypothesis two: five sessions of CBM-I will correspondingly reduce levels of 
severity of paranoia, compared to baseline.  In support of hypothesis two, six out of twelve 
participants showed clinical and/or reliable change in GPTS scores, reduced conviction, or 
both following the CBM-I package (participants 2, 4, 5, 7, 11, & 12).  All participants, except 
participant 11, maintained their gains at follow up.  Reduced paranoia due to CBM-I package 
corresponded with reduced social anxiety in two cases (participants 4 & 5, not participant 10).  
This means that in four cases paranoia reduced without corresponding reliable/clinical 
reduction in social anxiety. 
In addition to the individual differences, group analyses also supported hypothesis 
two.  The Friedman test indicated that paranoia changed significantly over the course of both 
package packages.  This was followed up by Wilcoxon tests using the Bonferroni correction.  
Compared to time-point two, paranoia significantly reduced following CBM-I.  There were no 
differences in paranoia when both treatment phases were compared.  Reduction in paranoia 
was also maintained at follow up.  It appears that, in comparison to time-point two, CBM-I 
significantly improved paranoia, with a moderate effect size.   
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4.3.3 Hypothesis three: five sessions of the Maudsley Review Training 
Programme will improve reasoning, compared to baseline, but will not improve anxiety.  
Following visual inspection, nine out of twelve participants improved in reasoning biases, 
although in one case (participant 7), the MRTP also improved social anxiety.  Therefore, eight 
out of twelve participants’ results supported hypothesis three (participants 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 
& 12).  All participants’ improvements in reasoning biases were maintained at follow up.   
Several group analyses were conducted, based on type of reasoning biases data.  
Cochrane’s Q revealed significant change in reasoning biases across time-point two and 
package phases.  To test for differential effects, McNemar’s tests were conducted using the 
Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons.  Compared to time-point two, reasoning 
biases significantly improved following the MRTP.  There was no difference in reasoning 
biases between time-point two and the CBM-I phases, neither was there a difference between 
MRTP and CBM-I phases when accounting for the correction.  The significant improvement 
comparing time-point two and the MRTP maintained at follow up.  Overall, it seems that the 
MRTP improved these reasoning biases with a moderate effect size, which was maintained at 
follow up. 
Friedman’s test indicated significant differences in EoE data between second time-
point two and both treatment phases.  Post hoc Wilcoxon tests using the Bonferroni correction 
indicated significant improvement in reasoning when comparing the MRTP to time-point two.  
There was no significant difference in reasoning biases between time-point two and CBM-I 
phases when correcting for multiple comparisons or between CBM-I and MRTP phases.  
These improvements in EoE scores maintained at follow up, compared to time-point two.  
These results indicate that the MRTP improved performance on the EoE assessment, with 
small – moderate effect sizes. 
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Friedman’s test indicated no significant differences in RTHC data between phases.  
Post hoc Wilcoxon’s tests with the Bonferroni correction also found no significant difference 
in reasoning biases between time-point two and MRTP phases, or between time-point two and 
CBM-I phases.  These results indicate that neither package had any effect on reasoning biases 
measured by the RTHC.   
Taken together, these results are suggestive of a moderate effect of the MRTP specific 
to reasoning biases, not social anxiety. 
 4.3.4 Hypothesis four: it is expected that five sessions of the Maudsley Review 
Training Programme will result in a corresponding reduction in paranoia, compared to 
baseline.  Following visual inspection, six of twelve participants improved in GPTS scores, 
conviction or both (participants 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 & 9).  All participants maintained their gains at 
follow up.  All of these participants also had corresponding improved reasoning biases, 
attributed to the MRTP package.  Three participants who reported improved reasoning biases 
did not report corresponding improvement in paranoia attributed to the MRTP (participants 2, 
10 & 12).  Two of these did experience improved paranoia following the CBM-I package 
however.  Therefore, one participant (10) experienced improved reasoning biases but not 
paranoia.  These relationships will be discussed in greater detail below.   
 In terms of group analyses, the Friedman test indicated that paranoia changed 
significantly over the course of both package packages.  This was followed up by Wilcoxon 
tests using a Bonferroni correction.  Compared to time-point two, paranoia significantly 
reduced with the MRTP.  There were no differences in paranoia when both treatment phases 
were compared.  Reduction in paranoia was also maintained at follow up.  It appears that, in 
comparison to time-point two, the MRTP also significantly improved paranoia, with a 
moderate effect size. 
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4.3.5 The relationship between baseline characteristics and response.  Table 3.48 
above describes time-point one and two and baseline clinical characteristics of each 
participant.  However, as discussed above, there does not appear to be any strong relationship 
between levels of conviction, duration of difficulties, severity of social anxiety and/or 
paranoia and response to either package.   
4.3.6 The relationship between social anxiety, reasoning biases and paranoia.  
This study was also interested in determining the relationship between these mechanisms of 
persecutory delusions.  As outlined in table 3.47, eight out of twelve participants showed that 
an improvement in social anxiety and/or reasoning biases corresponded with improvement in 
paranoia (as measured by reduced GPTS scores and/or improved conviction).  Specifically, 
improvement in social anxiety following CBM-I also corresponded with improvement in 
paranoia following CBM-I in two cases (participants 4 & 5), not in one (participant 10).  
Improvement in reasoning biases following the MRTP also corresponded with improvement 
in paranoia following the MRTP in five cases (participants 2, 3, 8, 9, & 12).  In one case 
(participant 7), the CBM-I package improved GPTS scores and conviction, but not social 
anxiety.  The MRTP improved social anxiety, reasoning biases and also improved conviction.  
In two cases (participants 1 & 6), did no improvements in either social anxiety or reasoning 
biases correspond with no improvement in paranoia, thus supporting the idea that these 
constructs may be linked.  In one case (participant 10), there were improvements in both 
social anxiety and reasoning biases, but no corresponding improvement in paranoia.  In 
another case (participant 11), the opposite occurred, where there were no improvements in 
either social anxiety or reasoning biases but paranoia improved.  It is interesting that in some 
cases, there was overlap in improved GPTS scores and/or conviction, according to type of 
package (participants 4, 5 & 7).  This also suggests that change in social anxiety and/or 
reasoning biases interact with change in paranoia, perhaps in a dynamic, rather than linear 
fashion.  Overall, ten of twelve participants supported a relationship, two of twelve did not.   
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It is also interesting to note that the underpowered inferential statistics indicated 
differential effects of CBM-I on social anxiety and the MRTP on reasoning, with a 
corresponding reduction in paranoia that was almost identical (both in terms of significance 
and effect size) to each package.  This suggests that there is, to some extent, a relationship 
between these three clinical constructs, although it is difficult to clarify this any further.  
These findings suggest that the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) has been 
largely supported, in that reduction in social anxiety and/or reasoning biases will result in a 
reduction in paranoia. 
4.4 Theoretical implications 
 Although the findings should be interpreted with some caution, there are important 
theoretical implications based on this study. 
 4.4.1 Social anxiety.  Although bias modification by CBM-I was not measured, the 
results support previous findings that social anxiety is at least to some extent maintained by 
negative interpretative biases of socially ambiguous information that promote fear of negative 
evaluation (Clark & Beck, 2010).  Although not formally measured, previous research does 
suggest a link between interpretation bias and social anxiety symptoms and that CBM-I exerts 
moderate effect sizes in modifying these biases thereby reducing symptoms (Hallion & 
Ruscio, 2011).  Similar effects of CBM-I have been found in the psychosis literature also 
(e.g., Turner et al., 2011).  Therefore, we may be able to assume with reasonable confidence 
that similar mechanisms of change may have happened in the current study.  In keeping with 
information processing models of social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Beck, 2010), the participants 
who reported better engagement with CBM-I did tend to get more clinical benefit from it 
(participants 1, 2, 4, 5 & 10), although in some instances this benefit only trended towards a 
reliable reduction.  This may be due to increased engagement with the task material and 
greater likelihood to apply the positive interpretative modification to real-life scenarios, as 
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reported in the results chapter.  Conversely, those participants who did not find the CBM-I 
task helpful (participants 3, 6, 8, 9, 11 & 12) were those who tended to have a more negative 
experience with it, e.g., it being patronising or repetitive, as well as being less likely to apply 
a more positive interpretation in real-life situations.  Considered overall, the results show 
moderate yet limited support for information processing models of social anxiety. 
The MRTP did not appear to significantly improve social anxiety, with the exception 
of one case (participant 7).  This case is interesting, because improvement in social anxiety 
may have been secondary to decreased delusional conviction and paranoia, rather than direct 
effects on social anxiety alone.  This makes sense when the content of the delusion is 
considered; a belief that they would be beaten or killed by a member of the public, were they 
to go outdoors.  It also makes sense given that all measures (idiographic and standardised) 
improved dramatically following the first few sessions of the MRTP, which the participant 
was randomised to first receive.  If this explanation is the case, then the Threat Anticipation 
Model (Freeman, 2007) would be supported, as relevant mechanisms of paranoia interact 
under change.  However, the possibility that the MRTP may have directly acted on social 
anxiety can't be ruled out.  This instance is difficult to tease apart with this design. 
Other than in the above case, the MRTP did not have any significant effect on social 
anxiety, further supporting the idea that social anxiety and reasoning biases are qualitatively 
different, with different treatment profiles.  The theoretical implications of this will be 
discussed further in the next section. 
4.4.2 Interpretation biases and reasoning biases as distinct.  Although reasoning 
biases have repeatedly been shown to be specific to psychosis (Garety et al., 2005; Freeman, 
2007), the reason why they are specific has not been fully explained.  The results of the 
current study may indicate that reasoning biases and social anxiety have unique aetiology, 
given their differential susceptibility to change.  This fits with some of the initial literature on 
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reasoning biases, suggesting that they may be associated with neuropsychological problems, 
such as working memory (Broom et al., 2007; Garety et al., 2013).  Difficulties with working 
memory have been shown to be more specific to psychosis, rather than social anxiety, and 
have even been proposed as a potential endophenotype of psychosis (e.g., Wood et al., 2003).  
Given this finding, the techniques used in the MRTP would be better suited to improve data 
gathering biases, since the package encourages general strategies, empirically shown to 
improve working memory, such as slowing down before making a decision, breaking down 
the decision making process into more manageable parts, use of visual aids, and frequent 
summarising, which all promote consolidation of material into longer term memory 
(McNamara & Scott, 2001).  The results of the current study show a significant effect of the 
MRTP on improving reasoning biases within the sample – ten of twelve cases overall, with a 
moderate effect size. 
Although theoretical models have explained the causal and maintaining role 
interpretation biases can play in social anxiety (e.g., Clark & Beck, 2010), the aetiology of 
reasoning biases in psychosis and persecutory delusions is less clearly known at present 
(Freeman, 2007).  Also, there seem to be certain cognitive styles that overlap between 
psychosis and social anxiety, e.g., intolerance of uncertainty (Broome et al., 2007).  Due to 
further research into the aetiology of data gathering biases in psychosis being needed, in-
depth discussion on how they develop is beyond the scope of the present study.   
4.4.3 Support for the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007).  The second 
research question was whether or not both packages would improve paranoia.  The 
implication would be that improvements in social anxiety and/or reasoning biases would lead 
to improvements in persecutory delusions, paranoia and ideas of reference as measured by the 
full GPTS scores and conviction ratings.  As already outlined in previous sections, support 
was found for hypothesised improvements in paranoia by both the CBM-I and MRTP 
packages.  Furthermore, in eight out of twelve cases, support for improvements in social 
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anxiety and/or reasoning biases corresponding with improved paranoia was found.  In two 
cases, no improvement in either social anxiety, reasoning biases or paranoia was found, which 
does also support the model, as no change in either or both mechanisms corresponded with no 
change in paranoia.  In two cases, the results contradicted any relationship between social 
anxiety, reasoning biases and paranoia.  Considered together, the findings from the current 
study give moderate support to several hypotheses that the Threat Anticipation Model 
(Freeman, 2007) makes.   
(1) Can it be shown that psychological factors are causal in paranoid thinking 
(Freeman, 2007)?  One of the potential advantages of this study was the use of specific 
computerised treatments, aimed at discrete psychological styles of information processing, 
using an experimental prospective design.  With the exception of one or two cases that could 
be argued to have been spontaneously improving (participants 2 & 3), the design of this study 
established with reasonable confidence that symptoms were not on a natural path to recovery.  
Therefore, experimental manipulation of psychological factors (such as interpretation and 
reasoning biases) corresponding with reduction in delusional conviction and persecutory 
ideation may lead to the conclusion that they are causally related. 
(2) Do psychological factors interact in the development of paranoia (Freeman, 2007)?  
Overall improvement in social anxiety and/or reasoning biases with a corresponding reduction 
in paranoia suggests that these factors do interact in the development and maintenance of 
paranoia.  Some individual findings supporting this hypothesis include the fact that there was 
some overlap of effects within individual cases, e.g., CBM-I and the MRTP both had 
significant effects on conviction for participant 7.  While CBM-I reduced social anxiety and 
the MRTP improved reasoning biases in participants 4 and 5, both packages also reduced 
GPTS scores and conviction in a discrete manner (see table 3.47).  Similarly, the CBM-I 
package induced reliable change in GPTS scores of participant 11, followed by a dramatic 
 148 
 
reduction following the MRTP, which became clinically significant.  The gains were not 
maintained at follow up, but the results lend some support to the above hypothesis. 
(3) Do processes that maintain social anxiety also serve to maintain paranoid thoughts 
(Freeman, 2007)?  Supporting this research question is more difficult due to lack of 
interpretation bias measures; however, the results do indicate some potential relationship 
between this maintaining factor and paranoia.  The results of this study showed that in two 
cases where clinical and/or reliable change in social anxiety occurred following CBM-I, there 
was also a corresponding reduction in paranoia (participants 4 & 5).  It must be noted that in 
these two cases, improved reasoning biases occurred also, indicating lack of a clear, exclusive 
link between interpretation bias and paranoia.  Given the results, it appears that targeting 
interpretation bias and social anxiety alone might not have been enough to induce reduction in 
paranoia in many cases.  However, it is interesting to note that group effect sizes of CBM-I on 
social anxiety and paranoia were similar (T = 5, r = -0.51, p < .01 and T = 7, r = -0.51, p < 
.01, respectively).  Although not measured, bias modification may have occurred to an 
unknown extent across the sample, which may then have reduced social anxiety and so led to 
a reduction in paranoid thoughts.  There were also four out of twelve cases where the CBM-I 
package significantly improved delusional conviction rates, a dimensional aspect of paranoia 
directly related to threat from other people.  One possible explanation for this is that CBM-I 
may be acting on paranoia through a mechanism other than social anxiety, due to lack of 
improvement in social anxiety found.  Another more likely possibility is that use of 
clinical/reliable change was not sensitive enough to detect relationships between changes in 
social anxiety and paranoia – increased sample size may have allowed for greater powered 
analyses, e.g., mediation analysis to clarify the differential mediating roles of social anxiety 
and reasoning biases and their mediating effects on paranoia. 
 (4) Are threat beliefs most likely to become of delusional intensity when accompanied 
by data gathering biases such as JTC, or belief inflexibility (measured by EoE, PBM and 
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RTHC; Freeman, 2007)?  This study has also provided experimental evidence that improving 
reasoning biases led to a corresponding reduction in paranoia in six out of twelve cases 
(participants 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 & 9).  In two cases (participants 4 & 5), improvements with 
reasoning biases occurred alongside improved social anxiety and a corresponding reduction in 
paranoia.  In three cases (participants 2, 10 & 12) improved reasoning biases did not 
correspond with a reduction in paranoia.  Improved reasoning biases corresponding with 
improved ideas of reference, ideas of persecution and/or reduced delusional conviction do 
suggest that presence of reasoning biases exacerbates delusional severity.  Further initial 
support for this relationship may be found when considering those participants whose 
reasoning biases did not respond (participants 1, 6 & 11).  In two out of three cases 
(participants 1 & 6), neither GPTS scores nor delusional conviction improved.  In one case 
(participant 11), GPTS scores, not conviction improved and the GPTS scores returned to time-
points one and/or two clinical rate at follow up. 
4.5 Clinical implications 
The last research question asked by Freeman (2007; pp 452) is ‘can the developments 
in the understanding of paranoia be used to improve treatments?’  This question raises 
important ideas about how to develop clinical packages for persecutory delusions that the 
results of this study may be able address to some degree.  In the introduction, the limitations 
of treating heterogeneous clinical phenomena found in psychosis were discussed.  Potentially, 
the advantages of the single-symptom approach could be extended to tailored clinical 
packages depending on presentation.  A clear clinical advantage is how discrete the effects of 
both computerised packages have been shown to be in this study.  It indicates that 
mechanisms of change can be targeted relatively specifically and with a fair amount of 
confidence that secondary benefits in paranoia may ensue.  This study also suggests that 
different packages may be indicated, depending on how the individual presents during 
assessment. 
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The results of the current study, as well as other studies (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011, 
Waller et al., 2011) indicate that CBM-I and the MRTP may not exert clinical effects large 
enough to be used as the only means of input for individuals.  However, they might prove to 
be a useful adjunct to other evidence based packages, such as CBT for social anxiety (Clark & 
Beck, 2010) and/or CBT for paranoid thoughts (Freeman & Garety, 2006).  Use of the CBM-I 
scenarios may facilitate development of behavioural experiments, which may help to decrease 
isolation and begin processing of disconfirmatory information.  The individual may have also 
presented with some overt reasoning biases during assessment.  The MRTP may help the 
individual to practice some of the techniques as behavioural experiments, or between session 
tasks, in keeping with the scientific theme of inquiry of the tasks themselves. 
Use of computerised packages also departs from traditional CBT for psychosis in that 
much of the clinical activity does not involve the client talking about past experiences, or 
developing a formulation with the clinician.  This may be preferable for some people, who, 
for various reasons, may not wish to explore their past in great detail with another person.  
Although difficult to research and subject to debate, limited evidence suggests that some 
individuals with psychosis find the process of developing a formulation to not be helpful and 
to actually be distressing (e.g., Chadwick, Williams & MacKenzie, 2003).  A combination of 
some initial computerised sessions may also be helpful for individuals who are suspicious 
and/or anxious and may therefore be unwilling to engage with services in the initial stages of 
therapy.  As people make increased use of technology and computers in many areas of their 
lives (e.g., purchases, socialising, etc.), the idea of computerised therapy delivered at home 
gains merit and feasibility.  It also may be seen as an attractive option for NHS trusts that are 
continually striving for cost effectiveness and meeting increased demands with less financial 
resources. 
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4.6 Limitations of the study 
 4.6.1 Study design.  This study has several limitations.  Although single case series 
and multiple baseline designs are appropriate for initial clinical studies, there is debate about 
whether or not findings from these designs can be generalised back to the populations from 
which the samples came (Kazdin, 2010).  As this debate is still ongoing, and due to further 
limitations described below, it may be sensible to interpret the findings of this study with 
caution.   
Due to the repeated measures nature of single case series designs, study of more than 
one package becomes difficult, due to the potential for cross-over and interaction effects.  
This is particularly true for studies that use packages designed to induce lasting change in 
cognitive processes, such as CBM-I and the MRTP.  Although counterbalancing of treatment 
does control for this effect somewhat, the design itself suffers this disadvantage.  There may 
have been alternative study designs better able to address the hypotheses.  For example, a 
group experimental design may have been more appropriate, where one group were 
randomised to CBM-I and another group were randomised to the MRTP.  Using comparative 
statistics would probably have yielded clearer results, whereas using two different groups 
would have controlled better for cross-over effects and may potentially have measured 
differential effects more clearly.  Although ten of twelve participants’ changes on measures of 
social anxiety, reasoning biases and paranoia support a relationship between them, use of the 
above group design employing multiple regression statistics could perhaps more objectively 
clarify the relationship and the strength of the relationship between these mechanisms of 
persecutory delusions.  However, this must be balanced with the constraints of the time and 
resources allocated to the study, as well as the scope of the study itself, i.e., an initial test of 
theoretically driven hypotheses.  The single case series design has been shown to be a good 
design of initial exploration of hypotheses, which can pave the way for larger scale studies. 
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4.6.2 Discrepancy between idiographic and standardised ratings.  In several cases 
(participants 1, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10 & 11), the idiographic and standardised ratings of social anxiety 
and/or paranoia did not follow a similar trajectory.  This means that the improvement or 
deterioration of symptoms captured by the high frequency idiographic data did not reflect the 
scores obtained by the standardised measures.  Similarly, in several cases, the idiographic 
ratings did not reflect the severity of social anxiety and/or paranoia symptoms elicited using 
the standardised measures (i.e., in participants 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10 & 12).  In most cases, (with the 
exception of participant 5) the idiographic social anxiety and/or paranoia data reflected a more 
positive appraisal of symptoms than the score on their respective measures. 
 One potential explanation for this is the general nature of the idiographic measures, 
e.g., the daily measure of paranoia ‘Today, I am feeling under threat from others __%,’ may 
not have had direct relevance to the participants’ delusional content.  Another explanation 
may involve demand characteristics.  This idea refers to the experimental artefact from 
research participants being aware of what the researcher is investigating and changing their 
responses accordingly (Orne, 1962).  One particular feature of this that may be a relevant 
criticism of this study is the role of the ‘good subject,’ which Orne (1962) describes as 
research participants seeking to satisfy the perceived needs of the researcher.  This may 
explain why many of the idiographic ratings reported improved symptoms, when the 
standardised measures indicated stasis, or even decline.  It may also explain the discrepancy 
in severity of idiographic and standardised ratings, as in many cases, the idiographic ratings 
reflected less severity.   
One way that the current study differs from other studies using CBM-I is that the 
researcher visited the participants in person for every session, whereas other research has 
promoted delivery of sessions without the researcher present (e.g., through providing 
computers, or delivery via the internet; Salemink, Kindt, Rienties, & van den Hout, 2014).  
This means that the potential for the researcher to give cues about the intentions of the study 
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to the participants may have helped to foster a desire for the participants to help the researcher 
in their aims.  This can have negative consequences for the data, as they may become skewed 
in various ways, depending on what the participant believes the goal of the study is.  This has 
implications for interpretation of the results, and should always be borne in mind when studies 
are conducted interpersonally, as opposed to remotely, e.g., via the internet.   
Conversely, the idea that certain research participants were motivated to make a 
positive contribution to the study could be interpreted as helpful.  This indicates that at least a 
certain proportion, if not all of the participants were willing to engage with all of the 
assessments and multiple computer sessions fully.  Research does show that individuals who 
have positive expectations of therapy tend to receive the most benefit from it (the opposite has 
also been shown; that low expectations may result in poorer benefit; Constantino, Ametrano 
& Greenberg, 2012).   
Orne (1962) identifies some ways experimenters can mitigate demand characteristics.  
He notes that ‘considerable self-discipline’ is needed on the part of the investigator in order to 
obtain a valid inquiry.  There were some instances where the researcher tried to at least be 
uniform in the information given to all research participants.  For example, all research 
participants read the Participant Information Sheet and had the opportunity to question it with 
the researcher.  The researcher also made efforts to conceal the purpose of certain parts of the 
study, e.g., several research participants queried the purpose of the 85:15 and 60:40 beads 
tasks.  All participants were happy to continue with the tasks until after the follow up 
assessment (or after dropping out of the study, if they wished), when the purposes and 
hypotheses behind the tasks were explained and discussed.  Although Orne (1962) 
recommends deception as to the purpose of the study to avoid the participant working out 
what the hypotheses might be, this would have presented some ethical difficulties in the 
current study.  In striving for just the opposite (clarity as to the purpose of both computerised 
packages in the Participant Information Sheet without making the differential hypotheses or 
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their relationship to paranoia explicit), this study may have reduced attempts of participants to 
guess at differing hypotheses, which may have idiosyncratically skewed the data (Orne, 
1962).  Finally, another control was to use the idiographic data to inform the analyses, but to 
only attribute an effect if the standardised measures indicated this. 
 4.6.3 Interpretation bias.  As discussed in section 1.7, social anxiety is hypothesised 
to develop and be maintained by negative interpretative biases (Stopa & Clarke, 2000; 
Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000).  Many studies have examined the relationship between the 
effects of CBM-I on reducing interpretative biases and the relationship that bias modification 
has with anxiety symptoms (e.g., Salemink et al., 2014).  Not measuring interpretative biases 
and their relationship to social anxiety symptoms is a limitation of this study.  It was decided 
to assume that social anxiety symptoms would be, to some extent, explained by negative 
interpretative biases and that these biases and symptoms would be amenable to modification, 
in line with previous research in anxiety generally (e.g., Hallion & Ruscio, 2011) as well as 
research into social anxiety in psychosis (e.g., Turner et al., 2011).  Although three 
participants did not meet clinical levels of social anxiety symptoms, this does not mean that 
interpretation biases were not present in the sub-sample.  Much research indicates presence of 
interpretation biases in sub-clinical levels of anxiety (e.g., MacLeod & Cohen, 1993; Mogg et 
al., 1994; Richards & French, 1992).  It should also be noted that the research questions and 
hypotheses did have a different focus in this study; looking at differential effects of CBM-I, 
rather than replicating previous findings related to bias modification and symptom reduction. 
 4.6.4 Statistical analyses.  Although Harrington (2013) proposes using both visual 
inspection and inferential statistics to complement analysis, it must be re-iterated that all 
inferential tests were underpowered, and therefore their results must be interpreted with 
caution.  The primary method of analysis was that of visual inspection and clinical/reliable 
reductions, which did indicate mixed support for hypothesis one and modest support for all 
other hypotheses.  The fact that two analytical strategies, derived from different 
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methodological perspectives, seem to agree with one another may increase confidence in the 
findings, however it is probably sensible to interpret these findings with caution. 
 4.6.5 Anomalous experiences.  Anomalous experiences are the third mechanism of 
paranoia implicated within the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) and are likely to 
play an important role in the genesis of persecutory thinking, given some findings (e.g., 
Freeman, 2008).  However, perceptual anomalies are difficult to describe, to measure and to 
treat, given their phenomenology (Freeman, 2007).  Having said this, this study may have 
been improved by a third dimension of measuring and treating the distress associated with 
perceptual anomalies, and determining their relationship to reductions in paranoia. 
4.6.6 Qualitative observations.  Although it could be argued that including 
qualitative observations and comments by participants was very helpful for understanding the 
data and interpreting the results on a case-by-case basis, there were limitations with this 
approach also.  No theoretically-driven qualitative analysis strategy was used on the data, 
therefore it is possible that the included comments are misleading, biased, or skewed in other 
ways.  Having said this, the qualitative observations were primarily for informational 
purposes only; the primary analysis of the study was that of visual inspection and 
clinical/reliable change to determine effects of each package. 
4.7 Advantages of the study 
 Despite the weaknesses outlined above, this study also has several strengths.  One of 
the main criticisms of the case studies in the systematic literature review was lack of sufficient 
baseline length.  This study employed randomly allocated baseline lengths of either two or 
three weeks – without any treatment phase being longer in duration than the baseline, which is 
methodologically sound for interpretation of temporal changes (Kazdin, 2010).  A further 
strength of this design is that, although there is the potential for carry-over effects (which 
counterbalancing of treatment did address to some extent), it does still enable differential 
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effects to be explicitly tested.  For example, in some cases, reasoning biases did not improve 
until the MRTP was introduced, even after introduction of CBM-I, so we can be more certain 
that improvements in reasoning biases are attributed to the MRTP as opposed to generic 
therapeutic effects.   
Another weakness of many of the studies reviewed was lack of standardisation of 
treatment protocol.  The CBM-I package was delivered in identically the same way across all 
60 sessions, as described in the methods section.  Although the MRTP encourages discussion 
and participant feedback, the tasks are highly structured, with the result that many of the 
discussions took similar themes.  A further advantage was no participant drop out and no loss 
of data.  All individuals who consented to take part completed the study fully, including the 
one-month follow up assessment, which means that this study does not suffer from loss to 
follow up, like many research studies in psychosis.  Recent studies have shown that clinician 
involvement helps with engagement and outcome in self-help packages, (e.g., Cuijpers, 
Donker, van Straten, Li, & Andersson, 2010).  Therefore, although there are potential reasons 
as to why researcher involvement may be a disadvantage, there are also clear advantages for 
this approach. 
4.8 Further research 
 Although the findings are mixed, further research into the effects of both packages in 
individuals with psychosis is warranted.  This study identifies some potential further research 
questions.  Although some support has been found for a relationship between JTC and belief 
conviction for delusions of varying types (e.g., Garety et al., 2005), these findings (to the 
author’s knowledge) have not yet been replicated.  An experimental prospective design 
manipulating change in the JTC bias would help to clarify the relationship with belief 
conviction, and potentially other measures of paranoia.  The results may stimulate theoretical 
and clinical advances.  Larger group designs as described previously could test out more 
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complicated associations, such as how does social anxiety interact with reasoning biases on 
paranoia, and which mechanisms of change (if any) exert greater effect sizes on reduction of 
paranoia.  Alternative designs could include well powered RCTs using mediation analysis, 
e.g., manipulation of social anxiety symptoms using CBM-I may clarify the relationship 
between social anxiety and paranoia via a mediating variable, perhaps anomalous experiences, 
as the Threat Anticipation Model (Freeman, 2007) postulates.  Conversely, testing out 
moderating factors would also be beneficial, e.g., would other clinical problems common to 
psychosis (for instance, negative symptoms), mitigate the efficacy of the MRTP package on 
reasoning biases and therefore paranoia?  Studies such as this may help to refine the active 
components of these packages, as mentioned in the introduction, and improve their effects. 
 This study has replicated other literature on the clinical efficacy of CBM-I in reducing 
anxiety symptoms with small – moderate effect sizes (e.g., Hallion & Ruscio, 2011).  If 
further research is warranted in the application of CBM-I to samples with psychosis, then the 
next step may be to test out ways of increasing its efficacy.  This could be tested by trying 
different modalities, such as audio (e.g., Steel et al., 2010), or visual, as well as augmentation 
using behavioural components of treatment, such as in vitro computerised self-immersion or 
behavioural experiments, which have been found to be effective for psychosis (Hagen & 
Nordal, 2008).  Clinical research may also focus on the feasibility, tolerability and clinical 
gains made from incorporating the CBM-I and MRTP tasks into CBT for persecutory 
delusions, with a focus on such issues as using the tasks themselves as homework, or to 
generate behavioural experiments.  Larger group studies would also provide more data on the 
relationship between baseline clinical characteristics of participants, and response to the 
computer packages.  Addressing this important research question could result in tailoring the 
computer packages according to presentation, which would improve efficacy.  The 
applicability of these tasks in group therapeutic settings may be a further innovation.  Target 
samples could include other clinical groups, such as individuals who comply with command 
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hallucinations, or individuals experiencing a first episode psychosis.  Small-scale single case 
series designs may be adequate to test out hypotheses related to these potential clinical 
applications. 
4.9 Conclusion 
 In summary, despite some methodological limitations, this study indicated that 
multiple sessions of CBM-I selectively improved social anxiety, not reasoning biases, with a 
moderate effect size.  However, it must be noted that improvements were only significant 
using underpowered statistics across the sample, with only three participants experiencing 
reliable/clinical reduction.  This study also showed that the MRTP improved reasoning biases, 
but not social anxiety in eight out of twelve participants.  These findings suggest that social 
anxiety and reasoning biases may have aetiology unique from one another, although this study 
could not establish this for certain.  The results did indicate specificity of response to either 
treatment, which holds interesting theoretical and clinical implications.  Furthermore, the 
relationship between improved anxiety, improved reasoning biases and a corresponding 
improvement in paranoia suggests further support for the Threat Anticipation Model 
(Freeman, 2007).  Future research focusing on various clinical applications of these packages 
may help to improve their effectiveness and potentially increase the effectiveness of CBT for 
distressing psychotic symptoms. 
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Appendix 1 – Participant Information Sheet 
A study exploring the usefulness of computer packages designed to help 
with social anxiety and thinking style 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Invitation Paragraph 
You are being invited to take part in a research study.  Before you decide, it is important for 
you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve.  Please take time 
to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others or the researcher if you 
wish.  Please ask the researcher if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more 
information. 
 
Thank you for reading this. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
This study has two aims, which are explained here.   
 
1. Many people have worries about being harmed or upset by others.  These worries 
may make some people look at social situations in a way that increases their anxiety.  
One aim is to see if computer package A, known as cognitive bias modification for 
interpretation, helps to reduce social anxiety.   
 
2. People who experience worries about being harmed or upset by others may also find 
that they make hasty decisions in uncertain situations.  The second aim is to find out 
if computer package B, known as the Maudsley review training programme, helps to 
slow down any hasty decision making.   
 
The researchers are trying to find out if these two computer packages are useful for other 
people who experience similar worries about being harmed or upset by others.  To find this 
out, you will also be invited to take part in a short interview to talk about your experiences of 
using computer package A. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
The researcher is approaching people who have worries about being harmed or threatened 
in any way.   We would like to include you in this study if you are aged between 18-65 years 
and have experienced or are experiencing psychosis, and have current worries about being 
harmed or threatened by others.   As all of the materials used in this study are written in 
English, in order to take part participants will need to have sufficient English to be able to 
read and understand this information sheet.    
 
Unfortunately we cannot include everyone in this study.  People with a learning disability or 
who have significant problems with drugs and alcohol will not be asked to take part.  We are 
also not approaching people who are currently receiving psychological therapy.  People for 
this study were selected by talking to people working in care teams.  It is these people that 
will have first contacted you, to ensure your confidentiality.  There will be 12 participants 
selected in this way for the study. 
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If you are interested in taking part, you will have an initial meeting with the researcher to talk 
about your current worries and see whether the study is suitable for you. More detail about 
this is provided below. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part.  If you do decide to take part you will be 
given this information sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent form.  If you 
decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  A 
decision to withdraw at any time or a decision not to take part will not affect the care you 
receive in any way.  If you do withdraw, the data collected up until this point may still be 
used.   
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
If you express an interest in taking part, you will have an initial meeting with the researcher 
for about 30 minutes. During this meeting, the researcher will ask you about your current 
worries, how upsetting they are to you and how they are affecting you at the moment.  This 
is so that you and the researcher can find out if the study is suitable for you.  If it turns out 
that the study is not suitable, you will be thanked for your time and you will not take further 
part in the study.  If the study is suitable and you would like to take part, you will be asked to 
sign a consent form. You will then be asked to fill in some questionnaires for up to 3 weeks.  
After this you will meet again with the researcher to start the computer-based packages.   
 
Each step of the study will now be explained in more detail:  
 
Step 1: If you agree, you can meet or speak with the researcher who will ask about your 
current worries and see if the research is suitable for you.   
 
Step 2: If the study is not suitable, or you do not wish to take part, you will be thanked for 
your time and the study will finish. 
 
Step 3: If you decide to take part, the researcher will give you a consent form to sign and 
keep and a calendar with a timetable of the sessions and meetings marked on it, so you can 
see the overall plan.  Next, you will be asked to complete some short questionnaires, talk 
about your experiences and complete some computerised tasks.  You will then be given a 
length of time which will be either two or three weeks.  During this time you will be asked to 
complete three ratings, once a day.  These ratings will be given to you in a booklet that you 
can keep during the study time, like a diary.  If you would like, the researcher can contact 
you to remind you to fill these in.   
 
Step 4: Once the time period is over, the researcher will arrange to meet with you again.  
Together, you will complete the same measures that you did at the start, including the 
computerised tasks.  The researcher will then arrange to visit you once every 3 days, to 
complete each computer package with you.  You will start with five sessions of computer 
package A, followed by five sessions of computer package B, or vice versa.  This means you 
will complete ten sessions in total, about one every three days.  The dates and times of 
these sessions can be arranged to best suit you.   
 
Step 5: After 5 sessions, the researcher will go through the same measures you did at the 
beginning of the study (the same as Step 3).   
 
Step 6: After 10 sessions, the same interview and measures will be completed again (like in 
Step 5).  Once this is finished, the researcher will arrange a time to meet with you one month 
later.   
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Step 7: During the one-month follow up period, you do not need to do anything, but can 
record any questions or comments for your follow up meeting if you wish.   
 
Step 8: After one month, the researcher will complete the questionnaires, interview and 
computerised tasks with you for the final time (same as Step 3).  The researcher will also 
ask for your opinion on using computer programme A to see what your experiences of it 
were like.  This interview will be tape recorded.  It will be used to explore your experiences of 
using computer programme A and what you thought about it.  You do not have to take part in 
this interview if you don’t want to.  The interview will last about 30 minutes.  All of the 
information will be kept secure.   
 
Step 9: You will be thanked for your time and a monetary token of £10 will be given to you. 
 
Participation in this research will last between eleven to twelve weeks, but there will be some 
long periods during this time when you will not need to do anything.  The researcher can 
explain anything you want to ask about, anytime.   
 
What is the therapy being tested? 
This study is testing two types of computer-based therapeutic interventions.   
 
Computer package A presents you with different stories about social activities and gives you 
the opportunity to practice different ways of thinking about the situations.  You need to read 
the story and fill in the missing letter from the last word of the story.  You will then be asked a 
question about the story, before moving on to the next story.  Here is one example:  
 
You arrange to have coffee with your friend.  She arrives late and rushes into the café.  She 
explains that she had found it difficult to find somewhere to [word presented with missing 
letter: p-rk].  [Correct word: park].  [Missing letter: a].Did you meet your friend in a café? 
[Correct response: Yes]. 
 
Computer package B shows you pictures and short videos of everyday events, such as 
sitting in a cafe, and asks you what you think about them.  It breaks down the processes of 
how we make decisions about things.  It explains how everybody jumps to conclusions about 
their decisions from time to time, because jumping to conclusions can be helpful, but 
sometimes it’s hard to come to the right decision, without all the information.   There are a 
few different exercises and videos to practice these ideas. 
 
Expenses and payments 
As a thank you for taking part in this study, you will be offered £10 at the completion of the 
study.  Unfortunately, the researcher will not be able to reimburse your travel costs; 
however, all visits can be conducted at a location suitable for you, including your own home 
if you wish.   
 
What will I have to do?  
If you like, you could think about whether you would be interested in taking part.  If you 
would like to talk about this informally, please feel free to contact the researcher using the 
information below.  If you prefer, you could wait a few days and the researcher will try to get 
in touch with you, by telephone if possible.   
 
At different points in time you will be asked to fill in some questionnaires, so that your 
progress can be monitored.   During the therapy sessions, the researcher will talk to you 
about various way of thinking about your anxiety and guide you through a series of exercises 
on a computer. 
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We may wish to tape record some of your sessions with the researcher.  This will be so that 
we can have a record of your experience of being involved in this study so that we can use 
this information to improve services for other people who have had similar experiences to 
you.  However, if you do not feel comfortable with this, this will not happen.  If you do agree 
to this, the tapes will be transcribed by a member of the research team and you will have the 
opportunity to read this transcription to make sure it is a true reflection of what was 
discussed.  The tapes will be stored in a locked filing cabinet and destroyed at the end of the 
study. 
 
 
What are the alternatives for treatment? 
Alternative treatments than the ones being looked at in this study can be other talking 
therapies, such cognitive behavioural therapy.  This therapy looks at how our thoughts, 
feelings and behaviours can influence how we feel about certain worries, and is available on 
the NHS.  If you would like more information on this, please contact the researcher, using 
the information below. 
  
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
The aim of computer package A is to help people to feel less worried and stressed about 
social situations.  The aim of computer package B is also to help people gather more 
evidence about uncertain situations, which can help increase their confidence in the decision 
they have made about those situations.   
 
We hope that these packages will help you.  The information we get from this study may 
help us develop packages for others who experience social anxiety and worries.    
 
What happens when the research study stops? 
When the research study finishes, you will receive normal care from the service you have 
already been in contact with, or that referred you to this research.  If you chose to delay any 
other treatment until the study ended, the service offering this will be in contact with you.   
 
What if there is a problem? 
Your care co-ordinator will know how you are getting on with the study.  In the unlikely event 
that you are upset by taking part in any research project, there are no special compensation 
arrangements.  If you are harmed by someone’s negligence you may have grounds for legal 
action but you may have to pay for it.  Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have 
any concerns about any aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the 
course of the study, the normal National Health Service complaints procedure is available to 
you.   
 
In the event that you become distressed while participating in this research, please contact 
the researcher, your GP services or primary care contact.  If this is outside of normal working 
hours please contact your out of hours GP service, NHS direct (0845 4647) or the 
Samaritans (08457 90 90 90).   
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?  
Yes - all information that is collected about you during the course of the research will be kept 
strictly confidential.  If the researcher is worried about risk to yourself or others during the 
course of the research then some information may need to be disclosed to relevant persons.  
This would be discussed with you first. 
 
If you consent, the researcher will inform your GP and the team responsible for your care 
about your involvement in the study.  The researcher will send them a very brief summary of 
the assessment, unless you do not wish them to do so.  Research supervisors at the 
University of East Anglia may look at data connected to this study.   
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Involvement of the General Practitioner/Family Doctor (GP) 
If you agree, a letter informing your GP about your involvement in this study will be sent.  
This is not necessary however, and if you would prefer that a letter is not sent, it will not be.  
Your consent to send a letter will be on the consent form. 
 
Where and how long will records be stored? 
Data will be stored in locked cabinets in local health care or university premises.  It will be 
kept for ten years after the completion of the study and then destroyed.   
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be reported as anonymous data.  The study will be seen by 
colleagues and supervisors at the University of East Anglia, and other members of the 
research team.  Results may also become available more publicly if the research is 
published, however no identifiable material will be published.   
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The study has been designed by James Hurley (Trainee Clinical Psychologist at the 
University of East Anglia), and his research supervisors.  The research is being carried out 
as part of training for a Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been considered and approved by the NHS Research Ethics Committee.  
The research has also been reviewed and approved by the University of East Anglia.   
 
Contact for further information: 
If you would like any more information about the study or need to contact the researcher, 
please feel free to contact James Hurley (Trainee Clinical Psychologist): 
 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
University of East Anglia 
Elizabeth Fry Building 
Norwich 
Norfolk 
NR4 7TJ 
 
Tel: 07585203167 
Email: james.hurley@uea.ac.uk 
 
Alternatively, you could contact 
Dr Jo Hodgekins 
Clinical Lecturer 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
Department of Clinical Psychology 
Norwich Medical School 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich 
NR4 7TJ 
 
Tel: +44 (0)1603 59 1890 
Email: j.hodgekins@uea.ac.uk 
 
For independent advice on participating in research, you can also contact your local Patient 
Advice and Liaison Service (PALS) at NSFT, Drayton High Road, Hellesdon, NR6 5BE or 
telephone 01603 421421.
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Appendix 2 – Participant Information Sheet Cover Letter 
 
 
 
Mr James Hurley, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
University of East Anglia 
Elizabeth Fry Building 
Norwich 
Norfolk 
NR4 7TJ 
 
Tel: XXXXXXXXXXX 
Email: james.hurley@uea.ac.uk 
[Participant Name] 
[Participant Address] 
 
[Date] 
 
Dear [Participant Name], 
 
Re: A study exploring the usefulness of computer packages designed to help with social anxiety and 
thinking style 
 
I am writing to invite you to take part in a research study being conducted as part of my clinical psychology 
training at the University of East Anglia. I received your name, address and telephone number from 
[Contact Name and Position] who has already spoken to you briefly about taking part in this study. 
 
Please find enclosed a participant information sheet, which explains the study and what would be involved 
for you if you decide to take part. 
 
Your participation in this study would be greatly appreciated. 
 
If you have any questions or would like to discuss any aspects of the research study, please do not hesitate 
to contact me. I will be contacting you by telephone in a few days to see if you might be interested. 
 
Best wishes, 
 
 
__________________ 
 
James Hurley 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
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Appendix 3 – Informed Consent Form 
Centre Number: 
 
Study Number: 
 
Participant Identification Number for this study:  
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: A study exploring the usefulness of computer packages designed to help with social anxiety 
and thinking style 
 
Name of Researcher: James Hurley  
                                               Please initial box 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 16/07/13 
(version 3) for the above study. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily.                
              
                                                                                                                                  
2. I understand that participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights being 
affected.        
                                                                                                                                    
 
3. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected during 
the study may be looked at by the researcher, from regulatory authorities or from 
the NHS trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this research. I give 
permission for these individuals to have access to my records. 
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4. If I withdraw/am withdrawn from the study, I am willing for information that I have 
provided during the course of the study to be used for research purposes, as 
stated in the information sheet dated 16/07/13 (version 3). 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 
5. I agree to my GP and care team/clinician involved in my care to be informed of 
my participation and completion of this project, and for assessment information to 
be shared with my GP and care team.          
                       
                                                                                              
6. I give my consent for a qualitative semi-structured interview and for a recording 
of this to be made. I understand that this is for the purposes of transcribing 
information, and that any person hearing the tape(s) will sign a declaration of 
confidentiality and that recordings will be stored under locked conditions.  
                                                                                                                                  
 
7. I agree to take part in the above study.                                          
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Participant Date Signature 
 
 
_________________________ ________________ ____________________ 
Name of Person taking consent Date Signature 
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Appendix 4 – Copies of all measures to be used 
CHORD       SUPERFLUOUS 
ACHE       SIMILE 
DEPOT       BANAL 
AISLE       QUADRUPED 
BOUQUET      CELLIST 
PSALM       FAÇADE 
CAPON       ZEALOT 
DENY       DRACHM 
NAUSEA      AEON 
DEBT       PLACEBO 
COURTEOUS      ABSTEMIOUS 
RAREFY       DÉTENTE 
EQUIVOCAL      IDYLL 
NAÏVE       PUERPERAL 
CATACOMB      AVER 
GAOLED      GAUCHE 
THYME       TOPIARY 
HEIR       LEVIATHAN 
RADIX       BEATIFY 
ASSIGNATE      PRELATE 
HIATUS       SIDEREAL 
SUBTLE       DEMESNE 
PROCREATE      SYNCOPE 
GIST       LABILE 
GOUGE       CAMPANILE    
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Appendix 4 - Measures 
PSYRATS PART B Delusions 
1 Amount of preoccupation with delusions 
0 No delusions, or delusions which the subject thinks about less than once a week 
1 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once a week 
2 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once a day 
3 Subject thinks about beliefs at least once an hour 
4 Subject thinks about delusions continuously or almost continuously 
2 Duration of preoccupation with delusions 
0 No delusions 
1 Thoughts about beliefs last for a few seconds, e.g. fleeting thoughts 
2 Thoughts about delusions last for several minutes 
3 Thoughts about delusions last for at least 1 hour 
4 Thoughts about delusions usually last for hours at a time 
3 Conviction 
0 No conviction at all 
1 Very little conviction in reality of beliefs, <10% 
2 Some doubts relating to conviction in beliefs, between 10-49% 
3 Conviction in belief is very strong, between 50-99% 
4 Conviction is 100% 
4 Amount of distress 
0 Beliefs never cause distress 
1 Beliefs cause distress on the minority of occasions 
2 Beliefs cause distress on <50% of occasions 
3 Beliefs cause distress on the majority of occasions when they occur between 50-99% of 
time 
4 Beliefs always cause distress when they occur 
5 Intensity of distress 
0 No distress 
1 Beliefs cause slight distress 
2 Beliefs cause moderate distress 
3 Beliefs cause marked distress 
4 Beliefs cause extreme distress, could not be worse 
6 Disruption to life caused by beliefs 
0 No disruption to life, able to maintain independent living with no problems in daily living 
skills. Able to maintain social and family relationships (if present). 
1 Beliefs cause minimal amount of disruption to life, e.g. interferes with concentration 
although able to maintain daytime activity and social and family relationships and be able to 
maintain independent living without support 
2 Beliefs cause moderate amount of disruption to life causing some disturbance to daytime 
activity and/or family or social activities. The patient is not in hospital although may live in 
supported accommodation or receive additional help with daily living skills 
3 Beliefs cause severe disruption to life so that hospitalisation is usually necessary. The 
patient is able to maintain some daily activities, self-care and relationships while in hospital. 
The patient may be also be in supported accommodation but experiencing severe disruption 
of life in terms of activities, daily living skills and/or relationships 4 Beliefs cause complete 
disruption of daily life requiring hospitalization. The patient is unable to maintain any daily 
activities and social relationships. Self-care is also severely disrupted 
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Appendix 4 - Measures 
Explanations of Experiences 
 
We’ve talked a bit about the things that led you to conclude…………You talked about…………that 
happened at the start and…………that has happened since. Asking you to think about it now can you 
think of any other explanations for the experiences that you have described? Are there any other 
reasons—other than…………that could possibly account for these experiences even if you think they 
are very unlikely? 
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Appendix 4 - Measures 
 
Explanations of Experiences 
 
Are there any other reasons that could possibly account for your experiences even if you think they 
are very unlikely? 
 
Explanation 1: 
 
How much do you believe this is true? 
   0 – 100% 
How much does this explanation upset you? 
0 – 100% 
 
Explanation 2: 
 
How much do you believe this is true? 
   0 – 100% 
How much does this explanation upset you? 
0 – 100% 
 
Explanation 3: 
 
How much do you believe this is true? 
   0 – 100% 
How much does this explanation upset you? 
0 – 100% 
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Appendix 4 - Measures 
 
JTC 
 
Ok, we’re now going to do a task using my laptop.  Do JTC. 
 
 
 
Trial 1 
 
• Correct/Incorrect 
• Number of beads taken………… 
 
Trial 2 
 
• Correct/Incorrect 
• Number of beads taken………… 
 
REFER TO REFERENCE BOOKLET OF SLIDES TO KEEP TRACK. 
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Appendix 4 - Measures 
Belief Ratings Scale 
 
So, still thinking about your worries that………… (state belief and write below, if reminder needed): 
 
Please rate how you have been feeling over the last week about ………… by rating from 0-100% 
 
_____________% 
 
Ask the first item, How much do you believe this is true? (How much do you believe it right now, not 
how much is it happening right now) and rate.  
 
Then ask: 
 
When you think about it now, is it at all possible that you are mistaken about this? 
 
 
 
Hesitant: Yes/No 
 
Write down the person’s response, and whether they hesitate, then ask to fill in visual analogue scale 
as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
Let me suggest something to you – something that does not fit with your view and you could tell me 
how you think you would react right now.  
 
Suggestion: 
 
 
 
 
 
Response: 
 
 
 
 
 
RTHC -  Ignores or rejects  3 
 Accommodates 2 
 Changes conviction 1 
 Dismisses belief 0 
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Appendix 4 - Measures 
Green et al. Paranoid Thought Scales 
 
Participant Code:________________    Date:________________ 
 
Please read each of the statements carefully. 
They refer to thoughts and feelings you may have had about others over the last month. 
Think about the last month and indicate the extent of these feelings from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Totally). 
Please complete both Part A and Part B. 
 
(N.B. Please do not rate items according to any experiences you may have had under the influence of 
drugs.) 
 
Part A 
 
Item 
No Item 
Not at 
all  
Somew
hat  Totally 
1 I spent time thinking about friends gossiping about me 1 2 3 4 5 
2 
I often heard people referring to me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 I have been upset by friends and colleagues judging me 
critically 1 2 3 4 5 
4 People definitely laughed at me behind my back 1 2 3 4 5 
5 I have been thinking a lot about people avoiding me 1 2 3 4 5 
6 
People have been dropping hints for me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 I believed that certain people were not what they 
seemed 1 2 3 4 5 
8 People talking about me behind my back upset me 1 2 3 4 5 
9 I was convinced that people were singling me out 1 2 3 4 5 
10 
I was certain that people have followed me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
11 Certain people were hostile towards me personally 1 2 3 4 5 
12 
People have been checking up on me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
13 I was stressed out by people watching me 1 2 3 4 5 
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14 
I was frustrated by people laughing at me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
15 I was worried by people’s undue interest in me 1 2 3 4 5 
16 It was hard to stop thinking about people talking about 
me behind my back 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part B 
 
Item 
No Item 
Not at 
all  
Somew
hat  Totally 
1 
Certain individuals have had it in for me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
I have definitely been persecuted 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 
People have intended me harm 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 People wanted me to feel threatened, so they stared at 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 I was sure certain people did things in order to annoy 
me 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 I was convinced there was a conspiracy against me 1 2 3 4 5 
7 
I was sure someone wanted to hurt me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 I was distressed by people wanting to harm me in some 
way 1 2 3 4 5 
9 I was preoccupied with thoughts of people trying to 
upset me deliberately 1 2 3 4 5 
10 I couldn’t stop thinking about people wanting to 
confuse me 1 2 3 4 5 
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11 
I was distressed by being persecuted 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
12 I was annoyed because others wanted to deliberately 
upset me 1 2 3 4 5 
13 The thought that people were persecuting me played on 
my mind 1 2 3 4 5 
14 It was difficult to stop thinking about people wanting to 
make me feel bad 1 2 3 4 5 
15 People have been hostile towards me on purpose 1 2 3 4 5 
16 
I was angry that someone wanted to hurt me 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix 4 - measures 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale 
Instructions 
In this section, for each item, please circle the number to indicate the degree to which you feel the 
statement is characteristic or true for you. The rating scale is as follows: 
   0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me. 
   1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me. 
   2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me. 
   3 = Very characteristic or true of me. 
   4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me 
 
Characteristic 
Not at 
all 
Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
01. I get nervous if I have to speak with 
someone in authority (teacher, boss). 
0 1 2 3 4 
02. I have difficulty making eye contact with 
others. 
0 1 2 3 4 
03. I become tense if I have to talk about 
myself or my feelings. 
0 1 2 3 4 
04. I find it difficult to mix comfortably with 
the people I work with. 
0 1 2 3 4 
05. I find it easy to make friends my own age. 0 1 2 3 4 
06. I tense up if I meet an acquaintance in the 
street. 
0 1 2 3 4 
07. When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 0 1 2 3 4 
08. I feel tense when I am alone with just one 
person. 
0 1 2 3 4 
09. I am at ease meeting people at parties, etc. 0 1 2 3 4 
10. I have difficulty talking with other people. 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I find it easy to think of things to talk 
about. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12. I worry about expressing myself in case I 
appear awkward. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13. I find it difficult to disagree with another’s 
point of view. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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(continued) 
 
 Characteristic Not at all Slightly Moderately Very Extremely 
14. I have difficulty talking to 
attractive persons of the 
opposite sex. 
0 1 2 3 4 
15. I find myself worrying that I 
won’t know what to say in 
social situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16. I am nervous mixing with 
people I don’t know well. 
0 1 2 3 4 
17. I feel I’ll say something 
embarrassing when talking. 
0 1 2 3 4 
18. When mixing in a group, I find 
myself worrying I will be 
ignored. 
0 1 2 3 4 
19. I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
20. I am unsure whether to greet 
someone I know only slightly. 
0 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix 5 – Idiographic Measures of anxiety, paranoia and conviction 
Daily measures of anxiety, worry and belief certainty 
 
For a, b and c, please pick any percentage (0-100%) which best describes how you are 
feeling. Use the examples below as a guide and write down a percentage in each space, 
e.g. 53%. 
 
A. Today, I am feeling ______________% socially anxious 
   0% = Not at all socially anxious 
   25% = Somewhat socially anxious 
   50% = Moderately socially anxious 
   75% = Very socially anxious 
   100% = Extremely socially anxious 
 
B. Today, I am feeling under threat from others: _____________% 
0% = Not at all  
   25% = Somewhat  
   50% = Moderately  
   75% = Very  
   100% = Absolutely  
 
C. Thinking about your main worry, how much do you believe it is true? ______% 
0% = Not at all  
   25% = Somewhat  
   50% = Moderately  
   75% = Very  
   100% = Absolutely 
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Appendix 6 – examples of CBM-I scenarios developed by Turner et al. (2011) 
 
 You arrange to have coffee with your friend. She arrives late and rushes into the café. 
She explains that she had found it difficult to find somewhere to [word presented with 
missing letter: p-rk]. [Correct word: park]. [Missing letter: a].Did you meet your friend in a 
café? [Correct response: Yes]. 
 You plant some tomato seeds. After a couple of weeks the seedlings start to grow. In 
the summer you will be able to have home grown tomatoes in your [word presented with 
missing letters: s—ad}. [Correct word: salad].  [Missing letters: al]. Did your tomato plants 
grow? [Correct response: Yes]. 
 You watch a comedian on the television. Some of their jokes are not very funny. You 
decide to find something else to watch, and so you change [word presented with missing 
letters: c-an-el]. [Correct word: channel]. [Missing letters: h, n]. Was the comedian funny? 
[Correct response: No]. 
You arrange to have coffee with your friend. She arrives late and rushes into the café. 
She explains that she had found it difficult to find somewhere to [word presented with 
missing letter: p-rk]. [Correct word: park]. [Missing letter: a].Did you meet your friend in a 
café? [Correct response: Yes]. 
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Appendix 7 – synopses of the Maudsley Review Training Programme, Waller et al., 
2011 
Task 1: ‘What’s the Picture?’ 
 This task introduces the idea that it can be difficult to come to an informed decision 
without all of the evidence. This teaches participants to look for more evidence before 
making a decision. 
Task 2: ‘illusions.’ 
This introduces the idea that things are not always as they first seem and that 
sometimes we only see part of the story, which can lead us to jump to conclusions and make 
mistakes. A series of optical illusions are presented, which helps to illustrate this. 
Task 3: ‘first impressions’ 
 This task gives 3 real life examples in video vignettes of scenarios. Participants are 
asked to rate what they believe is going on at early stages of the scenarios, which illustrates 
how we can all make incorrect assumptions, if we do not slow down and gather all the 
necessary evidence. 
Task 4: ‘looking for other possible explanations.’ 
 This introduces the idea of thinking flexibly about alternative explanations before 
reaching a conclusion. 3 video vignettes are shown, each with the option of positive, neutral 
or paranoid interpretation. Participants are encouraged at various points to use the interactive 
software to interpret the scenario as they see fit, with a debrief after the end of each vignette, 
depending on their interpretation. 
Task 5: ‘JTC summary’ 
 This final task is aimed at being somewhat light-hearted, allowing review of the key 
learning points throughout the tasks. Participants are shown 4 video scenarios, involving 
characters who jump to conclusions. They are encouraged to identify who the characters that 
jump to conclusions will be. Finally, they are asked about how the characters might have 
avoided the situations they got themselves into, by not jumping to conclusions. 
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Appendix 8 – Pilot Interview Schedule (adapted from Bendelin & Dahl, 2011) 
 
General opinion 
 
Description 
How would you describe the treatment you’ve been through? 
Please tell me what you did in the treatment? 
 
Attitude 
How did you experience this treatment? 
How has your life changed as a result of the treatment? 
If you were in the position to modify this treatment program based on your experiences of it, what 
would you choose to change, withdraw or add? 
Please tell me your view of computerised therapy. 
 
The accomplishment of the treatment 
 
Surroundings, time plan, structure of work, privacy-openness,  
How did you complete the treatment? 
How did others in your life find the treatment? 
Did the treatment lead to any practical changes in your everyday life? 
Is there any part of the material that you particularly remember? 
 
Efficient mechanisms, reinforcement  
What parts of the treatment were most important to you? 
Did you find any parts troublesome? Describe these please. 
Did you find your anxiety improving? What do you think improved your anxiety? 
 
Motivation, resistance, ambivalence, doubts 
What motivated you during the treatment? 
Did you have any doubts throughout the treatment time? 
 
Processes of change, key moments, problem situations, time 
Was there a certain point in the treatment when you felt things were changing for you? Can you 
describe this? 
Were there any moments of difficulty during treatment where you felt that nothing was happening 
in the treatment? Can you please describe this? 
To what extent could you yourself decide about the pace of the treatment? 
 
 After the treatment  
 
Experiences at the end of treatment, hopes 
How did you feel when the treatment was over? 
How did you find the treatment before you entered it and now afterwards? 
 
Power, attribution of results 
What was your view on your problem before entering treatment? 
What is the reason for how you feel today? 
Has your view on your difficulties changed in any way? 
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General opinion, recommendation 
Do you feel that this treatment has helped you? In what way has this treatment helped you? 
 
Life ahead 
How has life been since the treatment? 
Do you have any other thoughts about going through this that you would like to share? 
How has it been like to do this interview? 
Is there anything you’d like to ask me? 
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Appendix 9 –Letter to care coordinator/GP 
 
 
 
Mr James Hurley, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
University of East Anglia 
Elizabeth Fry Building 
Norwich 
Norfolk 
NR4 7TJ 
 
Tel: XXXXXXXXXXX 
Email: james.hurley@uea.ac.uk 
 
 
[Clinician Name] 
[Clinician Address] 
 
[Date] 
 
Dear [Clinician Name], 
 
Re: A study exploring the usefulness of computer packages designed to help with social anxiety 
and thinking style 
 
I am writing to confirm that your client/patient Mr/Ms XXXXXX has given informed consent (see copy 
of the consent form) to participate in the above research programme.  
 
Please find enclosed a participant information sheet, which explains the study and what would be 
involved for Mr/Ms XXXXXXXX. 
 
Upon completion of the project, I will send another letter to you summarising what Mr/Ms XXXXXXX 
participated in. 
 
If you have any questions or would like to discuss any aspects of the research study, please do not 
hesitate to contact me.  
 
Best wishes, 
 
 
__________________ 
 
James Hurley 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
 
Cc GP 
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Appendix 10: Screenshot of the MRTP (Waller et al., 
2011).
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Appendix 11 – REC Letter of Approval 
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Appendix 12 – NSFT R&D Letter of Access 
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